Unintended Consequences of Crisis Interventions for Financial Stability

我们的研究计划的目标是实证调查危机干预对金融稳定的意外后果。自2007年全球金融危机爆发以来，世界各国政府和央行实施了广泛的支持措施，试图稳定金融部门并确保实体部门的贷款。虽然短期金融稳定可能部分归因于这些干预措施，但我们对激励和预期的长期影响的理解仍然有限。通过这一建议，我们希望有助于我们理解危机干预对金融稳定的复杂影响。最近的欧洲金融和主权债务危机是进行这一调查的理想实验室。我们将建立一个新颖而全面的数据集，涵盖2007年至2013年期间欧洲各国政府和欧洲央行（ecb）的危机干预措施。将数据集与投资组合选择的微观层面数据相结合，使我们能够准确地追踪干预措施如何影响金融机构的决策。我们将解决以下研究问题：首先，软弱的欧洲政府是否会推迟对陷入困境的银行进行资本重组，从而通过允许事实上资不抵债的银行为复苏而赌博，从而给金融体系带来额外的风险？尽管自2007年金融危机爆发以来，几乎所有欧洲国家的政府都对本国银行业提供了支持，但各国干预的类型和范围却存在很大差异。我们使用贷款水平数据调查了这些干预措施对银行决策在贷款过程中的不同影响。其次，欧洲危机管理是否导致股东对未来系统重要性银行纾困可能性的看法发生重大变化？使用资产定价方法，我们希望量化相对于隐性政府担保产生的股权资本成本的融资优势。重要的是，我们希望了解实际干预、监管变化和银行业联盟的创建如何影响预期。第三，欧洲央行的宽松货币政策和危机干预是否导致了金融体系其他部分的风险转移行为？其中，长期的低利率显著降低了保险业的再投资回报。我们想调查这是如何影响保险公司的冒险动机的。因此，该项目首次尝试通过将讨论扩展到保险部门，为当前关于金融稳定和金融体系设计的辩论做出贡献。

The goal of our research proposal is to empirically investigate the unintended consequences of crisis interventions for financial stability. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2007, governments and central banks around the world have implemented a wide range of support measures in an attempt to both stabilize the financial sector and ensure real sector lending. While short-term financial stability may partly be attributed to these interventions, our understanding of the long-term impact on incentives and expectations is still limited. With this proposal, we want to contribute to our understanding of the complex implications of crisis interventions for financial stability. The recent European financial and sovereign debt crisis is an ideal laboratory for this investigation. We will build a novel and comprehensive dataset of crisis interventions by European governments and the European Central bank over the 2007 to 2013 period. Combining the dataset with micro-level data on portfolio choices allows us to accurately track down how intervention measures influence decision taking of financial institutions. We address the following research questions: First, did weak European governments delay recapitalizations for distressed banks and thereby create additional risks for the financial system by allowing de facto insolvent banks to gamble for resurrection? While almost all European governments supported their banking sectors from the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, type and scope of interventions varied considerably across countries. We investigate the differential impact of these interventions on bank decisions in the loan making process using loan-level data. Second, did the European crises management lead to significant changes in perceptions of shareholders regarding the likelihood of future bailouts for systemically important banks? Using an asset-pricing approach, we want to quantify funding advantages with respect to equity cost of capital arising from implicit government guarantees. Importantly, we want to understand how expectations were impacted by actual interventions, regulatory changes and the creation of the Banking Union.Third, did the accommodative monetary policy and crisis interventions of the ECB lead to risk-shifting behavior in other parts of the financial system? Among others, the prolonged period of low interest rates has significantly reduced reinvestment returns in the insurance sector. We want to investigate how this has affected risk-taking incentives of insurers. As such, this project is a first attempt to contribute the current debate on financial stability and the design of the financial system by extending the discussion to the insurance sector.