How does the social network affect the openness of farming villages in developing countries

本研究利用埃塞俄比亚农村地区的个人层面调查数据和独裁者博弈结果，考察了个人贸易政策偏好的决定因素。我们发现，低利他主义与保护主义立场。此外，以分配给本村人和村外人的资金之差来衡量的开放性表明，分配给村外人和村内人的资金之差较大（即对社交网络外的人怀有敌意）的人更有可能支持进口限制。然而，出口自由化并没有出现这种趋势。

This researh examines the determinants of individual trade policy preferences using individual-level survey data and results of the dictator game from rural Ethiopia. We find that low altruism are associated with protectionist stance. In addition, openness measured by the difference between money allocated to a person from the same village and a person outside the village shows that those whose difference between money allocated to outsiders and insiders is big (i.e. hostile to people outside the social network) are likely to support import restrictions. However, such tendency has not appeared for export liberalization.