SaTC: CORE: Small: Collaborative: Building Sophisticated Services with Programmable Anonymity Networks

SaTC：核心：小型：协作：使用可编程匿名网络构建复杂的服务

• 批准号: 1816802
• 负责人: David Levin
• 金额: $ 25万
• 依托单位: University of Maryland, College Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-09-15 至 2021-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1816802&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Collaborative; Building

This project designs and implements programmable system elements to be run within the anonymity networks, such as Tor (The Onion Routing network). The central idea is that users can inject new code into the network that is then run within a protected execution environment. The motivation is to enable the creation of new and significantly enhanced anonymity services, such as content distribution networks, of use in today's and future anonymity networks. The project carries potential to demonstrate that an anonymity communication network, such as today's Tor network, could deliver a much larger range of services that could greatly enhance the potential range of offerings over secure, anonymous networks, motivating further developments.The proposed research has four main and original thrusts: (1) Programmable Tor middleboxes,(2) Censorship-resistant hidden services, (3) Hidden-services-based content distribution network (CDN), (4) Decentralized anonymous credentials. Much thought and development will also go into the applications that can be built upon the proposed functionalities, and as a result, if successful, the end possibilities are expected to be transformative. The training obtained by students during the investigation spanning across cryptography, secure computation, and anonymized communication networks are expected to result in a cohort with a distinctive, important and useful set of skills.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该项目设计并实现了可在匿名网络中运行的可编程系统元素，例如Tor(洋葱路由网络)。其核心思想是，用户可以将新代码注入网络，然后在受保护的执行环境中运行。其动机是能够创建新的和显著增强的匿名服务，例如内容分发网络，用于今天和未来的匿名网络。该项目有可能证明一个匿名通信网络，如今天的Tor网络，可以提供更广泛的服务，可以极大地增强安全匿名网络上的潜在服务范围，从而推动进一步的发展。拟议的研究有四个主要和原创性的推动力：(1)可编程的Tor中间盒，(2)抗审查的隐藏服务，(3)基于隐藏服务的内容分发网络(CDN)，(4)去中心化匿名证书。还将对可以基于提议的功能构建的应用程序进行大量思考和开发，因此，如果成功，最终的可能性预计将是变革性的。学生们在调查期间获得的培训横跨密码学、安全计算和匿名通信网络，预计将产生一组具有独特、重要和有用的技能。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Bento: Safely Bringing Network Function Virtualization to Tor

Bento：将网络功能虚拟化安全地引入 Tor

• DOI: 10.1145/3452296.3472919
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: ACM SIGCOMM
• 作者: Reininger, Michael;Arora, Arushi;Herwig, Stephen;Francino, Nicholas;Hurst, Jayson;Garman, Christina;Levin, Dave
• 通讯作者: Levin, Dave

Geneva: Evolving Censorship Evasion Strategies

• DOI: 10.1145/3319535.3363189
• 发表时间: 2019-11
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
• 作者: Kevin Bock;George Hughey;Xiao Qiang;Dave Levin

Your Censor is My Censor: Weaponizing Censorship Infrastructure for Availability Attacks

• DOI: 10.1109/spw53761.2021.00059
• 发表时间: 2021-05
• 期刊: 2021 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)
• 作者: Kevin Bock;Pranav Bharadwaj;Jasraj Singh;Dave Levin

Even Censors Have a Backup: Examining China's Double HTTPS Censorship Middleboxes

即使是审查机构也有备份：检查中国的双重 HTTPS 审查中间盒

• DOI: 10.1145/3473604.3474559
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet (WOOT
• 作者: Bock, Kevin;Naval, Gabriel;Reese, Kyle;Levin, Dave
• 通讯作者: Levin, Dave

Achieving Keyless CDNs with Conclaves

• 发表时间: 2020
• 作者: Stephen Herwig;Christina Garman;Dave Levin