The Political Economy of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Situations

在冲突后局势中，权力分享如何影响精英和选民之间的资源分配？在冲突后局势中，州政府与前反叛团体之间的权力分享安排是否以及如何实际改变政治权力的分配和行使，这一问题很少得到调查。在这个拟议的研究项目中，我们认为，权力分享的类型影响次国家资源分配模式。权力分享为前冲突行为体提供了一个机会，使其能够获得国家资源，并将这些资源战略性地分配给其选民。政治精英之间个性化的权力分享安排有利于中饱私囊，因此被认为会导致分配给其选民的资源水平低下。与此相反，结构性权力分享机构有助于将资源集中分配给具有重要战略意义的核心群体。我们还假设，选区规模将缓和结构性权力分享和次国家资源分配之间的关系。这种有针对性的资源分配的预期效益将随着精英支持基础的规模而增加。我们还预计，冲突后的资源分配将因政府收入的类型和水平而异。自然资源和特定类型的外国援助等非税收收入所占比例较高，可能与权力分享安排中的精英与其选民之间更明显的庇护模式有关。最后，我们的理论意味着权力分享不是一种转变政治权力的工具（从而解决社会冲突的根本原因），而是一种将庇护机会制度化的工具。拟议的项目依赖于定量和定性方法的结合，以证实这些假设：我们首先使用统计地理空间方法，以调查权力分享的机制，国家以下的资源重新分配到核心选区。这项分析将利用1992年至2010年期间冲突后局势的全球数据。这一努力的核心是创建一个新的数据集，即权力分享数据集的地理维度，该数据集对冲突后局势中所有政府和叛乱分子的选区进行地理定位。第二步，我们将对利比里亚和印度尼西亚亚齐省这两个冲突后局势进行定性的个案内分析和深入的进程追踪。这一定性分析将基于对每个冲突后局势的实地研究，以更好地了解因果过程和范围条件。

How does power-sharing affect resource allocation between elites and constituencies in post-conflict situations? The question if and how power-sharing arrangements between a state government and former rebel groups actually change the distribution and exercise of political power in a post-conflict situation is rarely investigated. In this proposed research project, we argue that the type of power-sharing affects sub-national resource allocation patterns. Power-sharing provides an opportunity for former conflict actors to access state resources and distribute those resources strategically to their constituencies. Personalized power-sharing arrangements between political elites facilitate self-enrichment and are therefore hypothesized to result in low levels of resource allocation towards their constituencies. Structural power-sharing institutions, in contrast, facilitate a focused resource allocation to strategically important core constituencies. We also hypothesize that constituency size will moderate the relationship between structural power-sharing and sub-national resource allocation. The expected benefit of such targeted resource allocation will increase with the size of elites' support bases. We further expect post-conflict resource allocation to vary with type and level of government income. A higher share of non-tax income such as natural resources and specific types of foreign aid is likely to be associated with more pronounced patterns of patronage between elites in power-sharing arrangements and their constituencies. Ultimately, our theory implies that power-sharing is less a tool for transforming political power (and thus addressing the root causes of social conflict), but an instrument that institutionalizes patronage opportunities. The proposed project relies on the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to substantiate these hypotheses: We first use statistical geo-spatial methods in order to investigate power-sharing as mechanism for sub-national resource redistribution to core constituencies. This analysis will make use of global data on post-conflict situations between 1992 and 2010. Central to this effort will be the creation of a novel dataset, the Geographical Dimensions of Power-Sharing Dataset (GDPS) which geo-locates the constituencies of all government and rebels in post-conflict situations. In a second step, we will conduct qualitative within-case analyses and in-depth process tracing of two post-conflict situations: Liberia and the Indonesian province of Aceh. This qualitative analysis will be based on field research in each post-conflict situation to better understand causal processes and scope conditions.