Formal Causation in Aristotle and in Analytic Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science

因果关系是自然结构的一个基本特征，因此是当代形而上学和科学哲学研究的中心。然而，形式因果关系是亚里士多德区分的四种传统因果关系之一，目前研究不足，甚至已经声名狼藉。它名声不好的原因之一是，乍一看，它似乎预设了柏拉图的神秘世界不变的、永恒的和分离的形式，这与现代科学的经验主义和进化论立场相冲突。至少在一个朴素的版本中，它似乎无法处理异常，并且是解释性的空闲。这个项目是基于双重假设，即一个成熟的形式因果关系理论不仅能够经得起这些反对意见，而且如果没有这种各种各样的因果关系，微观物理和生物水平上的重要现象都将无法解释。当一件事物具有某种性质时，形式因果关系就会起作用，因为它属于某种类型。这些性质通常被称为基本性质。例如，鲸鱼有用肺呼吸的能力，因为它们是哺乳动物。在文献中，这些能力通常被视为事物的因果属性，通常被称为性格。在当代哲学中，有一种广泛而有影响力的趋势是根据这种倾向来研究因果关系，而为什么事物首先具有某些倾向而缺乏其他倾向的问题在很大程度上被忽视了。这个项目想要通过形式因果关系来解释这个问题。也就是说，它想要探索这样一种观点，即具有属性的物体可以通过类隶属关系来解释。因为鲸是哺乳动物，因此具有鲸的外形，所以它用肺呼吸空气，而不是用鳃在水中呼吸。这个项目的目的是测试是否可以恢复正式的因果关系。我们的假设是可以的。对此至关重要的是发展成熟的形式因果关系理论。为此，我们将首先重构亚里士多德的形式因果理论，特别考虑他的生物学著作。其次，我们将分析一个成熟的形式因果关系理论应该是什么样子，以便回答它的批评者。为此，我们将收集对形式因果关系的历史批评，检查其有效性，并在必要时对理论提出适当的修正，以避免反对意见。最后，我们表明成熟的理论填补了当代关于本质和必要性、依赖和基础、自然规律、倾向和功能的争论中的重要空白。最终，该项目将弥合亚里士多德学术与分析形而上学和科学哲学之间的差距。

Causation is a basic feature of the structure of nature and thus in the centre of much research in both contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science. Formal causation, however, which is one of the four traditional kinds of causation distinguished by Aristotle, is currently heavily under-researched and has even fallen into disrepute. One of the reasons for its bad reputation is that on first glance it seems to presuppose Plato's mystical world of unchanging, eternal and detached forms, which is in conflict with the empiricist and evolutionary stance of modern science. At least in a naive version, it seems to be incapable of handling exceptions, and to be explanatory idle. This project is based on the double hypothesis that a mature theory of formal causation is not only able to withstand these objections, but also that without this variety of causation, important phenomena on both the microphysical and the biological level would remain without an explanation. Formal causation is at play whenever a thing has a certain property because it is of a certain kind. Such properties are normally called essential properties. For instance, whales have the capability to breathe with lungs because they are mammals. In the literature, these capabilities are often seen as causal properties of things, and are often called dispositions. There is an extensive and influential trend in contemporary philosophy studying causation in terms of such dispositions, while the question of why things have some dispositions and lack others in the first place has largely been ignored. This project wants to account for this question by means of formal causation. That is, it wants to explore the view that an object having a property can be explained through kind membership. Because a whale is a mammal, and thus has the whale form, it breathes in air with lungs, rather than in water with gills. The goal of this project is to test whether formal causation can be rehabilitated. Our hypothesis is that it can. Crucial to this is the development of a mature theory of formal causation. For this purpose, we will first reconstruct Aristotle's theory of formal causation, taking special consideration of his biological works. Second, we will analyse how a mature theory of formal causation has to look like, in order to answer its critics. For this purpose, we will collect historical criticisms of formal causation, check their validity and, if necessary, suggest suitable amendments to the theory which avoid the objections. Finally, we show that the mature theory fills important gaps within contemporary debates about essence and necessity, dependence and grounding, laws of nature, dispositions, and functions. In outcome, the project shall bridge the gap between Aristotle scholarship and analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science.