Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Are moderate laws more effective than extreme ones in changing unfair customs?

许多发展中国家的决策者试图通过引入进步的法律来改变不公平和效率低下的社会规范。有时，这些法律在与这些法律相冲突的规范面前是无效的;其他时候，这些法律能够通过使规范更接近法律来改变规范。了解是什么使法律有效地改变社会规范，对于制定更好的法律至关重要。发展经济学和法律的文献假设，温和的法律比激进的法律更有效地引发行为变化。 然而，法律与主流社会规范的距离对法律效力的因果影响尚未在文献中探讨。 这项研究通过实验研究了温和的法律是否比激进的法律更有可能改变不公平的社会规范。在这个实验中，历史上贫困和弱势群体的高种姓和低种姓的个人在印度将被雇用为实验的对象。受试者将被允许在实验中创建自己的规范，并将根据治疗情况暴露于温和的法律或激进的法律。这项研究的结果对政策的制定和执行以及执法具有重要意义。“独裁者游戏”将被用作实验的主要工具。在独裁者博弈中，第一个参与者，“独裁者”，决定如何在自己和另一个人，“接受者”之间分配她的捐赠。每个高种姓的人将被指定为“独裁者”，低种姓的人将被指定为“接受者”。一群独裁者将在实验中通过讨论如何在自己和接受者之间分配捐赠来创建规范。在小组同意将适当的金额发送给他们匹配的接受者之后，每个独裁者将决定如何在自己和匹配的接受者之间分配她的捐赠。将有两种组间治疗条件：中度和激进的法律条件。温和（激进）的法律将要求独裁者发送最低（高）金额。这些法律将伴随着一个小的非威慑性制裁。这个实验将揭示个体的行为，对他人行为的信念以及对他人认为适当的行为的信念如何随着规范的创造和不同法律的引入而变化。

AbstractPolicy makers in many developing countries attempt to change unfair and inefficient social norms by introducing progressive laws. Sometimes these laws are ineffective in the presence of norms that conflict with these laws; other times these laws are able to change the norms by drawing them closer to the law. Understanding what makes a law effective in changing social norms is essential to crafting better laws. The development economics and legal literature hypothesize that moderate laws are more effective than radical ones in initiating behavioral change. However, the causal effect of the distance of a law from a prevailing social norm on the effectiveness of the law has not been explored in the literature. This study experimentally investigates if a moderate law is more likely than a radical one to change unfair social norms. In this experiment, historically advantaged and disadvantaged groups of high-caste and low-caste individuals in India will be employed as subjects in the experiment. The subjects will be allowed to create their own norms within the experiment and will be exposed to either a moderate law or a radical law depending on the treatment. The results of this research has important implications for policy development and implementation as well as law enforcement. "Dictator games" will be used as a major tool in the experiment. In a dictator game, the first player, "the dictator", decides how she wants to split her endowments between herself and another person, "the recipient". Each high-caste individual will be assigned the role of a "dictator" and low-caste individual will be assigned the role of a "recipient". A group of dictators will create norms within the experiment by discussing among themselves how each of them should divide endowments between oneself and a recipient. After the group agrees upon the appropriate amount to be sent to their matched recipients, each dictator will make a decision about how to divide her endowment between herself and a matched recipient. There will be two between-group treatment conditions: a moderate and a radical law condition. The moderate (radical) law will require the dictators to send a minimum of a low (high) amount. These laws will be accompanied with a small non-deterrent sanction. This experiment will shed light on how individuals' behavior, beliefs about others' actions and beliefs about what others consider as appropriate behavior change with norm creation and introduction of different laws.