Overcoming Meta-Cognitive Myopia

来自众多研究的一致证据指出，元认知近视是理性思维和行动的主要障碍。尽管人们在利用样本中给出的信息时通常非常准确，即使在复杂的任务设置中，他们对样本的来源和有效性也很天真和不加批判。即使是明显带有偏见和误导性的样本信息，法官和决策者也会屈服于样本输入中固有的偏见和扭曲。虽然先前关于元认知近视的研究（Fiedler，2012年综述）强调了这种综合征的持续性及其对治疗的抵抗力，但本研究项目致力于三种可能的补救措施，可能有助于克服元认知近视：（1）错误敏感的反馈程序;（2）集体推理中的社会冲突;（3）类比推理辅助。这三类补救措施的潜力将测试参考元认知近视在三个理论范式：（a）忽略样本大小;（B）在条件推理的混乱;（c）未能考虑到聚合水平的影响。

Convergent evidence from numerous studies points to metacognitive myopia as a major obstacle in the way of rational thinking and action. Although people are often remarkably accurate in utilizing the information given in a sample, even in complex task settings, they are naive and uncritical regarding the origin and validity of the sample. Taking even obviously biased and misleading sample information for granted, judges and decision makers succumb to the very biases and distortions that happen to be inherent in the sample input. While previous research on metacognitive myopia (reviewed in Fiedler, 2012) highlights the persistence of this syndrome and its resistance to treatment, the present research project is devoted to three sorts of possible remedies that may help to overcome meta-cognitive myopia: (1) error-sensitive feedback procedures; (2) social conflicts in collective reasoning; and (3) analogical reasoning aids. The potential of these three classes of remedies will be tested with reference to meta-cognitive myopia in three theoretical paradigms: (a) neglect of sample size; (b) confusion in conditional reasoning; and (c) the failure to take aggregation-level effects into account.