Limited liability for corporate torts

研究提案——公司侵权的有限责任——涉及公司法的核心要素：有限责任制度。这个概念指的是一种责任架构，根据这种架构，尽管公司本身作为一个法人实体对其所有资产负有责任，但股东的个人资产免于对公司债务承担责任。这种责任架构在公司法中得到广泛认可，几乎为每个法律体系所熟知。该项目旨在提供有限责任的基本分析，重点是非自愿债权人，即没有故意选择公司作为其债务人的债权人。在德国法规中，这种侵权债权人被称为因非法行为而产生的债权持有人。（Forderungen aus unerlaubten Handlungen）。应当从法律现实主义和经济角度对非自愿债权人在多大程度上可以维持有限责任进行调查。长期以来，有限责任一直受到批评，认为它会产生外部性，将责任风险从公司股东转移到公司债权人。在非自愿债权人的情况下，这个问题变得最为紧迫，因为有限责任公司债务人实际上是强加给他们的，而没有对冲或减轻现有破产风险的余地。因此，从表面上看，低效和对社会有害的行为受到了激励，收益与风险之间的经济联系被切断，侵权法的功能受到了损害。该项目设想以两种方式跟进刚才概述的经济批评：第一，深化有限责任的理论知识，第二，将经济分析的结果转化为法律术语和分类法。理论调查将利用统计和行为经济学，对有限责任进行定性和定量的成本效益分析。公司侵权无限责任作为一种法律假设，应与现行法律和理论相联系。希望通过这种双重方法，我们对由非法行为引起的有限责任和索赔及其相互作用和理由的理解将大大增加。此外，本项目推行的新责任计划将为实施和加强企业社会责任的国际公法原则提供一个工具。

The research proposal -Limited liability for corporate torts- concerns the very core element of corporate law: the institution of limited liability. This concept refers to a liability architecture, according to which, notwithstanding the corporation itself as a legal entity being liable with all its assets, shareholders personal assets are exempt from liability for corporate debts. Such a liability architecture is widely recognized at corporate laws being known to virtually every legal system. The project aims at providing a fundamental analysis of limited liability, focusing on involuntary creditors, i.e. creditors that did not deliberately select the corporation as their debtor. In German statutes, such tort creditors are called holders of -claims resulting from illicit acts- (orig.: Forderungen aus unerlaubten Handlungen). It shall be investigated both from a legal realist and economic point of view to what extent limited liability can be upheld against involuntary creditors. Limited liability has been subject to the long-standing criticism that it creates externalities, shifting liability risks from corporate shareholders to corporate creditors. This problem becomes most pressing in the case of involuntary creditors upon whom the limited liability corporate debtor is effectively imposed without there being room in order to hedge or mitigate the incumbent insolvency risk. Hence, prima facie, inefficient and socially harmful behaviour is incentivised, the economic link between gain and risk is being severed and the functioning of tort law is jeopardised. The project envisages to follow up on the economic criticism just outlined in two ways: First, theoretical knowledge of limited liability shall be deepened, while, second, the results of economic analysis shall be translated into legal terms and taxonomies. Theoretical investigations will provide a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit-analysis of limited liability, using inter alia statistics and behavioural economics. As a legal hypothesis, unlimited liability pro rata for corporate torts shall be posed and linked with existing law and doctrine. Using this two-fold approach, hopefully, our understanding of limited liability and claims resulting from illicit acts as well as their interaction and rationales will grow considerably. Plus, the new liability scheme pursued in this project will offer a tool in order to implement and strengthen public international legal principles of corporate social responsibility.