Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Are moderate laws more effective than extreme ones in changing unfair customs?

摘要许多发展中国家的政策制定者试图通过引入进步的法律来改变不公平和低效的社会规范。有时，这些法律在存在与这些法律相冲突的规范时是无效的；其他时候，这些法律能够通过使它们更接近法律来改变规范。理解是什么使一项法律在改变社会规范方面有效，对于制定更好的法律至关重要。发展经济学和法律文献假设，温和的法律在启动行为改变方面比激进的法律更有效。然而，法律与普遍的社会规范的距离对法律效力的因果影响在文献中还没有被探索过。这项研究通过实验调查了温和的法律是否比激进的法律更有可能改变不公平的社会规范。在这项实验中，印度历史上处于优势和不利地位的高种姓和低种姓个人群体将作为实验的对象。受试者将被允许在实验中创建自己的规范，并将根据治疗方式接受温和或激进的法律。这项研究的结果对政策的制定和执行以及执法具有重要意义。“独裁者游戏”将被用作实验的主要工具。在独裁者游戏中，第一个玩家“独裁者”决定她想要如何在自己和另一个人“接受者”之间分配她的捐赠。每个高种姓的人都将被赋予“独裁者”的角色，而低种姓的个人将被赋予“接受者”的角色。一群独裁者将在实验中建立规范，他们之间将讨论如何在自己和接受者之间分配捐赠。在该组织就发送给匹配的接受者的适当金额达成一致后，每个独裁者将决定如何在她自己和匹配的接受者之间分配她的捐赠。将有两种组间治疗条件：温和和激进的法律条件。温和(激进)的法律将要求独裁者发送最低(高)金额。这些法律将伴随着一项小型的非威慑制裁。这项实验将阐明，随着规范的建立和不同法律的引入，个人的行为、对他人行为的信念以及对其他人认为合适的行为的信念是如何改变的。

AbstractPolicy makers in many developing countries attempt to change unfair and inefficient social norms by introducing progressive laws. Sometimes these laws are ineffective in the presence of norms that conflict with these laws; other times these laws are able to change the norms by drawing them closer to the law. Understanding what makes a law effective in changing social norms is essential to crafting better laws. The development economics and legal literature hypothesize that moderate laws are more effective than radical ones in initiating behavioral change. However, the causal effect of the distance of a law from a prevailing social norm on the effectiveness of the law has not been explored in the literature. This study experimentally investigates if a moderate law is more likely than a radical one to change unfair social norms. In this experiment, historically advantaged and disadvantaged groups of high-caste and low-caste individuals in India will be employed as subjects in the experiment. The subjects will be allowed to create their own norms within the experiment and will be exposed to either a moderate law or a radical law depending on the treatment. The results of this research has important implications for policy development and implementation as well as law enforcement. "Dictator games" will be used as a major tool in the experiment. In a dictator game, the first player, "the dictator", decides how she wants to split her endowments between herself and another person, "the recipient". Each high-caste individual will be assigned the role of a "dictator" and low-caste individual will be assigned the role of a "recipient". A group of dictators will create norms within the experiment by discussing among themselves how each of them should divide endowments between oneself and a recipient. After the group agrees upon the appropriate amount to be sent to their matched recipients, each dictator will make a decision about how to divide her endowment between herself and a matched recipient. There will be two between-group treatment conditions: a moderate and a radical law condition. The moderate (radical) law will require the dictators to send a minimum of a low (high) amount. These laws will be accompanied with a small non-deterrent sanction. This experiment will shed light on how individuals' behavior, beliefs about others' actions and beliefs about what others consider as appropriate behavior change with norm creation and introduction of different laws.