Collaborative Research: Should Regulators Have Independence from Political Pressures? Politics, Banking, and Bankruptcies During the Progressive Era, 1890s to 1920s

合作研究：监管机构是否应该独立于政治压力？

• 批准号: 2214565
• 负责人: Gary Richardson
• 金额: $ 14.15万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-09-01 至 2024-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2214565&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Should; Regulators; Independence

Should government regulators, particularly those that supervise financial institutions, be subject to the whims of politicians, who might demand actions in their personal or partisan interests, or should regulators operate independent of politicians in the short run? Independent regulators are appointed by politicians to accomplish tasks defined by legislatures but can only be fired for “good cause,” which means that the regulators serve their terms in office as long as they fulfill their duties and do not violate the law. Today, regulatory independence is the norm. It forms a cornerstone of the financial system. All federal agencies that regulate banks, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve System, operate independently. Questions, however, have been raised about the effectiveness and constitutionality of regulatory independence. The effectiveness of regulatory independence is difficult to study today. So, we study historical analogies, particularly during the Progressive Era, when U.S. state governments experimented with the structure of regulatory agencies and transitioned from politically independent to politically dependent regulators. To assess the impact of these political experiments, we gather new data that will allow scholars to better understand the history of the Progressive Era and the impact of government intervention on the financial system and rest of the economy.This research will examine how political control of bank supervision affected financial institutions and firms, and how financial and political instability contributed to the spread of political polarization during the Progressive Era. To answer these questions, the project will build a new dataset on business and bank foundation and failure rates by state and quarter from the 1890s through the 1930s as well as the aggregate liabilities and assets of these institutions. The project will also build a new dataset on the structure of financial regulation in the 50 states. This information will be merged with existing data on politics, political structures, voting by the public and political representatives, and the state of the national and local economies. The new dataset will advance knowledge of the Progressive Era, lifting a veil on relationships between economics and politics that existing data obscures. The data will also advance knowledge related to current policy debates, particularly the optimal design of institutions regulating financial institutions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

政府监管机构，特别是那些监管金融机构的机构，是否应该受制于政客的突发奇想，因为政客可能会出于个人或党派利益要求采取行动，或者监管机构是否应该在短期内独立于政客运作？独立监管机构由政治家任命，以完成立法机构规定的任务，但只能因“正当理由”被解雇，这意味着监管机构只要履行职责，不违反法律，就可以任职。今天，监管独立是常态。它是金融体系的基石。所有监管银行的联邦机构，如联邦存款保险公司和联邦储备系统，都是独立运作的。然而，人们对监管独立性的有效性和合宪性提出了质疑。监管独立性的有效性今天很难研究。因此，我们研究历史类比，特别是在进步时代，当美国州政府试验监管机构的结构，并从政治独立过渡到政治依赖的监管机构。为了评估这些政治实验的影响，我们收集了新的数据，使学者们能够更好地了解进步时代的历史以及政府干预对金融体系和其他经济领域的影响。本研究将研究银行监管的政治控制如何影响金融机构和企业，以及金融和政治不稳定如何导致进步时代政治两极分化的蔓延。为了回答这些问题，该项目将建立一个关于19世纪90年代至20世纪30年代按州和季度划分的企业和银行基础和失败率的新数据集，以及这些机构的总负债和资产。该项目还将建立一个关于50个州金融监管结构的新数据集。这些信息将与关于政治、政治结构、公众和政治代表投票以及国家和地方经济状况的现有数据合并。新的数据集将推进对进步时代的了解，揭开现有数据掩盖的经济和政治之间关系的面纱。该数据还将促进与当前政策辩论相关的知识，特别是监管金融机构的机构的最佳设计。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。