An INUS theory of causal conditional reasoning

因果条件推理的 INUS 理论

• 批准号: 262770274
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Karl Christoph Klauer
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Abteilung Sozialpsychologie und Methodenlehre
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Priority Programmes
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2013-12-31 至 2018-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/262770274?language=en
• 关键词: INUS; theory; causal; conditional; reasoning

An INUS theory of causal conditional reasoning is proposed. It builds on Mackie's (1980) analysis of causes as causally prior INUS (i.e., insufficient but non-redundant parts of unnecessary but sufficient) conditions and addresses reasoning with causal conditionals of the form "If cause A is present, then the effect B occurs." According to the INUS theory, causal conditionals are interpreted as asserting that A is a causally prior INUS condition for B implying that "AX or Y if and only if B" with complementary necessary conditions X and alternative causes Y left largely implicit and unspecified, but by default assumed to be true (X) and false or of unknown truth value (Y), respectively. The INUS theory accounts for findings from the classical (deductive) and the new (probabilistic) paradigm of conditional reasoning within a common framework. Predictions are tested regarding the classical paradigm (1), the new paradigm (2-3), and their interrelationship (4): 1) The theory predicts a rich range of different inference patterns in the classical suppression paradigm (Byrne, 1989). 2) The theory predicts that documented discrepancies from the norms of probability (e.g., the neglect of alternative causes in so-called probabilistic modus ponens; Fernbach & Erb, 2013) can be eliminated if reasoners' interpretation of the questions put to them is taken into account. 3) The theory challenges the empirically well-supported "Equation" (P(If A, then B) = P(B | A)) in the new paradigm. 4) The theory predicts new, as yet undiscovered, dissociations between the classical and the new paradigms to occur in suppression-paradigm experiments.

提出了一种INUS因果条件推理理论。它建立在Mackie（1980）对原因作为因果先验INUS（即，不必要但充分的条件的不充分但不冗余的部分）的分析之上，并以“如果原因A存在，那么结果B就会发生”的形式的因果条件进行推理。根据INUS理论，因果条件被解释为断言A是B的因果先验INUS条件，这意味着“当且仅当B时，AX或Y”与互补的必要条件X和替代原因Y在很大程度上是隐含的和未指定的，但默认分别被假设为真(X)和假或未知的真值(Y)。INUS理论在一个共同的框架内解释了条件推理的经典（演绎）和新（概率）范式的发现。对经典范式（1)、新范式（2-3）及其相互关系(4)的预测进行了测试：1）该理论预测了经典抑制范式中丰富的不同推断模式（Byrne, 1989）。2)该理论预测，如果考虑到推理者对提出问题的解释，可以消除概率规范中记录的差异（例如，在所谓的概率模态中忽略了替代原因；Fernbach & Erb, 2013）。3)该理论挑战了新范式中经验充分支持的“方程”(P（If A, then B) = P(B | A)）。4)该理论预测在抑制范式实验中会出现新的、尚未被发现的经典范式与新范式之间的分离。