CPS: Medium: Collaborative Research: Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Additive Manufacturing with Untrusted Controllers

CPS：中：协作研究：具有不可信控制器的值得信赖的网络物理增材制造

• 批准号: 1739467
• 负责人: Saman Zonouz
• 金额: $ 62.45万
• 依托单位: Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-08-01 至 2022-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1739467&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CPS; Medium; Collaborative; Research; Trustworthy

Additive manufacturing is finding increased application in industry. Safety-critical products, such as medical prostheses and parts for aerospace and automotive industries are being printed by additive manufacturing methods, but there currently are no standard methods for verifying the integrity of the parts that are produced. Trustworthy operation of industrial additive manufacturing depends on secure embedded controllers that monitor and control the underlying physical manufacturing processes. This research will investigate a perfectly air-gapped intrusion detection solution for cyber-physical industrial additive manufacturing infrastructures in which some of the controllers may be infected by malicious code. The research will provide guidelines to: i) tie together resilience solutions in software security, control system design, and signal processing, and ii) incorporate reliable and practical cyber-physical attack detection into real-world manufacturing. Educational and technology transfer activities will address the need to improve the applicability of training methods to ensuring the safety and cyber security of physical control systems. Activities will involve The Society of Women Engineers and a large population of underrepresented and low-income minorities with diverse cultural backgrounds and improve the security of existing, real-world, additive manufacturing systems in industry. Next generation cyber-physical additive manufacturing enables advanced product designs and capabilities, but increasingly relies on highly networked industrial control systems that present opportunities for cyber attacks. The predominant approach to defending against these threats relies on host-based intrusion detectors that sit within the same target controllers, and hence are often the first target of the controller attacks. This project will research contact-less and perfectly air-gapped intrusion detection by analyzing physical side-channels to protect against cyber-physical attacks. This solution requires no runtime overhead on real-time controllers, requires minimal change to legacy systems, and reliably identifies intrusions even if the target system is completely compromised. The work will address solutions for: i) air-gapped intrusion detection on cyber-physical systems while maintaining a perfect air gap, ii) a comprehensive understanding of the types of side-channels available for analysis in different industrial systems, and iii) empirical validation of the various perfectly air-gapped intrusion detection tools, both independently and working in tandem.

加法制造在工业中得到了越来越多的应用。对安全至关重要的产品，如医疗假体和航空航天和汽车工业的零部件，正在通过添加剂制造方法印刷，但目前还没有标准方法来验证所生产零部件的完整性。工业添加剂制造的可靠运行依赖于安全的嵌入式控制器，这些控制器监视和控制底层的物理制造过程。这项研究将研究一种针对网络物理工业添加剂制造基础设施的完美气隙入侵检测解决方案，其中一些控制器可能会被恶意代码感染。这项研究将为以下方面提供指导：i)将软件安全、控制系统设计和信号处理方面的弹性解决方案结合在一起，以及ii)将可靠和实用的网络物理攻击检测融入现实世界的制造中。教育和技术转让活动将解决需要改进培训方法的适用性，以确保物理控制系统的安全和网络安全。活动将涉及女工程师协会和具有不同文化背景的人数不足的低收入少数群体，并改善工业中现有的、现实世界的添加剂制造系统的安全。下一代网络物理添加剂制造使先进的产品设计和能力成为可能，但越来越依赖高度网络化的工业控制系统，这为网络攻击提供了机会。防御这些威胁的主要方法依赖于位于相同目标控制器中的基于主机的入侵检测器，因此通常是控制器攻击的第一个目标。本项目将通过分析物理侧通道来防御网络物理攻击，来研究非接触式和完全气隙的入侵检测。该解决方案不需要实时控制器上的运行时开销，只需要对旧系统进行最小程度的更改，并且即使目标系统完全受到攻击，也能可靠地识别入侵。这项工作将解决以下问题的解决方案：i)在网络物理系统上进行气隙入侵检测，同时保持完美的气隙；ii)全面了解不同工业系统中可用于分析的旁路类型；iii)独立和协同工作的各种完全气隙入侵检测工具的经验验证。