Doctoral Dissertation Research: Extra-Legal Information Transfer during Eyewitness Identification

博士论文研究：目击证人识别过程中的法外信息传递

• 批准号: 1728938
• 负责人: Margaret Bull Kovera
• 金额: $ 2万
• 依托单位: CUNY John Jay College of Criminal Justice
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-08-15 至 2019-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1728938&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Extra; Legal

Eyewitness misidentification remains the chief contributing factor to wrongful convictions that have been overturned with DNA evidence. To improve identifications, eyewitness researchers recommend that all lineups be conducted using administrators who do not know which lineup member is the suspect (i.e., double-blind). The concern is that if lineup administrators know the suspect's identity, they may unconsciously influence witnesses to pick the suspect, increasing the risk of an innocent suspect being identified and convicted. Psychologists have shown that this influence does occur and have hypothesized that it is the result of subtle "informational cues" --that is, administrator behaviors that indicate to the witness which person they should select. However, the direct transfer of information from administrator to witness has never been empirically demonstrated. If this information transfer occurs, the behavioral cues are extra-legal information that bias witnesses' decisions; yet the legal system assumes that witnesses base their decision on their memory and that this selection is not contaminated by information provided by the investigators. Moreover, as the double-blind recommendation comes under scrutiny, scientists will need to conduct research that examines the underlying procedural fairness of using lineup administrators who know which lineup member is the suspect. The goal of this research is to address these issues by identifying the underlying informational mechanisms of lineup administrator influence. Classic dual-process models in psychology provide one possible framework for understanding when information transfer will occur in that they propose individuals process information only if they are motivated and able to do so. Therefore, motivation and ability should affect whether information transfer occurs during lineups if it is the mechanism by which single-blind administrators influence lineup decisions. First, administrators should be more likely to send information when they are motivated and able. Study 1 tests this hypothesis in a standard eyewitness paradigm by manipulating administrator knowledge (ability), rewards for suspect identifications (financial motivation), and case realism (psychological motivation). Second, witnesses should be more likely to process and use informational cues when they are motivated and able. Study 2 tests this hypothesis by manipulating administrator steering (cue presence), the witnesses executive functioning (cognitive ability), and reward for selecting the suspect (finical motivation). In both studies -- and only if information transfer is happening -- witnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect following manipulations that increase the ability and motivation to process extra-legal information.

目击者的错误辨认仍然是导致错误定罪的主要因素，而这些错误的定罪已被DNA证据推翻。为了提高鉴定，目击者研究人员建议，所有的队列都应该由不知道哪个队列成员是嫌疑人的管理员进行（即双盲）。令人担忧的是，如果指认人员知道嫌疑人的身份，他们可能会无意识地影响证人挑选嫌疑人，从而增加无辜嫌疑人被指认并定罪的风险。心理学家已经证明，这种影响确实存在，并假设这是微妙的“信息线索”的结果——也就是说，管理者的行为向证人表明他们应该选择哪一个人。然而，从管理员到证人的信息直接传递从未得到实证证明。如果这种信息传递发生了，行为线索就是使证人的决定产生偏见的法外信息；然而，法律制度假定证人的决定是基于他们的记忆，而这种选择不受调查人员提供的信息的影响。此外，随着双盲建议受到审查，科学家们需要进行研究，以检验使用知道哪位列队成员是嫌疑人的列队管理员的潜在程序公平性。本研究的目的是通过识别队列管理员影响的潜在信息机制来解决这些问题。心理学中经典的双过程模型为理解信息传递何时发生提供了一个可能的框架，该模型认为个体只有在有动机且有能力的情况下才会加工信息。因此，如果动机和能力是单盲管理者影响阵容决策的机制，那么在阵容中信息传递是否发生应该受到影响。首先，当管理员有动力和能力时，他们应该更有可能发送信息。研究1通过操纵管理员知识（能力）、嫌疑人识别奖励（财务动机）和案例真实性（心理动机），在标准目击者范式中检验了这一假设。其次，当证人有动力和能力时，他们应该更有可能处理和使用信息线索。研究2通过操纵管理者的引导（提示存在）、证人的执行功能（认知能力）和选择嫌疑人的奖励（经济动机）来验证这一假设。在这两项研究中，只有在信息传递发生的情况下，目击者才更有可能在处理法外信息的能力和动机增加后识别出嫌疑人。