Moral Motivation and the Emotions. The moralpsychological contribution of the passiones animae from Thomas Aquinas to mediat human striving structures and practical reasoning

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The project aims at the emotions theory of Thomas Aquinas as she is to be found in his treatises on the passions of the soul, the passiones animae, to evaluate their importance for the understanding of moral motivation. It should be worked out, whether and especially how, for Thomas emotions can contribute to the development of motivation to act. Starting point are observations within the current philosophy of emotions, according to which emotions play a key role in the question of how moral motivation is to be understood, i.e. how convictions of what is morally intended become effective for action. However, it is still comparatively unclear how emotions can motivate, what this effect is ultimately based on and how their relationship to the other forces of the rational subject of action involved in action control can be imagined. The recourse to Thomas von Aquinas' reflections on the passiones animae, which are still underestimated in scope and systematic significance, opens up a field that has so far been largely unresearched for this question within (theological) ethics and represents the core of the envisaged project. In terms of methodology, the aim is not only to reconstruct the structure and architecture of the emotional theory of Aquinas in the narrower sense but in particular also to shed light on the relevant moral-psychological, but also metaphysical and theological prerequisites of it, for example with regard to its concept of the soul and its striving theory, or if the eschatological ultimate goal of human existence (finis ultimus) is taken into account instead of isolated partial goals of individual actions alone. The extensive source material suggests an exemplary approach based on one of the main passions (timor - fear) and a theological passion (amor - love). The central hypotheses are, that with Thomas emotions do not motivate eo ipso, but on the one hand through a specific object reference, which is supposed to make the origin of the evoked emotion understandable and which assigns it a certain cognitive content, which makes it rationally accessible; and on the other hand through a subtle "rectification" and finalization of all body-soul forces of the human being, i.e. vital as well as rational parts, as a holistic model of moral motivation on the basis of love as a unifying bond. The first results of the work to date indicate that it is also promising to locate the passiones within the Thomanic genesis of action and to consider their relationship to one another within the course of a process. The processing of the question promises in addition to a substantial income to Thomas-research also a profit for both the more analytical-oriented philosophical debates as well as a possible Proprium Christianum in questions concerning the topic of moral motivation.