Whistle-blowing regulation: A uniform or tailored approach?

超过三分之一的公司欺诈行为是通过小费举报的：通常被称为告发。告密保护、法规和战略是零星的。虽然美国有全面的举报法，但澳大利亚、德国、英国和加拿大等其他发达的资本市场采取了不太全面的举报人战略，法国和瑞典等国家对举报人提供的立法支持非常有限(Wolfe等人，2012年)。鉴于所采用的不同战略，拟议的研究试图回答以下研究问题：各国是否需要不同的法律办法来进行举报人监管，或者一刀切的办法有效吗？这个项目将调查监管机制的影响，这些监管机制旨在鼓励在不同公司治理系统(退出和语音系统)中的会计师的告发或沉默决定时做出告发决定。特别是，我们将考虑反报复保护和经济奖励对专业会计师保持沉默、内部(向其雇主)或外部(向相关政府当局)告发的意图的影响。同时调查这些方面的每一个方面，将使我们深入了解会计师在他们可能发现的非常类型的欺诈--财务报表欺诈--方面所扮演的独特角色。

Over one-third of corporate fraud is reported through tips: commonly referred to as whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing protections, regulations and strategies are sporadic. While the United States has comprehensive whistle-blowing legislation, other well-developed capital markets such as Australia, Germany, the UK, and Canada have adopted less comprehensive whistle-blowing strategies and countries such as France and Sweden provide very limited legislative support for whistle-blowing (Wolfe et al., 2012). In light of the diverse strategies employed, the proposed study seeks to answer the following research question: Do countries need different legal approaches to whistle-blowing regulation or does a one size fits all approach work? This project will investigate the impact of regulatory mechanisms designed to encourage the decision to blow the whistle on the whistle-blowing or silence decision of accountants in different corporate governance systems (exit and voice systems). In particular, we will consider the impact of anti-retaliation protection and financial rewards on professional accountants intention to remain silent, to whistle-blow internally (to their employer), or externally (to the relevant government authority). Investigating each of these facets together will offer insight into the unique role of accountants in relation to the very type of fraud they are likely to discover, financial statement fraud.