CRII: SaTC: New Side-Channel Techniques in Support of Global Monitoring for Network Disruptions

CRII:SaTC:支持全球网络中断监控的新侧通道技术

基本信息

项目摘要

The Internet's size and complexity make it difficult to understand what happens to network packets as they travel from source to destination. Internet service providers and governments sometimes interfere with users' online activities, further complicating this task. This project advances the scientific understanding of network interference detection by developing new methods to remotely measure the manipulation of Internet traffic, such as attempts to censor, tamper with, and monitor users' online activities. The newly proposed techniques can achieve an unprecedented level of detail about network manipulation around the world. Network interference and censorship harms U.S. economic interests, national security, and the human rights of citizens in censored countries. By working towards a better scientific understanding of the techniques used for detecting and monitoring such interference, this project can defend Internet users from unwarranted network manipulation. Past research has used resources such as PlanetLab, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), and end-user machines to measure network disruptions. These vantage points scale poorly and have limited geographical coverage. They are difficult to deploy in practice and are unable to continuously collect data. In contrast, systems such as Spooky, Augur, and Iris (developed in the principal investigator's preliminary work) allow measurement systems to infer whether a remote system has network connectivity to another remote system without needing control of either. To do this, these systems exploit features in existing Internet protocols and infrastructure to interact with remote systems, and learn from their responses whether or not they were able to interact with other targeted hosts. These techniques overcome the problems of vantage point location and of recruiting participants.
互联网的规模和复杂性使得很难理解网络数据包从源到目的地的过程中发生了什么。互联网服务提供商和政府有时会干扰用户的在线活动,使这项任务更加复杂。该项目通过开发新方法来远程测量互联网流量的操纵,如试图审查,篡改和监视用户的在线活动,从而推进了对网络干扰检测的科学理解。新提出的技术可以实现世界各地网络操纵的前所未有的细节水平。网络干扰和审查损害了美国的经济利益、国家安全和受审查国家公民的人权。该项目致力于从科学上更好地了解用于检测和监测这种干扰的技术,从而保护互联网用户免遭不正当的网络操纵。 过去的研究使用了PlanetLab、虚拟专用网络(VPN)和最终用户机器等资源来测量网络中断。这些Vantage位置的比例很差,地理覆盖范围有限。它们难以在实践中部署,并且无法持续收集数据。相比之下,Spooky、Augur和Iris等系统(在主要研究者的前期工作中开发)允许测量系统推断远程系统是否与另一个远程系统具有网络连接,而无需控制任何一个系统。为此,这些系统利用现有互联网协议和基础设施中的功能与远程系统进行交互,并从它们的响应中了解它们是否能够与其他目标主机进行交互。这些技术克服了Vantage位置和招募参与者的问题。

项目成果

期刊论文数量(3)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
Quack: Scalable Remote Measurement of Application-Layer Censorship.
Quack:应用层审查的可扩展远程测量。
403 Forbidden: A Global View of Geoblocking
403 Forbidden:地理封锁的全球视角
Decentralized Control: A Case Study of Russia
  • DOI:
    10.14722/ndss.2020.23098
  • 发表时间:
    2020
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Reethika Ramesh;R. Raman;Matthew Bernhard;Victor Ongkowijaya;Leonid Evdokimov;A. Edmundson;Steven Sprecher;M. Ikram;Roya Ensafi
  • 通讯作者:
    Reethika Ramesh;R. Raman;Matthew Bernhard;Victor Ongkowijaya;Leonid Evdokimov;A. Edmundson;Steven Sprecher;M. Ikram;Roya Ensafi
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Roya Ensafi其他文献

Attacking Connection Tracking Frameworks as used by Virtual Private Networks
攻击虚拟专用网络使用的连接跟踪框架
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2024
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Benjamin Mixon;Jeffrey Knockel;Diwen Xue;Tarun Ayyagari;Deepak Kapur;Roya Ensafi;Jedidiah R. Crandall
  • 通讯作者:
    Jedidiah R. Crandall
CERTainty: Detecting DNS Manipulation at Scale using TLS Certificates
CERTainty:使用 TLS 证书大规模检测 DNS 操纵
Throttling Twitter: an emerging censorship technique in Russia
限制推特:俄罗斯新兴的审查技术
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2021
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Diwen Xue;Reethika Ramesh;Valdik S S;Leonid Evdokimov;Andrey Viktorov;Arham Jain;Eric Wustrow;Simonetta Basso;Roya Ensafi
  • 通讯作者:
    Roya Ensafi
Advanced Network Inference Techniques Based on Network Protocol Stack Information Leaks
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2015-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    4
  • 作者:
    Roya Ensafi
  • 通讯作者:
    Roya Ensafi
Network Responses to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: A Cautionary Tale for Internet Freedom
网络对 2022 年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的反应:互联网自由的警示故事
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2023
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Reethika Ramesh;R. Raman;A. Virkud;Alexander Dirksen;Armin Huremagic;D. Fifield;D. Rodenburg;Rod Hynes;Doug Madory;Roya Ensafi
  • 通讯作者:
    Roya Ensafi

Roya Ensafi的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Roya Ensafi', 18)}}的其他基金

CAREER: Internet-wide censorship detection, diagnosis, and circumvention beyond nation-state censorship
职业:超越民族国家审查制度的互联网范围内的审查制度检测、诊断和规避
  • 批准号:
    2237552
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Rethinking the Fundamentals of Tunneling Technologies for Security, Privacy, and Usability
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:重新思考隧道技术的安全性、隐私性和可用性的基础知识
  • 批准号:
    2141512
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant

相似海外基金

CRII: SaTC: Securing Smart Devices with AI-Powered mmWave Radar in New-Generation Wireless Networks
CRII:SaTC:在新一代无线网络中使用人工智能驱动的毫米波雷达保护智能设备
  • 批准号:
    2422863
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: Understanding the Limitations of Wireless Network Security Designs Leveraging Wireless Properties: New Threats and Defenses in Practice
协作研究:SaTC:核心:小型:了解利用无线特性的无线网络安全设计的局限性:实践中的新威胁和防御
  • 批准号:
    2316720
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: New Constructions for Garbled Computation
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:乱码计算的新结构
  • 批准号:
    2246355
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
CRII: SaTC: Securing Smart Devices with AI-Powered mmWave Radar in New-Generation Wireless Networks
CRII:SaTC:在新一代无线网络中使用人工智能驱动的毫米波雷达保护智能设备
  • 批准号:
    2245760
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
CRII: SaTC: Towards Understanding and Defending Against New Waves of Online Hate
CRII:SaTC:理解和防御新一波的网络仇恨
  • 批准号:
    2245983
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: Understanding the Limitations of Wireless Network Security Designs Leveraging Wireless Properties: New Threats and Defenses in Practice
协作研究:SaTC:核心:小型:了解利用无线特性的无线网络安全设计的局限性:实践中的新威胁和防御
  • 批准号:
    2316719
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: New Constructions for Garbled Computation
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:乱码计算的新结构
  • 批准号:
    2246354
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: New Constructions for Garbled Computation
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:乱码计算的新结构
  • 批准号:
    2246353
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
SaTC: CORE: Small: New Cryptographic Capabilities for a Quantum World
SaTC:核心:小型:量子世界的新加密功能
  • 批准号:
    2247727
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
SaTC: CORE: Small: New Approaches for Fuzzy Private Set Intersection
SaTC:核心:小型:模糊私人集交集的新方法
  • 批准号:
    2150726
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 资助金额:
    $ 17.5万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
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