DDRIG in DRMS: Communicating Controversial Risk Issues - Effects of Inoculation Messages on Selective Exposure to Counterattitudinal Messages and Subsequent Persuasive Outcomes

DRMS 中的 DDRIG：沟通有争议的风险问题 - 接种信息对选择性暴露于反态度信息和随后的说服性结果的影响

• 批准号: 2242458
• 负责人: Jeffrey Niederdeppe
• 金额: $ 3.02万
• 依托单位: Cornell University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2023-05-01 至 2024-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2242458&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: DDRIG; DRMS; Communicating; Controversial; Risk

Public communication surrounding controversial risk and policy issues is often characterized by competitive messaging, whereby different messengers compete to frame these risk issues in ways that they believe will shift public and policymaker opinions in favor of their interests. Inoculation is a long-standing persuasion theory that describes framing and responses to risk issues. Prior research suggests that inoculation messages can confer resistance to persuasion by another competing message. This study expands inoculation theory by testing people’s tendency to approach or avoid competing messages after being inoculated. If an inoculation message makes people more likely to proactively seek out competing information, they might be susceptible to persuasion from competing information compared to other messaging strategies that do not encourage people to explore competing information. This research tests and extends inoculation theory with the goal of helping risk communicators and policymakers to better understand how people process messages characterized by competition and controversy. In examining inoculation theory, the researchers are studying two issues that are characterized by competition and controversy – gun violence and nuclear energy. This research (N = 1,500) features a 2 (persuasive strategy – inoculation vs. one-sided) by 2 (issue direction – pro or con) by 2 (preexisting attitude direction – pro or con) between-subject experimental design, plus an offset control condition. It tests how people who read an inoculation message differ from other people in their selective exposure to counter messages or attack messages and subsequent persuasive outcomes. It further explores how these effects may differ among people whose initial attitudinal position is either consistent or inconsistent with the inoculation message advocated position. This research offers risk communicators theory-informed guidance on how to better employ an inoculation strategy to communicate with audiences in today’s high-choice media environment. Findings also shed light on the effects of risk messages among members of the public who hold a wide range of preexisting issue positions for controversial risk issues.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

围绕有争议的风险和政策问题的公共沟通通常以竞争性消息传递为特征，在这些消息传递中，不同的使者以他们认为会改变公共和政策制定者意见以支持其利益的方式来构建这些风险问题。接种是一种长期的说服理论，描述了对风险问题的框架和反应。先前的研究表明，接种消息可以通过另一个竞争信息来赋予对说服力的抵抗。这项研究通过测试人们接种后接近或避免竞争信息的趋势来扩展接种理论。如果接种消息使人们更有可能积极地寻求竞争信息，那么与其他不鼓励人们探索竞争信息的消息传递策略相比，他们可能容易受到竞争信息的说服力。该研究测试和扩展接种理论的目的是帮助风险沟通者和决策者更好地了解人们如何处理竞争和争议的特征。在检查接种理论时，研究人员正在研究两个以竞争和争议为特征的问题 - 枪支暴力和核能。这项研究（n = 1,500）以2（发行方向 - pro或con）为2（有说服力的策略 - 接种与单方面），按2（先前存在的态度方向 - pro或con）在受试者实验设计之间，以及偏移控制条件。它测试了在选择性接触反消息或攻击消息以及随后的有说服力的结果中，阅读接种消息的人如何与其他人不同。它进一步探讨了这些效果在最初的态度位置与接种消息所提倡的位置一致或不一致的人之间如何有所不同。这项研究提供了有关如何更好地雇员接种策略的风险沟通者理论的指导，以与当今高选择的媒体环境中的观众交流。调查结果还阐明了公众对风险信息的影响，他们在有争议的风险问题上持有广泛的先前问题立场。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是通过基金会的智力优点和更广泛影响的评估来评估来支持的珍贵支持。