课题基金 / 基金详情

CAREER: Toward Power Delivery Network-aware Hardware Security

CAREER: Toward Power Delivery Network-aware Hardware Security
职业:迈向电力传输网络感知硬件安全
批准号:
2338069
负责人:
Shahin Tajik
金额:
$59.41万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2024
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:
2024-03-01 至 2029-02-28

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
电子计算硬件构成了我们的信息系统和网络基础设施的基础。计算机芯片物理安全面临的威胁及其应对措施已经得到了广泛的研究。然而,对系统进行物理访问的对手仍然可以绕过常规防御并威胁系统的安全。例子包括篡改计算机芯片的印刷电路板或拆下其包装以读取存储在其上的秘密密钥。此类攻击源自微电子供应链的各个阶段,由于缺乏对硬件级别发生的事件的认识,无法仅通过传统的软件安全保护来解决。该项目研究了能够保护电子计算硬件免受源自微电子供应链各个阶段的复杂物理攻击的技术。这个项目的核心是更好地理解计算机器的物理层,即它的电力输送网络(PDN)及其在实现安全和可信硬件方面的作用。有三个研究重点需要调查:(1)融合用于分析基于pdn的签名的现有统计指标,实现非侵入性,整体性,无金性和根本原因感知的篡改检测;(2)利用信息论概念研究基于pdn的侧信道攻击强度(即阻抗分析)并制定对策;(3)创建基于pdn的传感器和指纹,监控物理完整性系统。该项目的成功成果将显著提高计算硬件的安全性。此外,该项目还包括各种外展活动,如组织特别会议和教程,开源基准测试,让高中生了解基本的电路概念和简单的电气诊断工具。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
Electronic computing hardware forms the foundation of our information systems and cyberinfrastructure. The threats to the physical security of computer chips and countermeasures have been widely researched. However, adversaries with physical access to the system can still bypass conventional defenses and threaten the systems’ security. Examples include tampering with the printed circuit board of a computer chip or removing its package to read out secret keys stored on it. Such attacks, originating at various stages of the microelectronics supply chain, cannot be addressed solely by conventional software security protections due to the lack of awareness about the events occurring at the hardware level.This project investigates technologies that can secure electronic computing hardware against sophisticated physical attacks originating at various stages of the microelectronics supply chain. Central to this project is a better understanding of the computing machine's physical layer, i.e., its power delivery network (PDN) and its role in achieving secure and trusted hardware. There are three research thrusts to investigate: (1) Fusing the existing statistical metrics used for the analysis of PDN-based signatures, enabling non-invasive, holistic, golden-free, and root cause-aware tamper detection; (2) Using information-theoretic notions to investigate the strength of PDN-based side-channel attacks (i.e., impedance analysis) and developing countermeasures; (3) Creating the PDN-based sensors and fingerprints to monitor the physical integrity system. Successful outcomes of this project will significantly improve the security of computing hardware. Moreover, this project includes various outreach activities, such as organizing special sessions and tutorials, open-sourcing benchmarks, and exposing high school students to basic circuit concepts and simple electrical diagnosis tools.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
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会议论文
Travel: NSF Student Travel Grant for 2024 New England Hardware Security Day (NEHWS2024)
  • 批准号:
    2420415
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.75万
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    Shahin Tajik
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: ERADICATOR: Techniques for Laser Assisted Side-Channel Attack Monitor & Response
  • 批准号:
    2150123
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $26.35万
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 负责人:
    Shahin Tajik
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Toward a general theory of intermittent aeolian and fluvial nonsuspended sediment transport
  • 批准号:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    --
  • 资助金额:
    55万元
  • 批准年份:
    2022
  • 负责人:
    Thomas Pahtz
  • 依托单位: