Collaborative Research: CISE-MSI: RPEP: CPS: A Resilient Cyber-Physical Security Framework for Next-Generation Distributed Energy Resources at Grid Edge

合作研究：CISE-MSI：RPEP：CPS：电网边缘下一代分布式能源的弹性网络物理安全框架

• 批准号: 2219733
• 负责人: Taesic Kim
• 金额: $ 73.74万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M University-Kingsville
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-10-01 至 2025-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2219733&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CISE; MSI; RPEP

This award is funded in whole or in part under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-2).Current electric power grid is undergoing transition due to the rapid penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) including renewable energy systems, energy storage systems, and electric vehicles. However, new cybersecurity threats arise. It is still challenging to model and manage a cross-layered security perimeter in multiparty-involved DER systems. Maloperation or malicious control of DERs will be caused by advanced attackers (e.g., hackers and insiders) as seen the real-world attack cases using the expanded attack surfaces. Besides, quantum era is coming soon and it is anticipated that quantum computing attacks will be possible within 5–10 years. In addition, many inverter-based DERs exposed to the public are vulnerable to physical attacks. To address major threats facing the cyber-physical DERs, this project aims to develop a resilient cyber-physical security framework with a collaborative partnership across multidisciplinary team members from two minority serving institutions, Texas A&M University-Kingsville and University of Illinois Chicago, and Sandia National Laboratories. Moreover, this partnership supports an integrative research and education program of the MSIs for training skilled next-generation workforce in the cyber-physical power and energy systems areas.The technical goal of this project is to launch a major research direction to develop an innovative resilient cyber-physical security framework that addresses imminent challenges in both future cyber-physical security requirements and power engineering designs and resilient operational strategies for DER-rich power systems. Specific integrated research thrusts are as follows: (a) developing a blockchain security governance model for DER systems operating under multiparty and system of systems environments; (b) developing a quantum secure DER network by studying a lightweight post quantum cryptography against quantum computing attacks; (c) realizing DER inverter hardware hardening by investigating a new DER smart inverter security design; and (d) achieving controlled resilience at grid edge using event-triggered resilient self-learning control with retrieval strategy ensuring reduced dependency and susceptibility to communication during security breach.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项全部或部分由2021年美国救援计划法案（公法117-2）资助。由于包括可再生能源系统、储能系统和电动汽车在内的分布式能源（DER）的快速渗透，当前电网正在经历转型。然而，新的网络安全威胁正在出现。在多方参与的DER系统中建模和管理跨层安全边界仍然具有挑战性。DER的误操作或恶意控制将由高级攻击者（例如，黑客和内部人员），如使用扩展的攻击表面的真实世界攻击案例所见。此外，量子时代即将到来，预计量子计算攻击将在5-10年内成为可能。此外，许多面向公众的基于逆变器的DER容易受到物理攻击。为了解决网络物理DER面临的主要威胁，该项目旨在开发一个弹性的网络物理安全框架，该框架与来自两个少数民族服务机构的多学科团队成员建立合作伙伴关系，德克萨斯农工大学金斯维尔分校和伊利诺伊大学芝加哥，以及桑迪亚国家实验室。此外，委员会认为，这一伙伴关系支持信息安全倡议的一项综合研究和教育计划，以培训网络-物理电力和能源系统领域的熟练下一代劳动力。该项目的技术目标是启动一个主要研究方向，开发一个创新的弹性网络-物理安全框架，以应对未来网络-物理电力和能源系统领域迫在眉睫的挑战。物理安全要求和电力工程设计以及DER丰富的电力系统的弹性操作策略。具体的综合研究方向如下：（a）为在多方和系统环境下运行的DER系统开发区块链安全治理模型;（B）通过研究针对量子计算攻击的轻量级后量子密码学来开发量子安全DER网络;（c）通过研究新的DER智能逆变器安全设计来实现DER逆变器硬件加固;（d）通过研究新的DER智能逆变器安全设计来实现DER逆变器硬件加固。以及（d）使用事件触发的弹性自学习控制和检索策略，在电网边缘实现受控弹性，确保在安全漏洞期间减少对通信的依赖性和敏感性。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Blockchain-Integrated Resilient Distributed Energy Resources Management System

区块链集成弹性分布式能源管理系统

• DOI: 10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961046
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm
• 作者: Ahmad, Seerin;Ahn, Bohyun;Kim, Taesic;Choi, Jinchun;Chae, Myungsuk;Han, Dongjun;Won, Dongjun
• 通讯作者: Won, Dongjun