Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Should I trust the Mechanic? An Experiment on Bayesian Persuasion

经济学博士论文研究：我应该相信机械师吗？

• 批准号: 1824353
• 负责人: Andreas Blume
• 金额: $ 0.61万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-07-15 至 2019-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1824353&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Should

Economic models assume that competition will encourage information transparency which is essential for efficient decision making and functioning of markets. However, information can be manipulated or concealed to change the receiver's beliefs. This research project will use laboratory experiments to test whether competition among economic agents encourage transparency. In these experiments, agents send information to persuade or influence a decision maker. The study proceeds in two steps. In the first experiment, only one person at a time, without competition, sends information to the decision maker. In the second experiment, two competing people send information to the decision maker. There is no prediction of full information revelation in the first experiment, while theory predicts full information revelation in the second. These design differences allows the researchers to test whether competition leads to information transparency. The results of this research project will provide a test of one of the fundamental assumptions about competition which is the foundation of most market economies. The results will also provide guidance on designing mechanisms to elicit transparency in economic interactions, thus improve the efficiency of the US economy, growth, and income.This proposed research will build on Bayesian persuasion and use laboratory experiments to test whether competition leads to transparency in information transmission. Conventional wisdom suggests that competition between agents will encourage transparency. The PIs will test this in a lab experiment in which two agents individually provide information in different ways, to influence a decision maker. The PIs develop a model in which the two senders of information have zero sum utilities and expect the first sender to reveal the truth. If s/he conceals the truth, competitive theory predicts that the second agent will send the opposite signal and the receiver is likely to follow the more precise information. The base model is one in which only one agent at a time sends information to the decision maker. The experiments will test these theoretical predictions and will serve to validate the theory as well as provide guidance on behavioral factors that affect transparency. Besides testing the theoretical assumption of information transparency, this research will provide guidance on mechanism design to enhance information transparency. This will help improve the functioning of the US economy, hence economic growth and increased income.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

经济模型假定竞争将鼓励信息透明度，这对有效的决策和市场运作至关重要。 然而，信息可以被操纵或隐藏，以改变接收者的信念。该研究项目将利用实验室实验来检验经济行为主体之间的竞争是否鼓励透明度。 在这些实验中，代理人发送信息来说服或影响决策者。 研究分两步进行。 在第一个实验中，一次只有一个人，没有竞争，向决策者发送信息。 在第二个实验中，两个相互竞争的人向决策者发送信息。 在第一个实验中没有预测到完全信息揭示，而理论预测了第二个实验中的完全信息揭示。这些设计差异使研究人员能够测试竞争是否会导致信息透明。 这一研究项目的结果将检验作为大多数市场经济基础的关于竞争的基本假设之一。 研究结果还将为设计经济互动中的透明机制提供指导，从而提高美国经济、增长和收入的效率。这项拟议中的研究将建立在贝叶斯说服的基础上，并使用实验室实验来测试竞争是否会导致信息传递的透明。 传统观点认为，代理人之间的竞争将促进透明度。 PI将在实验室实验中测试这一点，其中两个代理人分别以不同的方式提供信息，以影响决策者。 PI开发了一个模型，在这个模型中，两组信息的效用为零，并期望第一个发送者揭示真相。 如果他/她隐瞒真相，竞争理论预测，第二个代理将发送相反的信号，接收者可能会遵循更精确的信息。 在基本模型中，一次只有一个代理向决策者发送信息。 实验将测试这些理论预测，并将验证该理论，以及对影响透明度的行为因素提供指导。 本研究除了验证信息透明度的理论假设外，也将对提高信息透明度的机制设计提供指导。 这将有助于改善美国经济的运作，从而促进经济增长和收入增加。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。