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The Political Economy of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Situations

冲突后局势中权力分享的政治经济学

基本信息

批准号：
280367933
负责人：
Professor Dr. Andreas Mehler
金额：
--
依托单位：
Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut für kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung e.V. Freiburg (ABI)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/280367933?language=en
关键词：
Political Economy Power Sharing Post

项目摘要

How does power-sharing affect resource allocation between elites and constituencies in post-conflict situations? The question if and how power-sharing arrangements between a state government and former rebel groups actually change the distribution and exercise of political power in a post-conflict situation is rarely investigated. In this proposed research project, we argue that the type of power-sharing affects sub-national resource allocation patterns. Power-sharing provides an opportunity for former conflict actors to access state resources and distribute those resources strategically to their constituencies. Personalized power-sharing arrangements between political elites facilitate self-enrichment and are therefore hypothesized to result in low levels of resource allocation towards their constituencies. Structural power-sharing institutions, in contrast, facilitate a focused resource allocation to strategically important core constituencies. We also hypothesize that constituency size will moderate the relationship between structural power-sharing and sub-national resource allocation. The expected benefit of such targeted resource allocation will increase with the size of elites' support bases. We further expect post-conflict resource allocation to vary with type and level of government income. A higher share of non-tax income such as natural resources and specific types of foreign aid is likely to be associated with more pronounced patterns of patronage between elites in power-sharing arrangements and their constituencies. Ultimately, our theory implies that power-sharing is less a tool for transforming political power (and thus addressing the root causes of social conflict), but an instrument that institutionalizes patronage opportunities. The proposed project relies on the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to substantiate these hypotheses: We first use statistical geo-spatial methods in order to investigate power-sharing as mechanism for sub-national resource redistribution to core constituencies. This analysis will make use of global data on post-conflict situations between 1992 and 2010. Central to this effort will be the creation of a novel dataset, the Geographical Dimensions of Power-Sharing Dataset (GDPS) which geo-locates the constituencies of all government and rebels in post-conflict situations. In a second step, we will conduct qualitative within-case analyses and in-depth process tracing of two post-conflict situations: Liberia and the Indonesian province of Aceh. This qualitative analysis will be based on field research in each post-conflict situation to better understand causal processes and scope conditions.

在冲突后的情况下，权力分享如何影响精英和选民之间的资源分配？在冲突后的情况下，州政府和前反叛组织之间的权力分享安排是否以及如何改变了政治权力的分配和行使，这一问题很少得到调查。在这个建议的研究项目中，我们认为权力分享的类型影响地方资源配置模式。权力分享为前冲突参与者获得国家资源并将这些资源战略性地分配给他们的支持者提供了机会。政治精英之间个性化的权力分享安排有利于中饱私囊，因此被认为会导致对其选民的资源分配水平较低。相比之下，结构性权力分享机制有助于将资源集中分配给具有战略重要性的核心选区。我们还假设选区规模将调节结构性权力分享与地方资源分配之间的关系。这种有针对性的资源配置的预期收益将随着精英支持基础的规模而增加。我们进一步预期，冲突后的资源分配将随着政府收入的类型和水平而变化。非税收入（如自然资源和特定类型的外援）所占比例较高，可能与权力分享安排中的精英及其选民之间更明显的庇护模式有关。最终，我们的理论表明，权力分享不是一种转变政治权力的工具（从而解决社会冲突的根本原因），而是一种将庇护机会制度化的工具。建议的项目依赖于定量和定性方法的结合来证实这些假设：我们首先使用统计地理空间方法来调查权力分享作为地方资源再分配到核心选区的机制。这项分析将利用1992年至2010年冲突后局势的全球数据。这项工作的核心将是创建一个新的数据集，即权力分享数据集的地理维度（GDPS），该数据集对冲突后局势中所有政府和叛军的选区进行地理定位。在第二步中，我们将对利比里亚和印度尼西亚亚齐省这两个冲突后局势进行定性个案分析和深入的进程追踪。这种定性分析将基于对每个冲突后局势的实地研究，以便更好地了解因果过程和范围条件。