Doctoral Dissertation Research: Extra-Legal Information Transfer during Eyewitness Identification

目击者的错误识别仍然是导致错误定罪的主要因素，这些错误定罪已经被DNA证据推翻。为了更好地辨认，目击者研究人员建议所有列队都由不知道哪个列队成员是嫌疑人的管理员进行(即，双盲)。令人担忧的是，如果列队管理人员知道嫌疑人的身份，他们可能会在不知不觉中影响证人挑选嫌疑人，增加无辜嫌疑人被识别和定罪的风险。心理学家已经证明，这种影响确实会发生，并假设它是微妙的“信息线索”的结果--即管理员向证人表明他们应该选择哪个人的行为。然而，信息从管理人到证人的直接转移从来没有得到过经验证明。如果发生这种信息转移，行为线索是影响证人决定的法律外信息；然而，法律制度假设证人根据他们的记忆做出决定，这种选择不会受到调查人员提供的信息的影响。此外，随着这项双盲建议受到审查，科学家们将需要进行研究，以检验使用知道哪一名嫌疑人是嫌疑人的名单管理员的潜在程序公平性。本研究的目的是通过识别阵容管理者影响力的潜在信息机制来解决这些问题。心理学中经典的双过程模型为理解何时发生信息传递提供了一种可能的框架，因为他们认为只有当个人有动机并能够这样做的时候，他们才会处理信息。因此，如果动机和能力是单盲管理员影响阵容决策的机制，那么动机和能力应该影响信息传输是否发生在阵容期间。首先，管理员应该更有可能在他们有动力和能力的时候发送信息。研究1通过操纵管理员知识(能力)、对嫌疑人身份的奖励(经济动机)和案例现实主义(心理动机)，在标准目击者范式中检验了这一假设。第二，当证人有动机和能力时，他们应该更有可能处理和使用信息线索。研究2通过操纵管理员引导(线索存在)、证人的执行功能(认知能力)和选择嫌疑人的奖励(财务动机)来检验这一假设。在这两项研究中--只有在信息转移发生的情况下--证人将更有可能在增加处理法律外信息的能力和动机的操纵之后识别嫌疑人。

Eyewitness misidentification remains the chief contributing factor to wrongful convictions that have been overturned with DNA evidence. To improve identifications, eyewitness researchers recommend that all lineups be conducted using administrators who do not know which lineup member is the suspect (i.e., double-blind). The concern is that if lineup administrators know the suspect's identity, they may unconsciously influence witnesses to pick the suspect, increasing the risk of an innocent suspect being identified and convicted. Psychologists have shown that this influence does occur and have hypothesized that it is the result of subtle "informational cues" --that is, administrator behaviors that indicate to the witness which person they should select. However, the direct transfer of information from administrator to witness has never been empirically demonstrated. If this information transfer occurs, the behavioral cues are extra-legal information that bias witnesses' decisions; yet the legal system assumes that witnesses base their decision on their memory and that this selection is not contaminated by information provided by the investigators. Moreover, as the double-blind recommendation comes under scrutiny, scientists will need to conduct research that examines the underlying procedural fairness of using lineup administrators who know which lineup member is the suspect. The goal of this research is to address these issues by identifying the underlying informational mechanisms of lineup administrator influence. Classic dual-process models in psychology provide one possible framework for understanding when information transfer will occur in that they propose individuals process information only if they are motivated and able to do so. Therefore, motivation and ability should affect whether information transfer occurs during lineups if it is the mechanism by which single-blind administrators influence lineup decisions. First, administrators should be more likely to send information when they are motivated and able. Study 1 tests this hypothesis in a standard eyewitness paradigm by manipulating administrator knowledge (ability), rewards for suspect identifications (financial motivation), and case realism (psychological motivation). Second, witnesses should be more likely to process and use informational cues when they are motivated and able. Study 2 tests this hypothesis by manipulating administrator steering (cue presence), the witnesses executive functioning (cognitive ability), and reward for selecting the suspect (finical motivation). In both studies -- and only if information transfer is happening -- witnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect following manipulations that increase the ability and motivation to process extra-legal information.