Phase I IUCRC University of Connecticut: Center for Hardware and Embedded Systems Security and Trust

第一阶段 IUCRC 康涅狄格大学：硬件和嵌入式系统安全与信任中心

• 批准号: 1916756
• 负责人: John Chandy
• 金额: $ 75万
• 依托单位: University of Connecticut
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-10-01 至 2025-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1916756&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Phase; IUCRC; University; Connecticut; Center

The Center for Hardware and Embedded Systems Security and Trust (CHEST) coordinates university-based research with needs of industry and government partners to advance knowledge of security, assurance, and trust for electronic hardware and embedded systems. Interests of CHEST include identification, detection, monitoring, mitigation, and elimination of vulnerabilities that affect hardware and embedded systems. The CHEST Center addresses a range of attack vectors across design, operation, manufacturing, supply chains, and integration of the hardware, software, and firmware to a variety of systems. The Center is inventing and disseminating technologies, practices, and guidelines to stakeholders and educating a next generation of experts.The NSF CHEST Center addresses security, assurance, and trust across several levels: Large-scale systems, embedded systems, design and operations, requirements, standards, manufacturing, supply chains, and integrated circuits and boards. Among the universities, the University of Connecticut will lead CHEST efforts for hardware and embedded system security and trust at the circuit and systems level. Research topics include (i) anti-tamper technologies that help prevent reverse engineering; (ii) counterfeit detection and prevention in the supply chain of integrated circuits and component subsystems, and (iii) methods to automatically configure hardware components in distributed embedded systems.Security, assurance, and trust of integrated cyber-physical systems enable meeting fundamental human needs, along with supporting broader social, environmental, and economic progress of the nation. The ability of systems to absorb disruptive shocks and recover with minimal loss is key to protecting human lives and property. The NSF CHEST Center influences the practices of industry, government, and the military in design, protection, and resilience to vulnerabilities associated with hardware and embedded systems. Improving assurance and trust contributes to the reducing the frequencies and severities of adverse events with attention to system missions, performance, schedule, and cost.The NSF CHEST Center website, www.nsfchest.org, is the repository for all publicly accessible data, code, results, etc. These pages will be maintained for at least as long as the CHEST Center is active. In addition, all projects led by the University of Connecticut (UConn) are permanently archived in digital format on the UConn file servers with sufficient provisions for backup and recovery in case of equipment failure. All archival UConn computers and servers are backed up on a regular basis.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

硬件和嵌入式系统安全与信任中心(ROST)协调基于大学的研究与行业和政府合作伙伴的需求，以促进电子硬件和嵌入式系统的安全、保证和信任方面的知识。ROST的兴趣包括识别、检测、监控、缓解和消除影响硬件和嵌入式系统的漏洞。该中心针对设计、运营、制造、供应链以及将硬件、软件和固件集成到各种系统中的一系列攻击媒介。该中心正在向利益相关者发明和传播技术、实践和指导方针，并培养下一代专家。NSF胸科中心致力于解决以下几个层面的安全、保证和信任问题：大规模系统、嵌入式系统、设计和运营、要求、标准、制造、供应链以及集成电路和电路板。在这些大学中，康涅狄格大学将在电路和系统层面领导硬件和嵌入式系统安全和信任的公益性努力。研究课题包括(I)有助于防止反向工程的防篡改技术；(Ii)集成电路和组件子系统供应链中的假冒检测和预防；以及(Iii)分布式嵌入式系统中硬件组件的自动配置方法。集成的网络物理系统的安全、保证和信任能够满足人类的基本需求，并支持国家更广泛的社会、环境和经济进步。系统吸收破坏性冲击并以最小损失恢复的能力是保护人类生命和财产的关键。NSF胸部中心影响着行业、政府和军方在设计、保护和应对与硬件和嵌入式系统相关的漏洞方面的实践。改善保证和信任有助于降低不良事件的频率和严重性，并关注系统任务、性能、进度和成本。NSF胸部中心网站www.nsfchest.org是所有可公开访问的数据、代码、结果等的存储库。只要胸部中心处于活动状态，这些页面将至少保持不变。此外，康涅狄格大学(康涅狄格大学)领导的所有项目都以数字格式永久保存在康涅狄格大学的文件服务器上，并为设备发生故障时的备份和恢复提供了足够的资金。康涅狄格州大学的所有档案计算机和服务器都定期进行备份。这一奖励反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

PCB Security Modules for Reverse-Engineering Resistant Design

用于抗逆向工程设计的 PCB 安全模块

• DOI: 10.1142/s0129156423500155
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: International Journal of High Speed Electronics and Systems
• 作者: Chen, Shuai;Wang, Lei
• 通讯作者: Wang, Lei

Translation of AADL model to security attack tree (TAMSAT) to SMART evaluation of monetary security risk

将 AADL 模型转化为安全攻击树（TAMSAT）以实现货币安全风险的 SMART 评估

• DOI: 10.1080/19393555.2022.2106909
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective
• 作者: Wortman, P. A.;Chandy, John
• 通讯作者: Chandy, John

Synthetic Data for Deep Learning: Segmentation of PCB X-Ray Images

用于深度学习的合成数据：PCB X 射线图像的分割

• DOI: 10.1093/micmic/ozad067.979
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Microscopy and Microanalysis
• 影响因子: 2.8
• 作者: Phoulady, Adrian;Choi, Hongbin;May, Nicholas;Shahbazmohamadi, Sina;Tavousi, Pouya
• 通讯作者: Tavousi, Pouya

Terahertz Readable Laser Tags for Information Storage and Traceability

用于信息存储和可追溯性的太赫兹可读激光标签

• DOI: 10.1093/micmic/ozad067.406
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Microscopy and Microanalysis
• 影响因子: 2.8
• 作者: Hoveida, Pouria;Phoulady, Adrian;Choi, Hongbin;May, Nicholas;Shahbazmohamadi, Sina;Tavousi, Pouya
• 通讯作者: Tavousi, Pouya

Characterization of mitigation schemes against timing-based side-channel attacks on PCIe hardware

PCIe 硬件上基于时序的旁道攻击缓解方案的表征

• DOI: 10.1109/isqed54688.2022.9806241
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: 2022 23rd International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED
• 作者: Ali, Usman;Khaliq, Salman Abdul;Khan, Omer
• 通讯作者: Khan, Omer