B4: Determinism, Control, and the Consequence Argument

B4：决定论、控制和后果论证

• 批准号: 327812493
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Andreas Hüttemann
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Philosophisches Seminar
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Units
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2016-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/327812493?language=en
• 关键词: B4; Determinism; Control; Consequence; Argument

The central question of the project is whether control over our actions is compatible with determinism. If determinism is true, then the complete state of the world at any time in the distant past (even before we were born) together with the laws of nature completely fixes our current actions. Determinism, therefore, threatens our everyday conviction that we have control over our actions. The project argues that this apparent tension between determinism and control only arises if further assumptions about causation, laws, counterfactuals, and modality are added to determinism. Many of these added assumptions seem intuitively plausible. However, the project will use empirical data (concerning both scientific results and scientific practice) as well as inductive methods to question these assumptions. Among other things, we will show that the so-called 'Consequence Argument', which many consider the strongest argument for the incompatibility of control and determinism, rests on empirically un-founded assumptions about alternative possibilities.

这个项目的中心问题是，对我们行为的控制是否与决定论相容。如果决定论是正确的，那么在遥远的过去（甚至在我们出生之前）的任何时候，世界的完整状态与自然法则一起完全确定了我们当前的行为。因此，决定论威胁到我们每天都坚信自己可以控制自己的行为。该项目认为，这种明显的紧张关系之间的决定论和控制只会出现，如果进一步假设因果关系，法律，反事实，和模态被添加到决定论。这些附加的假设中有许多在直觉上似乎是合理的。然而，该项目将使用经验数据（涉及科学结果和科学实践）以及归纳方法来质疑这些假设。除其他事项外，我们将表明，所谓的“后果论证”，许多人认为最强有力的论据控制和决定论的不相容性，依赖于经验上没有根据的假设替代的可能性。