NSF-BSF: SaTC: CORE: Small: Rowhammering Peripherals

NSF-BSF：SaTC：核心：小型：Rowhammering 外围设备

• 批准号: 2154771
• 负责人: Donald Porter
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-06-15 至 2025-05-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2154771&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSF; BSF; SaTC; CORE; Small

This project studies an emerging, potential attack vector against modern computer systems: vulnerable peripheral devices, such as flash storage or network devices. Many modern computer memory (Random Access Memory, or RAM) designs are vulnerable to a rowhammering attack, where some regions of memory can be corrupted by repeated accesses from application code. This project observes that peripheral devices are no longer purely hardware, but instead have their own internal CPU and RAM, which can also be attacked---indirectly---through heavy input/output (I/O) operations. The novelties of this project are demonstrating a proof-of-concept that one can potentially deny service or gain administrative privilege on a system through vulnerable peripheral devices, as well as creating strategies to mitigate these attacks. The project's broader significance and importance is hardening the security of modern computing systems, especially cloud computing, where different users may share vulnerable hardware.This project studies rowhammering the internal RAM in modern peripherals, using only standard, unprivileged I/O operations at the high bandwidths offered by these peripherals. The project studies practical attacks on Solid State Drives (SSDs), traditional Network Interface Cards (NICs), and emerging SmartNICs, launched by unprivileged users, such as a guest virtual machine in a multi-tenant cloud system, and using only standard I/O patterns. The work studies the impact on vulnerability to this attack of design choices in both device firmware and operating system device drivers, using both open and closed devices, and, in the case of SmartNICs, using both custom and standard network offload functions. Because it is difficult to defend against rowhammering entirely in hardware, the proposed work innovates in efficient, software/hardware cooperative defenses, which can potentially improve future peripheral hardware designs.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该项目研究针对现代计算机系统的一种新兴的潜在攻击媒介：易受攻击的外围设备，如闪存或网络设备。许多现代计算机内存（随机存取存储器，或RAM）设计容易受到行击攻击，其中内存的某些区域可能会被应用程序代码的重复访问损坏。该项目观察到，外围设备不再是纯粹的硬件，而是有自己的内部CPU和RAM，也可以通过繁重的输入/输出（I/O）操作间接攻击。该项目的新颖之处在于展示了一种概念验证，即人们可以通过易受攻击的外围设备拒绝服务或获得系统上的管理权限，并创建策略来减轻这些攻击。该项目的更广泛的意义和重要性是加强现代计算系统的安全性，特别是云计算，在云计算中，不同的用户可能会共享易受攻击的硬件。该项目研究在现代外围设备中的内部RAM中进行锤击，仅使用标准的，无特权的I/O操作，在这些外围设备提供的高带宽下进行。该项目研究了对固态硬盘（SSD）、传统网络接口卡（NIC）和新兴智能卡的实际攻击，这些攻击由非特权用户发起，例如多租户云系统中的来宾虚拟机，并且只使用标准I/O模式。这项工作研究了在设备固件和操作系统设备驱动程序的设计选择，使用开放和封闭的设备，这种攻击的脆弱性的影响，并在SmartCable的情况下，使用自定义和标准的网络卸载功能。由于完全依靠硬件来防御排爆是困难的，因此该项目在有效的软硬件协同防御方面进行了创新，这可能会改善未来的外围硬件设计。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Degrading Data to Save the Planet

• DOI: 10.1145/3593856.3595896
• 发表时间: 2023-06
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems
• 作者: A. Zuck;Donald Porter;Dan Tsafrir

Mosaic Pages: Big TLB Reach with Small Pages

马赛克页面：小页面实现大 TLB 覆盖范围

• DOI: 10.1145/3582016.3582021
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Proc.\ 28th {ACM} International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
• 作者: Gosakan, Krishnan;Han, Jaehyun;Kuszmaul, William;Mubarek, Ibrahim N.;Mukherjee, Nirjhar;Sriram, Karthik;Tagliavini, Guido;West, Evan;Bender, Michael A.;Bhattacharjee, Abhishek
• 通讯作者: Bhattacharjee, Abhishek