Collaborative Research: Empirical Models of Supracompetitive Pricing in Differentiated Products Markets

这项研究研究了价格和价格-成本差额的幅度和决定因素，为兼并执法和卡特尔侦查提供了经验教训。大多数实证研究假设价格是由公司的产品组合决定的，消费者在多大程度上认为产品是有区别的，重要的是，竞争完全基于当前的市场条件。然而，当企业期望在未来竞争，并有足够低的折扣率，未来的价格战的威胁可以支持更高的价格比静态定价模型预测。本项目从两个方面探讨了这一理论。首先，研究者建立并估计了寡头垄断价格领导的重复博弈模型。模型中的假设是由一个行业的做法，其中一家公司提出了加价联盟的动机。然后，该模型被用来了解合并如何改变定价激励。其次，研究人员开发了一个静态竞争的测试，是强大的企业如何确切地设置价格下的备择假设。本研究说明了这两种方法与实证应用。本研究的特点是均衡的价格领导模型，状态条件下，边际成本可以收回给定的数据，价格，数量和需求估计，并表征条件下，企业的隐含的时间偏好可以确定。调查人员将该模型应用于美国酿酒业，并研究了米勒/库尔斯合资企业如何改变定价激励。静态纳什竞争的测试考虑到产品的差异化和单个企业的多产品所有权。这一测试适用于美国金枪鱼罐头市场，三家最大的公司中有两家最近承认操纵价格。这项研究表明，该框架如何可以用来i）日期卡特尔运作，ii）将卡特尔参与者与简单地在竞争对手串通的情况下进行最优定价的公司区分开来，iii）通过将观察到的价格和可变利润与纳什均衡中出现的价格和可变利润进行比较，研究卡特尔的有效性。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已被认为是值得通过评估使用基金会的知识产权的支持。优点和更广泛的影响审查标准。

This research studies the magnitude and determinants of prices and price-cost margins, with lessons for merger enforcement and the detection of cartels. Most empirical research assumes prices are determined by firms' product portfolios, the extent to which consumers view products as differentiated, and, importantly, competition based solely on current market conditions. However, when firms expect to compete in the future and have sufficiently low discount rates, threats of future price wars can support higher prices than predicted by static pricing models. This project explores this theory in two ways. First, the investigators develop and estimate a repeated game model of oligopoly price leadership. The assumptions in the model are motivated by an industry practice where one firm proposes a markup to a coalition. The model is then used to understand how mergers change pricing incentives. Second, the investigators develop a test of static competition that is robust to how exactly firms set prices under the alternative hypothesis. This research illustrates both methodologies with empirical applications. This research characterizes equilibrium in the price leadership model, state conditions under which marginal costs can be recovered given data on prices, quantities, and demand estimates, and characterize conditions under which firms' implied time preferences can be identified. The investigators apply the model to the U.S. brewing industry and study how the Miller/Coors joint venture changed pricing incentives. The test for static Nash competition takes into account product differentiation and multi-product ownership by individual firms. This test is applied to the U.S. canned tuna market, where two of the three largest firms recently plead guilty to price fixing. This research shows how the framework can be used to i) date cartel operations, ii) distinguish cartel participants from firms that are simply pricing optimally given its competitors are colluding and iii) study the effectiveness of the cartel by comparing observed prices and variable profits to those that arise in Nash-Bertrand equilibrium and under joint profit maximization.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.