Collaborative Research: Should Regulators Have Independence from Political Pressures? Politics, Banking, and Bankruptcies During the Progressive Era, 1890s to 1920s

合作研究：监管机构是否应该独立于政治压力？

• 批准号: 2214557
• 负责人: Marco Antonio Martinez del Angel
• 金额: $ 15.84万
• 依托单位: California State L A University Auxiliary Services Inc.
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-09-01 至 2024-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2214557&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Should; Regulators; Independence

Should government regulators, particularly those that supervise financial institutions, be subject to the whims of politicians, who might demand actions in their personal or partisan interests, or should regulators operate independent of politicians in the short run? Independent regulators are appointed by politicians to accomplish tasks defined by legislatures but can only be fired for “good cause,” which means that the regulators serve their terms in office as long as they fulfill their duties and do not violate the law. Today, regulatory independence is the norm. It forms a cornerstone of the financial system. All federal agencies that regulate banks, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve System, operate independently. Questions, however, have been raised about the effectiveness and constitutionality of regulatory independence. The effectiveness of regulatory independence is difficult to study today. So, we study historical analogies, particularly during the Progressive Era, when U.S. state governments experimented with the structure of regulatory agencies and transitioned from politically independent to politically dependent regulators. To assess the impact of these political experiments, we gather new data that will allow scholars to better understand the history of the Progressive Era and the impact of government intervention on the financial system and rest of the economy.This research will examine how political control of bank supervision affected financial institutions and firms, and how financial and political instability contributed to the spread of political polarization during the Progressive Era. To answer these questions, the project will build a new dataset on business and bank foundation and failure rates by state and quarter from the 1890s through the 1930s as well as the aggregate liabilities and assets of these institutions. The project will also build a new dataset on the structure of financial regulation in the 50 states. This information will be merged with existing data on politics, political structures, voting by the public and political representatives, and the state of the national and local economies. The new dataset will advance knowledge of the Progressive Era, lifting a veil on relationships between economics and politics that existing data obscures. The data will also advance knowledge related to current policy debates, particularly the optimal design of institutions regulating financial institutions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

政府监管机构，尤其是那些监管金融机构的机构，是否应该屈从于政客们的异想天开（他们可能会要求出于个人或党派利益采取行动），或者监管机构是否应该在短期内独立于政客运作？独立监管机构由政治家任命，以完成立法机构规定的任务，但只有在“正当理由”下才能被解雇，这意味着监管机构只要履行职责且不违反法律，就可以在任期内任职。如今，监管独立已成为常态。它构成了金融体系的基石。所有监管银行的联邦机构，如联邦存款保险公司和联邦储备系统，都是独立运作的。然而，人们对监管独立性的有效性和合宪性提出了质疑。监管独立性的有效性在今天很难研究。因此，我们研究历史类比，特别是在进步时代，当时美国州政府试验了监管机构的结构，并从政治上独立的监管机构过渡到政治上依赖的监管机构。为了评估这些政治实验的影响，我们收集了新的数据，这些数据将使学者们更好地了解进步时代的历史以及政府干预对金融体系和其他经济领域的影响。本研究将探讨银行监管的政治控制如何影响金融机构和公司，以及金融和政治不稳定如何促成进步时代政治两极分化的蔓延。为了回答这些问题，该项目将建立一个新的数据集，包括从19世纪90年代到30年代，各州和各季度的商业和银行基础和失败率，以及这些机构的总负债和资产。该项目还将建立一个关于50个州金融监管结构的新数据集。这些信息将与有关政治、政治结构、公众和政治代表投票以及国家和地方经济状况的现有数据合并。新的数据集将促进对进步时代的认识，揭开现有数据所掩盖的经济与政治之间关系的面纱。这些数据还将促进与当前政策辩论有关的知识，特别是监管金融机构的机构的最佳设计。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。