The concept of matter in Aristotle

亚里士多德经常被认为是把物质概念引入哲学的人。然而，在他的文本中，“物质”的含义并不完全清楚。亚里士多德的定义和规范似乎晦涩难懂，有时甚至不一致。学者们也得出了完全相反的结论;他们的解释从亚里士多德的物质是一种抽象的形而上学的原则，在现实中是不存在的，到物质总是一种特殊的可感觉的东西，它构成了一个个体的物质，例如青铜或肉和骨头。我的研究的特别重点在于亚里士多德为什么引入物质的概念，即他试图通过引入和进一步具体化这个概念来解决哪些本体论问题。我认为亚里士多德引入物质是为了解释个体物质的产生。因此，他的理论不仅反对那些通常否认变化可能性的观点，而且特别反对那些把新个体的出现描述为不是实质性变化的情况，而是描述为一个单一物质的偶然变化，或者描述为一种新的性质组合的立场。根据亚里士多德的观点，只有当我们对物质有一个适当的概念时，我们才能把一个新个体的出现理解为一个实质性变化的例子。在一个实质性的变化中，物质是一个个体物质从中出现并以一种有待描述的特定方式继续存在于该个体物质中的物质。我进一步认为，亚里士多德将如此构想的物质与可感知的东西等同起来;他给出的典型例子包括青铜器或月经。它们不是单独的实体，但它们具有特殊的能力，可以被制成单独的实体。我的解释遵循了亚里士多德的普遍观点，即物质主要是实质性变化的基础。然而，我不同意传统解释的某些方面，特别是对物质在实质性变化中的持久性的传统理解。我主张，物质在实质性变化中的持久性不能与单个物质在偶然变化中的持久性相比较。我认为亚里士多德把物质等同于可感知的东西，这一观点反对传统的解释，即亚里士多德的物质是一个抽象的原则，也反对流行的观点，即亚里士多德的物质是一个严格的相对术语，它不是指世界上的一个实体或一类实体，而是指任何受到某种变化的东西。

Aristotle is often credited with having introduced the concept of matter (gr. hylê) into philosophy. However, it is not entirely clear what "matter" means in his texts. Aristotle's definitions and specifications seem obscure and sometimes even inconsistent. Also scholars have reached quite opposite results; their interpretations range from the view that Aristotelian matter is an abstract metaphysical principle that never exists in actuality to the position that matter is always a particular sensible stuff which constitutes an individual substance, for example bronze or flesh and bone.The special focus of my investigation lies on the question of why Aristotle introduces the concept of matter, i.e. which ontological problems he tries to solve by introducing and further specifying this concept. I argue that Aristotle introduces matter in order to explain the coming-to-be of individual substances. His theory thus not only opposes those views which generally deny the possibility of change, but is in particular set against positions which describe the occurrence of a new individual not as a case of substantial change, but either as an accidental modification of one singular matter, or as a new combination of qualities. According to Aristotle, we can only understand the occurrence of a new individual as a case of substantial change if we have an adequate concept of matter. In a substantial change, matter is that from which an individual substance emerges and which continues to exist - in a particular way yet to be described - in that individual substance. I further argue that Aristotle identifies the so-conceived matter with sensible stuff; typical examples he gives include bronze or the catamenia. They are not individual substances, but they have the peculiar capacity that they can be made into an individual substance.My interpretation follows the common view that matter in Aristotle is primarily the substratum of substantial change. However, I disagree with certain aspects of the traditional interpretation, in particular with the traditional understanding of matter's persistence in substantial change. I claim that matter's persistence in substantial change must not be compared with the persistence of an individual substance in accidental change. My suggestion that Aristotle identifies matter with sensible stuff opposes the traditional interpretation according to which Aristotelian matter is an abstract principle, as well as the popular view according to which Aristotelian matter is a strictly relative term which does not refer to an entity or a class of entities in the world, but designates whatever is subject to a certain change.