The concept of matter in Aristotle

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Aristotle is often credited with having introduced the concept of matter (gr. hylê) into philosophy. However, it is not entirely clear what "matter" means in his texts. Aristotle's definitions and specifications seem obscure and sometimes even inconsistent. Also scholars have reached quite opposite results; their interpretations range from the view that Aristotelian matter is an abstract metaphysical principle that never exists in actuality to the position that matter is always a particular sensible stuff which constitutes an individual substance, for example bronze or flesh and bone.The special focus of my investigation lies on the question of why Aristotle introduces the concept of matter, i.e. which ontological problems he tries to solve by introducing and further specifying this concept. I argue that Aristotle introduces matter in order to explain the coming-to-be of individual substances. His theory thus not only opposes those views which generally deny the possibility of change, but is in particular set against positions which describe the occurrence of a new individual not as a case of substantial change, but either as an accidental modification of one singular matter, or as a new combination of qualities. According to Aristotle, we can only understand the occurrence of a new individual as a case of substantial change if we have an adequate concept of matter. In a substantial change, matter is that from which an individual substance emerges and which continues to exist - in a particular way yet to be described - in that individual substance. I further argue that Aristotle identifies the so-conceived matter with sensible stuff; typical examples he gives include bronze or the catamenia. They are not individual substances, but they have the peculiar capacity that they can be made into an individual substance.My interpretation follows the common view that matter in Aristotle is primarily the substratum of substantial change. However, I disagree with certain aspects of the traditional interpretation, in particular with the traditional understanding of matter's persistence in substantial change. I claim that matter's persistence in substantial change must not be compared with the persistence of an individual substance in accidental change. My suggestion that Aristotle identifies matter with sensible stuff opposes the traditional interpretation according to which Aristotelian matter is an abstract principle, as well as the popular view according to which Aristotelian matter is a strictly relative term which does not refer to an entity or a class of entities in the world, but designates whatever is subject to a certain change.