CRII: SaTC: GEMINI: Guided Execution Based Mobile Advanced Persistent Threat Investigation

CRII:SaTC:GEMINI:基于引导执行的移动高级持续威胁调查

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    1755721
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2018
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2018-02-01 至 2020-01-31
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

Advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns are increasingly targeting mobile devices deployed across corporations, governments, and financial institutions. Unfortunately, prohibitively slow responses to even high-profile APT attacks have shown that authorities lack the capability to quickly investigate ongoing attacks (in a matter of hours or days rather than months). To address this challenge, this research draws inspiration from recent developments in memory image forensics (in particular a recently introduced technique called guided execution), which has provided rapid evidence collection and crime investigation capabilities currently unparalleled in APT investigation. This research is developing an integrated framework, called GEMINI, which shifts the goal of modern memory forensics from the investigation of physical-world crimes to APT campaigns. Based on the analysis of only a single memory image --- collected from an Android device after an attack is suspected --- GEMINI provides the following set of APT investigation capabilities: (1) Based on exploratory guided execution techniques, GEMINI can search for and re-create previously enacted APT attack stages. (2) Beyond investigating prior attack execution, GEMINI enables the revelation of hidden/potential future attack behaviors by 'puppeteering' their executing with pre-staged memory image data. (3) After exploring future payloads, GEMINI can further leverage its guided execution capabilities for the remediation of the observed attack strategies.This work directly contributes to national security by advancing research in and developing techniques for the investigation of APT campaigns targeting mobile devices. In addition, the results of this research are being made publicly available with the goal of enhancing discovery and empowering future research in this area as well as contributing to the development of new curriculum materials focused on malware analysis and reverse engineering.
高级持续性威胁(APT)活动越来越多地针对企业、政府和金融机构部署的移动的设备。不幸的是,即使是对高调的APT攻击的反应也非常缓慢,这表明当局缺乏快速调查正在进行的攻击的能力(在几小时或几天内,而不是几个月)。为了应对这一挑战,本研究从内存图像取证的最新发展(特别是最近推出的一种称为引导执行的技术)中汲取灵感,该技术提供了目前APT调查中无与伦比的快速证据收集和犯罪调查能力。 这项研究正在开发一个名为GEMINI的综合框架,该框架将现代记忆取证的目标从调查物理世界的犯罪转移到APT活动。基于对单个内存映像的分析--在怀疑攻击后从Android设备收集-- GEMINI提供了以下一组APT调查功能:(1)基于探索性引导执行技术,GEMINI可以搜索并重新创建先前实施的APT攻击阶段。(2)除了调查先前的攻击执行情况外,GEMINI还可以通过使用预先准备的内存映像数据“操纵”攻击行为的执行来揭示隐藏/潜在的未来攻击行为。(3)在探索未来的有效载荷后,GEMINI可以进一步利用其引导执行功能来修复观察到的攻击策略。这项工作通过推进针对移动的设备的APT活动的研究和开发技术来直接促进国家安全。此外,这项研究的结果正在公开提供,目的是加强发现和授权这一领域的未来研究,并有助于开发专注于恶意软件分析和逆向工程的新课程材料。

项目成果

期刊论文数量(1)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
The Betrayal At Cloud City: An Empirical Analysis Of Cloud-Based Mobile Backends
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2019
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Omar Alrawi;Chaoshun Zuo;Ruian Duan;R. Kasturi;Zhiqiang Lin;Brendan Saltaformaggio
  • 通讯作者:
    Omar Alrawi;Chaoshun Zuo;Ruian Duan;R. Kasturi;Zhiqiang Lin;Brendan Saltaformaggio
{{ item.title }}
{{ item.translation_title }}
  • DOI:
    {{ item.doi }}
  • 发表时间:
    {{ item.publish_year }}
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    {{ item.factor }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.authors }}
  • 通讯作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ journalArticles.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ monograph.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ sciAawards.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ conferencePapers.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ patent.updateTime }}

Brendan Saltaformaggio其他文献

Tipped Off by Your Memory Allocator: Device-Wide User Activity Sequencing from Android Memory Images
内存分配器提示:根据 Android 内存映像对设备范围内的用户活动进行排序
Gemini: Guest-transparent honey files via hypervisor-level access redirection
Gemini:通过虚拟机管理程序级访问重定向对来宾透明的蜜文件
  • DOI:
    10.1016/j.cose.2018.02.014
  • 发表时间:
    2018
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Zhongshu Gu;Brendan Saltaformaggio;X. Zhang;Dongyan Xu
  • 通讯作者:
    Dongyan Xu
Measuring and Preventing Supply Chain Attacks on Package Managers
测量和防止对包管理器的供应链攻击
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2020
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Ruian Duan;Omar Alrawi;R. Kasturi;R. Elder;Brendan Saltaformaggio;Wenke Lee
  • 通讯作者:
    Wenke Lee
This Hacker Knows Physics: Device Physics Aware Mimicry Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
这位黑客了解物理:网络物理系统中的设备物理感知模仿攻击
Cyber Forensics through Program Analysis
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2016
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Brendan Saltaformaggio
  • 通讯作者:
    Brendan Saltaformaggio

Brendan Saltaformaggio的其他文献

{{ item.title }}
{{ item.translation_title }}
  • DOI:
    {{ item.doi }}
  • 发表时间:
    {{ item.publish_year }}
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    {{ item.factor }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.authors }}
  • 通讯作者:
    {{ item.author }}

{{ truncateString('Brendan Saltaformaggio', 18)}}的其他基金

CAREER: GLEAN: Gearing Rapid Malware Forensics Toward Holistic Mobile Botnet Takedown
职业生涯:GLEAN:利用快速恶意软件取证实现全面摧毁移动僵尸网络
  • 批准号:
    2143689
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
SaTC: CORE: Medium: Collaborative: Doctor WHO: Investigation and Prevention of Online Content Management System Abuse
SaTC:核心:媒介:协作:WHO 医生:在线内容管理系统滥用的调查和预防
  • 批准号:
    1916550
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant

相似海外基金

CRII: SaTC: Automated Knowledge Representation for IoT Cybersecurity Regulations
CRII:SaTC:物联网网络安全法规的自动化知识表示
  • 批准号:
    2348147
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
CRII: SaTC: Reliable Hardware Architectures Against Side-Channel Attacks for Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms
CRII:SaTC:针对后量子密码算法的侧通道攻击的可靠硬件架构
  • 批准号:
    2348261
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
CRII: SaTC: Privacy vs. Accountability--Usable Deniability and Non-Repudiation for Encrypted Messaging Systems
CRII:SaTC:隐私与责任——加密消息系统的可用否认性和不可否认性
  • 批准号:
    2348181
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Using Intelligent Conversational Agents to Empower Adolescents to be Resilient Against Cybergrooming
合作研究:SaTC:核心:中:使用智能会话代理使青少年能够抵御网络诱骗
  • 批准号:
    2330940
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
CRII: SaTC: Evolving I/O Protocols for Confidential Computing
CRII:SaTC:用于机密计算的不断发展的 I/O 协议
  • 批准号:
    2348130
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
SaTC: CORE: Small: An evaluation framework and methodology to streamline Hardware Performance Counters as the next-generation malware detection system
SaTC:核心:小型:简化硬件性能计数器作为下一代恶意软件检测系统的评估框架和方法
  • 批准号:
    2327427
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Differentially Private SQL with flexible privacy modeling, machine-checked system design, and accuracy optimization
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:具有灵活隐私建模、机器检查系统设计和准确性优化的差异化私有 SQL
  • 批准号:
    2317232
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
CRII: SaTC: Enforcing Expressive Security Policies using Trusted Execution Environments
CRII:SaTC:使用可信执行环境执行表达性安全策略
  • 批准号:
    2348304
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: NSF-BSF: SaTC: CORE: Small: Detecting malware with machine learning models efficiently and reliably
协作研究:NSF-BSF:SaTC:核心:小型:利用机器学习模型高效可靠地检测恶意软件
  • 批准号:
    2338301
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
CRII: SaTC: The Right to be Forgotten in Follow-ups of Machine Learning: When Privacy Meets Explanation and Efficiency
CRII:SaTC:机器学习后续中被遗忘的权利:当隐私遇到解释和效率时
  • 批准号:
    2348177
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
{{ showInfoDetail.title }}

作者:{{ showInfoDetail.author }}

知道了