Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Do Firms Indeed Pursue Profit Maximization? An Experiment

经济学博士论文研究：企业确实追求利润最大化吗？

• 批准号: 2149219
• 负责人: Charles Noussair
• 金额: $ 0.45万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-04-15 至 2025-03-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2149219&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Do

Profit maximization is a simple tool that economists use to model firms' behaviors; and this assumption of profit maximization is pervasive in economics. However, it is doubtful that profit maximization is the only way to describe firms’ behaviors. In a modern economy, ownership and management are separated for many firms, except for family-owned businesses. Owners are usually shareholders, and they get dividends from their own companies. Managers, such as a CEO and workers, get salaries from companies based on their working performances, indicated as profit and sales, revenue, market shares, or other quantitative indices. For example, suppose a manager’s salary is decided by his sales. Then, he will focus on increasing sales, which leads to a different outcome compared to the case where the manager’s salary is decided based on the firm’s profit. In other words, firms’ behaviors depend on how managers’ incentives are determined. Managers (delegated by owners) make decisions related to firms’ operations, and this does not necessarily result in profit-maximizing behavior. Though there was some research about strategic delegation before, most economic research has assumed profit maximization, without considering strategic delegation. Therefore, this research will examine how firms’ behaviors under strategic delegation are different from those obtained under pure profit maximization. This experimental study uses a two-stage Cournot duopoly game to describe strategic delegation in a market (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Jansen et al., 2007). In the experiment, there are two firms in a market. Each firm consists of one owner and one manager. In Stage 1, both firm owners choose a contract determining the managers’ incentives: profit delegation (only profit), revenue delegation (profit and weighted revenue), and market share delegation (profit and weighted market share). In Stage 2, managers choose whether or not to collude. Owners’ and managers’ selections will determine market output under strategic delegation. Theoretically, the market outcome under strategic delegation is more aggressive than that under profit maximization. Thus, this study will investigate whether the theoretical results are held under strategic delegation. This research will help understand firms’ behaviors are more/less competitive than analyzed before. For example, Spierdijk and Zaouras (2017) show that the Lerner index obtained by profit maximization assumption is not appropriate to describe market power if firms do not maximize profit. As an extension of such research, this study will use experiments to identify firms’ behaviors that are not profit-maximizing. Also, this project will contribute to improving structural models. Since the BLP model (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) was proposed, demand estimation has been advanced, but the ‘supply’ part from the model still assumes profit maximization that leads to underestimating the marginal cost. Thus, the results of the experimental study will potentially help improve structural models.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

利润最大化是经济学家用来模拟企业行为的一个简单工具;利润最大化的假设在经济学中很普遍。然而，利润最大化是否是描述企业行为的唯一方式值得怀疑。在现代经济中，除了家族企业之外，许多企业的所有权和管理权是分离的。所有者通常是股东，他们从自己的公司获得股息。经理人，如首席执行官和工人，根据他们的工作业绩从公司获得工资，这些业绩表现为利润和销售额，收入，市场份额或其他量化指标。例如，假设一个经理的工资是由他的销售决定的。然后，他将专注于增加销售，这导致了与经理的工资是根据公司的利润决定的情况不同的结果。换句话说，企业的行为取决于管理者的激励如何确定。经理（由所有者委派）做出与公司运营相关的决策，这并不一定会导致利润最大化的行为。虽然以前有一些关于战略授权的研究，但大多数经济学研究都假设利润最大化，没有考虑战略授权。因此，本研究将探讨企业在策略性授权下的行为与单纯利润最大化下的行为有何不同。这项实验研究使用两阶段古诺双寡头博弈来描述市场中的战略授权（Vickers，1985; Fershtman和Judd，1987; Jansen等人，2007年）。在实验中，市场中有两家公司。每个公司由一名所有者和一名经理组成。在第一阶段，两个公司所有者选择一个合同，确定管理者的激励：利润授权（只有利润），收入授权（利润和加权收入），市场份额授权（利润和加权市场份额）。在第二阶段，管理者选择是否合谋。在战略授权下，所有者和管理者的选择将决定市场产出。从理论上讲，战略委托下的市场结果比利润最大化下的市场结果更具侵略性。因此，本研究将探讨在策略性授权下，理论结果是否成立。这一研究将有助于理解企业的行为是更多/更少的竞争比以前的分析。例如，Spierdijk和Zaouras（2017）表明，如果企业不实现利润最大化，则通过利润最大化假设获得的Lerner指数不适合描述市场力量。作为这类研究的延伸，本研究将通过实验来识别企业的非利润最大化行为。此外，该项目将有助于改进结构模型。自BLP模型（Berry，Levinsohn，and Pakes，1995）提出以来，需求估计已经得到了改进，但模型中的“供给”部分仍然假设利润最大化，导致低估了边际成本。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。