Collaborative Research: Empirical Models of Supracompetitive Pricing in Differentiated Products Markets

合作研究：差异化产品市场超竞争定价的实证模型

• 批准号: 1824318
• 负责人: Nathan Miller
• 金额: $ 8.86万
• 依托单位: Georgetown University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-09-15 至 2022-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1824318&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Empirical; Models; Supracompetitive

This research studies the magnitude and determinants of prices and price-cost margins, with lessons for merger enforcement and the detection of cartels. Most empirical research assumes prices are determined by firms' product portfolios, the extent to which consumers view products as differentiated, and, importantly, competition based solely on current market conditions. However, when firms expect to compete in the future and have sufficiently low discount rates, threats of future price wars can support higher prices than predicted by static pricing models. This project explores this theory in two ways. First, the investigators develop and estimate a repeated game model of oligopoly price leadership. The assumptions in the model are motivated by an industry practice where one firm proposes a markup to a coalition. The model is then used to understand how mergers change pricing incentives. Second, the investigators develop a test of static competition that is robust to how exactly firms set prices under the alternative hypothesis. This research illustrates both methodologies with empirical applications. This research characterizes equilibrium in the price leadership model, state conditions under which marginal costs can be recovered given data on prices, quantities, and demand estimates, and characterize conditions under which firms' implied time preferences can be identified. The investigators apply the model to the U.S. brewing industry and study how the Miller/Coors joint venture changed pricing incentives. The test for static Nash competition takes into account product differentiation and multi-product ownership by individual firms. This test is applied to the U.S. canned tuna market, where two of the three largest firms recently plead guilty to price fixing. This research shows how the framework can be used to i) date cartel operations, ii) distinguish cartel participants from firms that are simply pricing optimally given its competitors are colluding and iii) study the effectiveness of the cartel by comparing observed prices and variable profits to those that arise in Nash-Bertrand equilibrium and under joint profit maximization.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

本研究研究了价格和价格成本边际的大小和决定因素，为合并执法和卡特尔侦查提供了经验教训。大多数实证研究假设价格是由公司的产品组合决定的，消费者认为产品是差异化的程度，重要的是，竞争完全基于当前的市场条件。然而，当企业期望在未来竞争并且有足够低的贴现率时，未来价格战的威胁可以支持比静态定价模型预测的更高的价格。本项目从两个方面探讨了这一理论。首先，研究人员建立并估计了寡头垄断价格领导的重复博弈模型。模型中的假设是由一个行业惯例激发的，其中一个公司向联盟提出加价。然后用这个模型来理解合并是如何改变定价激励的。其次，研究人员开发了一个静态竞争的测试，该测试对企业在可选假设下如何准确地设定价格是可靠的。本研究用实证应用说明了这两种方法。本研究描述了价格领导模型中的均衡，在给定价格、数量和需求估计数据的情况下边际成本可以回收的状态条件，并描述了企业隐含时间偏好可以确定的条件。研究人员将该模型应用于美国酿酒行业，研究米勒/库尔斯合资企业如何改变定价激励机制。静态纳什竞争的检验考虑了单个企业的产品差异化和多产品所有权。这一检验适用于美国罐装金枪鱼市场，美国最大的三家公司中有两家最近承认操纵价格。本研究展示了如何使用该框架来i)确定卡特尔运作的日期，ii)区分卡特尔参与者与在竞争对手串通的情况下简单定价最优的公司，以及iii)通过比较观察到的价格和可变利润与纳什-贝特朗均衡和共同利润最大化下产生的价格和可变利润来研究卡特尔的有效性。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry

寡头垄断价格领先与兼并：美国啤酒业

• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190913
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: American Economic Review
• 影响因子: 10.7
• 作者: Miller, Nathan H.;Sheu, Gloria;Weinberg, Matthew C.
• 通讯作者: Weinberg, Matthew C.