CAREER: Supply Chain Security for Integrated Circuits

职业：集成电路供应链安全

• 批准号: 1749845
• 负责人: Daniel Holcomb
• 金额: $ 59.62万
• 依托单位: University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-02-01 至 2024-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1749845&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Supply; Chain; Security; Integrated

The integrated circuits (ICs) that underpin critical systems in modern society are produced by a global supply chain that involves a variety of actors in many countries. Some of the actors are trusted, but others are not. Untrusted actors give rise to supply chain threats such as counterfeit ICs of uncertain quality or the possibility of malicious changes to the function of ICs. To secure electronic systems in defense, critical infrastructure, and healthcare, it is increasingly important to secure the global IC supply chain. This research project pursues new strategies for securing ICs against supply chain threats. This research explores a new framework for supply chain security organized around three main thrusts. The first thrust explores application-specific designs with post-fabrication programmability to prevent targeted Trojan insertion by an untrusted foundry. The second thrust of the work addresses the design side of the supply chain, and seeks new formal abstractions for reasoning about, and protecting against, entire classes of malicious circuit modifications. The third thrust addresses the distribution side of the supply chain with a low-cost authentication technique to verify the provenance of packaged ICs. This research project has the potential to positively impact national security and well-being of individuals by helping to keep malicious parts out of critical systems such as defense aircraft and medical devices. The work supports economic competitiveness of US semiconductor companies by trying to prevent billions of dollars in annual losses from counterfeits. The project supports cybersecurity education through a variety of contest-based learning activities, and through a supply chain testbed for lab courses that supports both education and research. Public data, tools, and design artifacts associated with this project will be made publicly available through the completion of the project at https://github.com/danholcomb/supply-chain-security.

支撑现代社会关键系统的集成电路（IC）是由全球供应链生产的，该供应链涉及许多国家的各种参与者。有些演员是值得信任的，但有些则不然。不受信任的参与者会带来供应链威胁，例如质量不确定的假冒IC或恶意更改IC功能的可能性。为了保护国防、关键基础设施和医疗保健领域的电子系统，保护全球IC供应链变得越来越重要。该研究项目寻求新的策略，以保护IC免受供应链威胁。本研究围绕三个主要目标探索了一个新的供应链安全框架。第一个目标是探索具有制造后可编程性的特定于应用程序的设计，以防止不受信任的代工厂有针对性地插入木马。这项工作的第二个重点是解决供应链的设计方面，并寻求新的正式抽象推理，并防止整个类别的恶意电路修改。第三个重点是通过低成本的认证技术来验证封装IC的来源，从而解决供应链的分销方问题。该研究项目有可能通过帮助将恶意部件排除在国防飞机和医疗设备等关键系统之外，从而对国家安全和个人福祉产生积极影响。这项工作通过努力防止假冒产品每年造成数十亿美元的损失，支持美国半导体公司的经济竞争力。该项目通过各种基于专家的学习活动，以及通过支持教育和研究的实验室课程的供应链测试平台，支持网络安全教育。与此项目相关的公共数据、工具和设计工件将在项目完成后在https://github.com/danholcomb/supply-chain-security上公开提供。

项目成果

Efficient Register Renaming Architectures for 8-bit AES Datapath at 0.55 pJ/bit in 16-nm FinFET

16 nm FinFET 中 0.55 pJ/位的 8 位 AES 数据路径的高效寄存器重命名架构

• DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2020.2999593
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI
• 作者: Dhanuskodi, Siva Nishok;Allen, Samuel;Holcomb, Daniel E.
• 通讯作者: Holcomb, Daniel E.

Know Time to Die – Integrity Checking for Zero Trust Chiplet-based Systems Using Between-Die Delay PUFs

了解死亡时间 — 使用芯片间延迟 PUF 对基于零信任 Chiplet 的系统进行完整性检查

• DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.391-412
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
• 作者: Deric, Aleksa;Holcomb, Daniel
• 通讯作者: Holcomb, Daniel

COUNTERFOIL: Verifying Provenance of Integrated Circuits using Intrinsic Package Fingerprints and Inexpensive Cameras

COUNTERFOIL：使用固有封装指纹和廉价相机验证集成电路的来源

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20
• 作者: Dhanuskodi, Siva Nishok;Li, Xiang;Holcomb, Daniel
• 通讯作者: Holcomb, Daniel

Precise Fault Injection to Enable DFIA for Attacking AES in Remote FPGAs

精确的故障注入使 DFIA 能够攻击远程 FPGA 中的 AES

• DOI: 10.1109/fccm53951.2022.9786154
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: 2022 IEEE 30th Annual International Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM
• 作者: Li, Xiang;Tessier, Russell;Holcomb, Daniel
• 通讯作者: Holcomb, Daniel

Jitter-based Adaptive True Random Number Generation Circuits for FPGAs in the Cloud

• DOI: 10.1145/3487554
• 发表时间: 2023-03-01
• 期刊: ACM TRANSACTIONS ON RECONFIGURABLE TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEMS
• 影响因子: 2.3
• 作者: Li, Xiang;Stanwicks, Peter;Holcomb, Daniel
• 通讯作者: Holcomb, Daniel