Understanding the Social Network Premium in Hiring Low Wage Workers

该项目采用实验方法研究个人的社会联系如何影响该人获得就业的可能性。该项目是与几个大型建筑工地合作进行的，旨在揭示社会关系较弱的个人往往更难找到工作的原因。该项目侧重于测试几个潜在的渠道，这些渠道被提议作为这种差异的重要驱动因素：（i）社会关系较弱的工人更难向雇主表明他们的能力，（ii）雇主可能更愿意与他们已经有社会关系的雇员一起工作，（iii）从长远来看，雇主可能更有能力让社会关系工人承担责任，（iv）雇主可能更愿意向与他们有联系的人提供就业福利，或（v）社会联系实际上是潜在生产力的准确预测指标。该项目的成果将为促进平等就业机会和提高劳动力市场效率的政策提供投入。 这将改善劳动力分配，提高劳动生产率，促进经济增长。为了解释为什么雇主从他们的社交网络中雇佣员工以及这如何影响群体生产率，提出了五个假设：（i）向雇主发出信号的能力;（ii）雇主对他们网络中的人的偏好;（iii）问责制和更好的监督;（iv）个人喜好;（v）社交网络可能是工人生产率的指标。 本研究测试这些潜在的机制，通过不同的信息雇主对工人的生产力，与员工生产力相关的经济激励，以及雇主对员工的监控能力的程度。这项研究测量了工人在治疗前的生产力，然后在治疗期间和治疗后再次测量。PI将构建一个衡量生产力的指标，该指标可以捕获有关工人每天完成的任务的详细信息。最后，PI将随着时间的推移跟踪工人，以了解工人的雇佣模式如何根据他们在实验阶段接受的待遇而变化。结合起来，这些信息使PI能够理清这些渠道中的哪一个解释了就业率的横截面变化。该项目的成果将为促进平等就业、提高劳动力市场效率、改善劳动力配置、提高劳动生产率、促进经济增长等政策提供投入。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This project uses experimental methods to study how an individual’s social connectedness affects the likelihood of that person securing employment. The project is conducted in partnership with several large construction worksites and seeks to unpack the reasons why less socially connected individuals tend to have a harder time finding work. The project focuses on testing several potential channels that have been proposed as important drivers of this difference: (i) less socially connected workers have a harder time signaling their ability to employers, (ii) employers may prefer to spend the workday with employees for whom they have a social connection already, (iii) employers may be better able to hold socially connected workers accountable in the long run, (iv) employers may prefer to provide the benefits of employment to those they are connected to, or (v) social connectedness is actually an accurate predictor of underlying productivity. The results of this project will provide inputs into policies to promote equal access to employment and increase the efficiency of the labor market. This will improve labor allocation, labor productivity, and economic growth.Five hypotheses have been put forth to explain why employers hire from their social networks and how this affects group productivity: (i) signal ability to employers; (ii) employer preference for people in their network, (iii) accountability and better monitoring, (iv) personal favor, and (v) social network may be an indicator of worker productivity. This research tests each of these potential mechanisms by varying the information employers have about worker’s productivity, financial incentives associated with employee productivity, and the extent of monitoring capability employers have over employees. The research measures worker productivity before treatment and then again during and after the treatment. The PIs will construct a measure productivity that captures detailed information about the tasks completed by the worker each day. Finally, the PIs will track workers over time to see how hiring patterns change for workers depending on the treatment they received during the experimental phase. Combined, these pieces of information allow the PIs to disentangle which of these channels explains the cross-sectional variation in employment rates. The results of this project will provide inputs into policies to promote equal access to employment and increase the efficiency of the labor market, improve labor allocation, labor productivity, and economic growth.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.