NSF/BSF: Strategic Information Disclosure

NSF/BSF：战略信息披露

• 批准号: 2116250
• 负责人: Andrzej Skrzypacz
• 金额: $ 16.29万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-09-15 至 2024-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2116250&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSF; BSF; Strategic; Information; Disclosure

This award funds research in the economic theory of information disclosure. The goal is to develop and analyze three separate models of how people interact in employment and market situations. The first considers whether a manager of a publicly traded firm who seeks to maximize share prices should disclose everything she knows today, or whether she should delay disclosure until she has more information. The second project examines whether a manager is more likely to disclose when she is more confident that the information is accurate. The third project considers how an entrepreneur might reveal information to investors and regulators. The results of this project will advance the national prosperity because it will help us better understand the effects of different regulations on publicly traded firms.Voluntary information disclosure by agents is a common feature of markets, ranging from public information disclosure by managers of public firms that affects stock prices, to entrepreneurs disclosing information to influence investors and customers, to politicians trying to influence voters. While most previous models have studied relatively simple, mostly static disclosure problems, this proposal explores more realistic and complex environments. The first project analyzes models of agents facing a dynamic problem: disclose information now or later. In the model, a public firm's value follows a random walk. At each point in time, a manager of the firm learns with some probability the current value and can disclose it credibly. The manager maximizes a weighted average of stock prices, and the market sets prices rationally. The project explores how dynamic considerations affect equilibrium disclosure, how regulation requiring timely disclosure affects information dissemination, and incentives to acquire information in the first place. The second project captures another realistic aspect of disclosure: that when an agent reveals information, it is often just a noisy estimate of the true value. Moreover, the market may be worried that the agent is hiding more accurate information. It answers which types of signals (more or less accurate) the manager is more likely to disclose. It describes the correlation between prices and residual uncertainty about the true value conditional on disclosed information. The third project studies a model of an agent trying to influence multiple decisions by receivers. For example, an entrepreneur may reveal information to investors and to regulators to influence decisions by both. It aims to discover under what conditions sequential information disclosure can strictly improve upon single-shot disclosure and the optimal order of communication.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项资助信息披露的经济理论研究。我们的目标是开发和分析人们在就业和市场情况下如何互动的三个独立模型。第一个问题考虑的是，一个寻求股价最大化的上市公司经理是否应该披露她今天所知道的一切，或者她是否应该推迟披露，直到她有更多的信息。第二个项目考察的是，当管理者对信息的准确性更有信心时，她是否更有可能披露信息。第三个项目考虑企业家如何向投资者和监管机构披露信息。本研究的结果将有助于我们更好地理解上市公司的不同监管措施的效果，从而促进国家的繁荣。代理人的自愿信息披露是市场的共同特征，从上市公司的管理者披露影响股价的信息，到企业家披露影响投资者和消费者的信息，再到政治家试图影响选民的信息。虽然大多数以前的模型研究相对简单，大多是静态的披露问题，这一建议探讨更现实和复杂的环境。第一个项目分析了代理人面临的一个动态问题：现在或以后披露信息的模型。在该模型中，上市公司的价值遵循随机游走。在每一个时间点，公司的管理者都有一定的概率知道当前的价值，并可以合理地披露它。管理者最大化股票价格的加权平均值，市场理性地设定价格。该项目探讨了动态考虑因素如何影响均衡披露，要求及时披露的监管如何影响信息传播，以及获取信息的动机。第二个项目抓住了披露的另一个现实方面：当代理人透露信息时，它通常只是对真实价值的嘈杂估计。此外，市场可能担心代理人隐藏了更准确的信息。它回答了管理者更有可能披露哪些类型的信号（或多或少准确）。它描述了价格与以披露信息为条件的真实价值的剩余不确定性之间的相关性。第三个项目研究了一个代理人试图影响接收者的多个决策的模型。例如，企业家可以向投资者和监管机构透露信息，以影响双方的决策。该奖项旨在发现在何种条件下，顺序信息披露可以严格改善一次性披露和最佳沟通顺序。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。