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Limited liability for corporate torts

企业侵权行为的有限责任

基本信息

批准号：
278732151
负责人：
Privatdozent Dr. Chris Thomale
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/278732151?language=en
关键词：
Limited liability corporate torts

项目摘要

The research proposal -Limited liability for corporate torts- concerns the very core element of corporate law: the institution of limited liability. This concept refers to a liability architecture, according to which, notwithstanding the corporation itself as a legal entity being liable with all its assets, shareholders personal assets are exempt from liability for corporate debts. Such a liability architecture is widely recognized at corporate laws being known to virtually every legal system. The project aims at providing a fundamental analysis of limited liability, focusing on involuntary creditors, i.e. creditors that did not deliberately select the corporation as their debtor. In German statutes, such tort creditors are called holders of -claims resulting from illicit acts- (orig.: Forderungen aus unerlaubten Handlungen). It shall be investigated both from a legal realist and economic point of view to what extent limited liability can be upheld against involuntary creditors. Limited liability has been subject to the long-standing criticism that it creates externalities, shifting liability risks from corporate shareholders to corporate creditors. This problem becomes most pressing in the case of involuntary creditors upon whom the limited liability corporate debtor is effectively imposed without there being room in order to hedge or mitigate the incumbent insolvency risk. Hence, prima facie, inefficient and socially harmful behaviour is incentivised, the economic link between gain and risk is being severed and the functioning of tort law is jeopardised. The project envisages to follow up on the economic criticism just outlined in two ways: First, theoretical knowledge of limited liability shall be deepened, while, second, the results of economic analysis shall be translated into legal terms and taxonomies. Theoretical investigations will provide a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit-analysis of limited liability, using inter alia statistics and behavioural economics. As a legal hypothesis, unlimited liability pro rata for corporate torts shall be posed and linked with existing law and doctrine. Using this two-fold approach, hopefully, our understanding of limited liability and claims resulting from illicit acts as well as their interaction and rationales will grow considerably. Plus, the new liability scheme pursued in this project will offer a tool in order to implement and strengthen public international legal principles of corporate social responsibility.

研究提案“公司侵权行为的有限责任”涉及公司法的核心要素：有限责任制度。这一概念指的是一种责任架构，根据该架构，尽管公司本身作为法人实体以其全部资产承担责任，但股东的个人资产免除了公司债务的责任。这种责任架构在几乎所有法律体系都熟知的公司法中得到了广泛认可。该项目旨在提供有限责任的基本分析，重点关注非自愿债权人，即没有故意选择公司作为债务人的债权人。在德国法规中，此类侵权债权人被称为“因非法行为而产生的索赔”的持有人（原文：Forderungen aus unerlaubten Handlungen）。应从法律现实主义和经济学的角度来考察在多大程度上可以对非自愿债权人维持有限责任。有限责任长期以来一直受到批评，认为它会产生外部性，将责任风险从公司股东转移到公司债权人。对于非自愿债权人来说，这个问题变得最为紧迫，因为有限责任公司债务人实际上被强加给非自愿债权人，而没有空间对冲或减轻现有破产风险。因此，表面上看，低效且对社会有害的行为受到激励，收益与风险之间的经济联系被切断，侵权法的运作受到损害。该项目设想以两种方式跟进刚才概述的经济批评：一是深化有限责任的理论知识，二是将经济分析的结果转化为法律术语和分类法。理论研究将利用统计学和行为经济学等方法对有限责任进行定性和定量的成本效益分析。作为一种法律假设，应提出企业侵权行为按比例承担无限责任，并将其与现行法律和原则联系起来。希望使用这种双重方法，我们对非法行为造成的有限责任和索赔及其相互作用和理由的理解将大大加深。此外，该项目推行的新责任计划将为实施和加强企业社会责任的公共国际法律原则提供工具。