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Fundamental assumptions of game-theoretic solution concepts

博弈论解决方案概念的基本假设

基本信息

批准号：
235263282
负责人：
Privatdozent Dr. Andreas Tutic
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Soziologie
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/235263282?language=en
关键词：
Fundamental assumptions game theoretic solution

项目摘要

Both decision- and game-theoretical assumptions of rational choice theory have come under criticism in recent years, mainly due to experimental research. At the same time there is an apparent convergence of new sociological action theories, social-psychological dual-process theories and economic theories of bounded rationality, which gives birth to a new synthesis in interdisciplinary action theory. This synthesis could serve as an alternative to the standard theory, provided the theory matures in terms of its degree of formalization. The core idea of this alternative is to conceptualize rational behavior and in particular Zweckrationalität as but one decision procedure among others, and to differentiate it from more automatic forms of decision-making. The new synthesis provides a variety of hypotheses concerning the conditions, under which instinctive rather than contemplative, automatic-spontaneous rather than reflecting-calculating or system-1- rather than system-2-behavior comes about. This alternative theory exists already as rudimentary decision theory; its extension to a theory of strategic interaction, i.e., the answer to the question of how a new game theory, which is based upon these principles, might look like, still misses.In this project two core ideas of this new synthesis will be examined in the context of strategic interaction. First of all, the centerpiece of the synthesis, i.e., the body of hypotheses referring to the situational conditions under which either automatic-spontaneous or reflecting-calculating decision making occurs, shall be tested experimentally. To this end, we will recur on the most explicit version of these hypotheses, which was provided by Esser and Kroneberg as part of the new sociological action theory. A second series of experiments will be directed at an empirical test of another core idea of the new synthesis, which has not yet been included in new sociological action theories. This is the notion that system-2-like, reflective thinking shares some kind of "energy pool" with other, higher cognitive functions. Specifically, we will test experimentally whether and to what extent the performance in strategic interaction is affected by classic social-psychological techniques of manipulating this pool (e.g.: Memorizing sequences while making decisions; performing an activity that demands self-control; etc.). The sketched research project contributes to the interdisciplinary understanding of human decision-making, since these two essential principles of the new synthesis have never been tested systematically in the context of strategic interaction.

近年来，理性选择理论的决策论和博弈论假设都受到了批评，主要是由于实验研究。与此同时，新的社会学行动理论、社会心理双过程理论和有限理性的经济学理论也出现了明显的趋同，这催生了跨学科行动理论的新综合。这种综合可以作为标准理论的替代，只要理论在形式化程度上成熟。这种替代方案的核心思想是将理性行为（尤其是Zweckrationalität）概念化，并将其与更自动化的决策形式区分开来。新的综合提供了各种假设的条件下，本能，而不是模仿，自动自发，而不是反映计算或系统1，而不是系统2的行为。这种替代理论已经作为基本的决策理论存在;它扩展到战略互动理论，即，基于这些原则的新博弈论是什么样的，这个问题的答案仍然没有找到。2在这个项目中，将在战略互动的背景下研究这种新综合的两个核心思想。首先，合成的核心，即，涉及自动自发决策或反思计算决策发生的情境条件的假设主体，应通过实验进行检验。为此目的，我们将重新讨论这些假设的最明确的版本，它是由Esser和Kroneberg作为新社会学行动理论的一部分提供的。第二个系列的实验将针对新综合的另一个核心思想的实证检验，这还没有包括在新的社会学行动理论。这是一种类似系统2的概念，即反思性思维与其他更高的认知功能共享某种“能量库”。具体来说，我们将通过实验测试策略互动中的表现是否以及在多大程度上受到操纵这一池的经典社会心理技术的影响（例如：在做决定的时候打乱顺序;执行一项需要自我控制的活动;等等）。概述的研究项目有助于人类决策的跨学科理解，因为这两个新的综合的基本原则从来没有在战略互动的背景下进行系统的测试。