Collaborative Research: Financial Network Reactions to Regulations and Interventions

合作研究：金融网络对监管和干预的反应

• 批准号: 1919351
• 负责人: Selman Erol
• 金额: $ 19.8万
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-09-01 至 2023-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1919351&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Financial; Network; Reactions

AbstractThe role of government interventions and regulations in the operation of the financial sector has important implications for the economy. This project explores how banking regulations and government interventions affect the interaction of banks. The project uses historical and modern data sources to analyze the changes in interbank relations in changing regulatory policy environments. The project considers that a banking network adjusts to the anticipation of government support in ways that makes the banking system more reliant on government support and more prone to less likely catastrophic events. Second, the project looks at the effects of opacity versus transparency by considering that banks operating with opacity support each other at times of distress without disturbing the broader economy and creating panics. Finally, the research looks at the implications of central clearing counterparties. Central clearing counterparties (CCP) are institutions that take counterparty risk to transactions and provide clearing and settlement services for them. This research explores how central clearing of derivatives enhances coordination among banks and prevents crises which can arise as coordination failures on clearing obligations.This project explores several research questions on the banking system and central clearing policies. First question explores how public liquidity provision affects the way banks relate to each other. The project constructs a theory on the effects of the public liquidity provisions by the Federal Reserve System (FED) and test the predictions of this theory utilizing historical data on the establishment of the FED in 1913. This research indicates that public liquidity provision by the FED indirectly creates the first shadow banking sector in the U.S., so that an unexpected contraction in public liquidity can induce systemic risk. Second research question explores recent regulations that mandate central clearing of derivatives and how these regulations affect the exposure and interconnections of different banks. This research constructs a theoretical model of derivatives which highlights a tradeoff. On the one hand, CCPs have the benefit of enhancing coordination across banks. On the other hand, CCPs operate partly as an exchange that improves market transparency, reducing bank insurance. Using detailed data that includes exposures of all banks in the U.S. to all other financial and non-financial institutions, this research explores how these tradeoffs interact in different layers of the banking network.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

摘要政府干预和法规在金融部门运营中的作用对经济具有重要意义。该项目探讨了银行法规和政府干预措施如何影响银行的相互作用。 该项目使用历史和现代数据源来分析改变监管政策环境中银行间关系的变化。该项目认为，银行网络以使银行体系更依赖政府支持的方式来适应政府支持的预期，并且更容易发生较少的灾难性事件。其次，该项目通过考虑到在遇到困难时相互支持的银行在不打扰更广泛的经济并造成恐慌的情况下相互支持，从而着眼于不透明度与透明度的影响。最后，研究着眼于中央清算对手的含义。中央清算交易对手（CCP）是承担交易对手风险并为其提供清算和和解服务的机构。这项研究探讨了衍生工具的中央清算如何增强银行之间的协调，并防止危机可能是随着清算义务的协调失败而发生的。该项目探讨了有关银行系统和中央清算政策的几个研究问题。 第一个问题探讨了公共流动性规定如何影响银行彼此之间的关系。该项目构建了关于美联储系统（FED）公共流动性规定影响的理论，并测试了该理论的预测，该理论利用了1913年建立美联储的历史数据。这项研究表明，美联储的公共流动性在美国建立了公共流动性，从而在美国建立了第一个影子银行部门，因此公共流动性的意外构造可以引起系统性的系统性风险。第二个研究问题探讨了最新的法规，该法规要求衍生工具的中央清算以及这些法规如何影响不同银行的接触和互连。这项研究构建了一种理论模型的衍生物模型，突出了一个权衡。一方面，CCP的好处是增强整个银行的协调。另一方面，CCP部分作为提高市场透明度并降低银行保险的交易所运营。本研究使用详细数据，包括美国所有银行对所有其他财务和非财务机构的曝光，探讨了这些折衷方案如何在银行网络的不同层次上进行交互。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并认为通过基金会的知识分子和更广泛的影响审查Criteria来评估，并被认为是值得通过评估的支持。