The concept of matter in Aristotle

亚里士多德的物质概念

• 批准号: 314667317
• 负责人: Professorin Dr. Anna Schriefl
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Faculty of Philosophy
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Fellowships
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2015-12-31 至 2016-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/314667317?language=en
• 关键词: concept; matter; Aristotle

Aristotle is often credited with having introduced the concept of matter (gr. hylê) into philosophy. However, it is not entirely clear what "matter" means in his texts. Aristotle's definitions and specifications seem obscure and sometimes even inconsistent. Also scholars have reached quite opposite results; their interpretations range from the view that Aristotelian matter is an abstract metaphysical principle that never exists in actuality to the position that matter is always a particular sensible stuff which constitutes an individual substance, for example bronze or flesh and bone.The special focus of my investigation lies on the question of why Aristotle introduces the concept of matter, i.e. which ontological problems he tries to solve by introducing and further specifying this concept. I argue that Aristotle introduces matter in order to explain the coming-to-be of individual substances. His theory thus not only opposes those views which generally deny the possibility of change, but is in particular set against positions which describe the occurrence of a new individual not as a case of substantial change, but either as an accidental modification of one singular matter, or as a new combination of qualities. According to Aristotle, we can only understand the occurrence of a new individual as a case of substantial change if we have an adequate concept of matter. In a substantial change, matter is that from which an individual substance emerges and which continues to exist - in a particular way yet to be described - in that individual substance. I further argue that Aristotle identifies the so-conceived matter with sensible stuff; typical examples he gives include bronze or the catamenia. They are not individual substances, but they have the peculiar capacity that they can be made into an individual substance.My interpretation follows the common view that matter in Aristotle is primarily the substratum of substantial change. However, I disagree with certain aspects of the traditional interpretation, in particular with the traditional understanding of matter's persistence in substantial change. I claim that matter's persistence in substantial change must not be compared with the persistence of an individual substance in accidental change. My suggestion that Aristotle identifies matter with sensible stuff opposes the traditional interpretation according to which Aristotelian matter is an abstract principle, as well as the popular view according to which Aristotelian matter is a strictly relative term which does not refer to an entity or a class of entities in the world, but designates whatever is subject to a certain change.

亚里士多德通常被认为是将物质概念引入哲学的人（hylê）。然而，在他的文本中，“物质”的含义并不完全清楚。亚里士多德的定义和规范似乎模糊不清，有时甚至不一致。学者们也得出了完全相反的结果；他们的解释从亚里士多德的物质是一种抽象的形而上学的原则，在现实中从来没有存在过的观点，到物质总是一种特殊的可感知的材料，构成一个单独的实体，例如青铜或肉和骨头。我的研究重点在于亚里士多德为什么引入物质概念的问题，即他试图通过引入和进一步指定这个概念来解决哪些本体论问题。我认为亚里士多德引入物质是为了解释个体物质的形成。因此，他的理论不仅反对那些普遍否认变化可能性的观点，而且特别反对那些将新个体的出现描述为不是实质性变化的情况，而是将其描述为单一物质的偶然改变，或将其描述为性质的新组合的观点。根据亚里士多德的观点，只有当我们对物质有足够的概念时，我们才能把一个新个体的出现理解为一种实质性的变化。在一个实质性的变化中，物质是一个个体实体从中产生并以一种尚未描述的特定方式继续存在于该个体实体中的物质。我进一步论证，亚里士多德将如此被构想的物质等同于可感知的东西；他给出的典型例子包括青铜或铜像。它们不是单独的物质，但它们有一种特殊的能力，可以组成一个单独的物质。我的解释遵循普遍观点，即亚里士多德的物质主要是实质变化的基础。然而，我不同意传统解释的某些方面，特别是对物质在实质性变化中持续存在的传统理解。我断言，物质在实质性变化中的持久性绝不能与单个物质在偶然变化中的持久性相比。我认为亚里士多德将物质等同于可感知的东西，这与传统的解释相反，传统的解释认为亚里士多德的物质是一个抽象的原则，也与流行的观点相反，后者认为亚里士多德的物质是一个严格的相对术语，并不指世界上的一个实体或一类实体，而是指任何会发生某种变化的东西。