Doctoral Dissertation Research: Extra-Legal Information Transfer during Eyewitness Identification

目击者的误认仍然是导致DNA证据推翻错误定罪的主要因素。为了提高识别能力，目击者研究人员建议所有的列队都由不知道哪个列队成员是嫌疑人的管理员进行（即，双盲）。令人担忧的是，如果阵容管理员知道嫌疑人的身份，他们可能会无意识地影响证人挑选嫌疑人，增加无辜嫌疑人被识别和定罪的风险。心理学家已经证明，这种影响确实存在，并假设这是微妙的“信息线索”的结果，也就是说，管理者的行为向证人表明他们应该选择哪个人。然而，信息从管理人到证人的直接转移从未得到经验证明。如果这种信息传递发生了，那么行为线索就属于法律的外信息，会使证人的决定产生偏见;然而，法律的系统假设证人的决定是基于他们的记忆，而且这种选择不会受到调查人员提供的信息的污染。此外，随着双盲推荐受到审查，科学家们将需要进行研究，检查使用知道哪个阵容成员是嫌疑人的阵容管理员的潜在程序公平性。 本研究的目标是通过识别阵容管理员影响的潜在信息机制来解决这些问题。心理学中的经典双过程模型为理解何时发生信息传递提供了一个可能的框架，因为它们建议个人只有在他们有动机并且能够这样做的情况下才能处理信息。因此，动机和能力应该影响是否发生信息传递过程中阵容，如果它是单盲管理员影响阵容决策的机制。首先，管理员应该更有可能发送信息时，他们的动机和能力。研究1测试这一假设在一个标准的目击者范式操纵管理员的知识（能力），奖励嫌疑人识别（经济动机），和案件的现实主义（心理动机）。第二，当证人有动机和能力时，他们应该更有可能处理和使用信息线索。研究2通过操纵管理员转向（线索在场）、证人执行功能（认知能力）和选择嫌疑人的奖励（财务动机）来检验这一假设。在这两项研究中，只有在信息转移发生的情况下，证人才更有可能在增加处理法外信息的能力和动机的操纵后指认嫌疑人。

Eyewitness misidentification remains the chief contributing factor to wrongful convictions that have been overturned with DNA evidence. To improve identifications, eyewitness researchers recommend that all lineups be conducted using administrators who do not know which lineup member is the suspect (i.e., double-blind). The concern is that if lineup administrators know the suspect's identity, they may unconsciously influence witnesses to pick the suspect, increasing the risk of an innocent suspect being identified and convicted. Psychologists have shown that this influence does occur and have hypothesized that it is the result of subtle "informational cues" --that is, administrator behaviors that indicate to the witness which person they should select. However, the direct transfer of information from administrator to witness has never been empirically demonstrated. If this information transfer occurs, the behavioral cues are extra-legal information that bias witnesses' decisions; yet the legal system assumes that witnesses base their decision on their memory and that this selection is not contaminated by information provided by the investigators. Moreover, as the double-blind recommendation comes under scrutiny, scientists will need to conduct research that examines the underlying procedural fairness of using lineup administrators who know which lineup member is the suspect. The goal of this research is to address these issues by identifying the underlying informational mechanisms of lineup administrator influence. Classic dual-process models in psychology provide one possible framework for understanding when information transfer will occur in that they propose individuals process information only if they are motivated and able to do so. Therefore, motivation and ability should affect whether information transfer occurs during lineups if it is the mechanism by which single-blind administrators influence lineup decisions. First, administrators should be more likely to send information when they are motivated and able. Study 1 tests this hypothesis in a standard eyewitness paradigm by manipulating administrator knowledge (ability), rewards for suspect identifications (financial motivation), and case realism (psychological motivation). Second, witnesses should be more likely to process and use informational cues when they are motivated and able. Study 2 tests this hypothesis by manipulating administrator steering (cue presence), the witnesses executive functioning (cognitive ability), and reward for selecting the suspect (finical motivation). In both studies -- and only if information transfer is happening -- witnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect following manipulations that increase the ability and motivation to process extra-legal information.