CAREER: Normative Macro-Finance

职业：规范宏观金融

• 批准号: 2237790
• 负责人: Eduardo Davila
• 金额: $ 44.13万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2023-06-01 至 2028-05-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2237790&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Normative; Macro; Finance

This CAREER project expands and consolidates a particular area of economics, normative macro-finance. This field studies the efficiency, distributional impact, and optimal design of policy in economies in which risk, heterogeneity, dynamic considerations, imperfect commitment, and financial frictions are of first-order relevance. To that end, this project i) develops a general framework to make welfare assessments in environments with risk and uncertainty, ii) explores the welfare implications of assigning different mandates to central bankers, iii) studies the design of corrective regulation with imperfect instruments and multiple regulators, iv) examines the welfare properties of trading in financial markets when agents have different information, and v) explores the welfare consequences of allowing for joint borrowing agreements among different governments. The educational component of this project develops new self-contained materials on how to conduct normative analysis on questions pertaining to financial economics and macroeconomics. This will lower the barriers to entry to normative macro-finance, in particular for policymakers and economists in policymaking institutions. Better understanding of the welfare consequences of economic policies will influence the optimal design and implementation of government policy.This CAREER project has five components. The first component develops a general framework for making welfare assessments in dynamic stochastic economies with rich individual heterogeneity by introducing the notion of Dynamic-Stochastic weight (DS-weights). This framework allows for a novel, exact, and widely applicable decomposition of welfare assessments. This decomposition opens the door to defining new mandates for policy institutions that were not possible before. The second component explores the welfare implications of assigning different mandates to central bankers in an environment in which optimal monetary policy may be time inconsistent, perhaps because of distributional considerations. The third component studies the design of optimal corrective regulation whenever policies are conducted with imperfect instruments and when there are multiple regulators with potentially different regulatory mandates. The fourth component studies the welfare properties of trading in financial markets when individual investors have dispersed information and markets are incomplete. The fifth component studies the welfare consequences of allowing for joint borrowing agreements among different governments. Each component is directly related to economic policymaking and will provide new insights into normative questions in finance and macroeconomics.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

这个职业项目扩展和巩固了经济学的一个特定领域，规范的宏观金融。该领域研究经济中的效率，分配影响和政策的最优设计，其中风险，异质性，动态考虑，不完善的承诺和金融摩擦具有一阶相关性。为此，本项目i）开发了一个总体框架，以在风险和不确定性的环境中进行福利评估，ii）探索了向中央银行家分配不同任务的福利影响，iii）研究了不完善工具和多个监管机构的矫正监管设计，iv）研究了代理人拥有不同信息时金融市场交易的福利属性，及v）探讨容许不同政府之间订立联合借款协议的福利后果。该项目的教育部分就如何对有关金融经济学和宏观经济学的问题进行规范分析编写了新的自成一体的材料。这将降低进入规范性宏观融资的障碍，特别是对决策机构的决策者和经济学家而言。更好地理解经济政策的福利后果将影响政府政策的最佳设计和执行。第一部分通过引入动态随机权重（DS权重）的概念，建立了一个在个体异质性丰富的动态随机经济中进行福利评估的一般框架。这个框架允许一个新的，准确的，广泛适用的福利评估分解。这种分解为确定政策机构的新任务打开了大门，这在以前是不可能的。第二部分探讨了在最优货币政策可能是时间不一致的环境中，分配不同的任务给中央银行家的福利影响，也许是因为分配的考虑。第三个组成部分研究的最佳矫正监管的设计时，政策进行不完善的工具，当有多个监管机构与潜在的不同的监管任务。第四部分研究了当个体投资者信息分散且市场不完全时金融市场交易的福利性质。第五部分研究允许不同政府之间的联合借款协议的福利后果。每个组成部分都与经济决策直接相关，并将为金融和宏观经济学的规范性问题提供新的见解。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。