DDRIG in DRMS: Communicating Controversial Risk Issues - Effects of Inoculation Messages on Selective Exposure to Counterattitudinal Messages and Subsequent Persuasive Outcomes

DRMS 中的 DDRIG：沟通有争议的风险问题 - 接种信息对选择性暴露于反态度信息和随后的说服性结果的影响

• 批准号: 2242458
• 负责人: Jeffrey Niederdeppe
• 金额: $ 3.02万
• 依托单位: Cornell University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2023-05-01 至 2024-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2242458&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: DDRIG; DRMS; Communicating; Controversial; Risk

Public communication surrounding controversial risk and policy issues is often characterized by competitive messaging, whereby different messengers compete to frame these risk issues in ways that they believe will shift public and policymaker opinions in favor of their interests. Inoculation is a long-standing persuasion theory that describes framing and responses to risk issues. Prior research suggests that inoculation messages can confer resistance to persuasion by another competing message. This study expands inoculation theory by testing people’s tendency to approach or avoid competing messages after being inoculated. If an inoculation message makes people more likely to proactively seek out competing information, they might be susceptible to persuasion from competing information compared to other messaging strategies that do not encourage people to explore competing information. This research tests and extends inoculation theory with the goal of helping risk communicators and policymakers to better understand how people process messages characterized by competition and controversy. In examining inoculation theory, the researchers are studying two issues that are characterized by competition and controversy – gun violence and nuclear energy. This research (N = 1,500) features a 2 (persuasive strategy – inoculation vs. one-sided) by 2 (issue direction – pro or con) by 2 (preexisting attitude direction – pro or con) between-subject experimental design, plus an offset control condition. It tests how people who read an inoculation message differ from other people in their selective exposure to counter messages or attack messages and subsequent persuasive outcomes. It further explores how these effects may differ among people whose initial attitudinal position is either consistent or inconsistent with the inoculation message advocated position. This research offers risk communicators theory-informed guidance on how to better employ an inoculation strategy to communicate with audiences in today’s high-choice media environment. Findings also shed light on the effects of risk messages among members of the public who hold a wide range of preexisting issue positions for controversial risk issues.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

围绕有争议的风险和政策问题的公共传播通常具有竞争性信息传递的特点，不同的信息传递者竞相以他们认为会改变公众和政策制定者观点的方式来构建这些风险问题。接种是一个长期存在的说服理论，描述了风险问题的框架和反应。先前的研究表明，接种信息可以通过另一种竞争信息来抵抗说服。这项研究通过测试人们在接种后接近或避免竞争信息的倾向来扩展接种理论。如果接种信息使人们更有可能主动寻找竞争信息，那么与不鼓励人们探索竞争信息的其他信息策略相比，他们可能更容易受到竞争信息的说服。这项研究测试和扩展接种理论的目标是帮助风险传播者和政策制定者更好地了解人们如何处理以竞争和争议为特征的信息。在研究接种理论时，研究人员正在研究两个以竞争和争议为特征的问题-枪支暴力和核能。本研究（N = 1，500）采用2（说服策略-接种与单侧）乘2（问题方向-赞成或反对）乘2（预先存在的态度方向-赞成或反对）受试者间实验设计，加上偏移控制条件。它测试了阅读接种信息的人与其他人在选择性接触对抗信息或攻击信息以及随后的说服结果方面的差异。它进一步探讨了这些影响可能会有所不同的人的初始态度的立场是一致的或不一致的接种信息主张的立场。本研究为风险传播者提供了理论指导，指导他们如何在当今高选择媒体环境中更好地运用预防接种策略与受众进行沟通。调查结果还揭示了公众谁持有广泛的预先存在的问题的立场有争议的风险issues.This奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已被认为是值得通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准的评估支持的风险信息的影响。