Phenomenology of Activity – Basics, Irreducibility, Typology and Unity

虽然有些事情只是发生在我们身上，但有些事情是我们主动创造出来的。从这个意义上说，人类自我理解的一个重要部分似乎需要这样一种想法，即我们能够积极地干预世界的方式，以实现我们的目标和目的。通常，在这样做的时候，我们自己的行为是如此亲密地给予我们，以至于我们很少注意到它们，并倾向于将它们视为理所当然。然而，哲学上正在进行的讨论表明，活跃的本质一点也不明显。此外，当代心理哲学和行动理论的争论往往受到自然主义/唯物主义的还原和功能主义版本的影响，长期以来一直认为，可以在不参考主体的第一个人代理经验的情况下理解人类代理。与这一趋势相反，这个项目的目标是以体验性活动(换句话说，活动的现象学)为起点。除非认真考虑代理的现象维度，否则哲学行动理论有边缘化其最初活跃性质的风险。根据该项目的一个激励想法，以这种方式存在偏见的理论对如何评估人类自由和道德责任具有严重的、往往是有问题的影响。这就是为什么对经验活动进行彻底澄清和辩护的项目具有高度的哲学意义。因此，该项目的总体目标是探索活跃的经验，并详细介绍其哲学成果和影响。一个中心论点是，经验活动相当于一种不可还原的、多种多样的、无处不在的现象意识形式，它以各种有意的“在世存在”的方式表现自己。虽然该项目主要是系统性的，并希望对围绕“代理现象学”和“非激进主义”的高度专题研究作出贡献，但它也旨在通过借鉴被忽视的属于所谓的“早期现象学运动”(约1900-1927年)的作家提出的方法论工具和丰富的概念资源来丰富当代辩论。尽管已经存在对特定类型的现象活动的引人注目的描述，但仍然缺乏试图系统地对这些不同类型及其构成方面进行分类并探索它们之间的相互联系和关系的建议。这就是设想的项目将开始的地方。它将分三步进行：第一，关于活动现象学的方法论和概念性问题；第二，我将捍卫经验活动是真实的，不能还原为其他现象特征的观点；第三，对基本类型的活动进行分类和表征。最后，有人问，这些不同类型的代理之间是否存在(现象)统一。

While some things merely happen to us, some are brought actively into being by us. In this sense, an essential part of human self-understanding seems to entail the idea that we are capable to intervene actively in the way of the world in order to realize our goals and purposes. In doing so, typically, our own actions are so intimately given to us that we seldom pay attention to them and tend to take them for granted. However, ongoing discussions in philosophy show that the nature of being active is anything but obvious. Furthermore, contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and action theory, often influenced by reductive and functionalistic versions of naturalism/materialism, have assumed for a long time that human agency can be understood without reference to the subject’s first-personal agentive experience. In contrast to this trend, the goal of this project is to take experiential activity (or, in other words, the phenomenology of activity) as its starting point. Unless the phenomenal dimension of agency is taken seriously into account, philosophical theories of action run the risk of marginalizing its originally active nature. According to one of the motivating ideas of the project, theories that are biased in this way have serious and often problematic implications for how human freedom and moral responsibility are assessed. This is why the project of a thoroughgoing clarification and defence of experiential activity is of high philosophical importance. Thus, the project’s overall aim is to explore the experience of being active and to present in detail its philosophical fruitfulness and implications. One central thesis is that experiential activity amounts to an irreducible, multifarious and pervasive form of phenomenal consciousness manifesting itself in various ways of intentional “Being-in-the-World”. While the project is primarily systematic in nature and wants to contribute to highly topical research surrounding the “phenomenology of agency” and "enactivism", it also aims at enriching contemporary debates by drawing from the methodological tools and rich conceptual resources proposed by neglected writers belonging to the so-called “early phenomenological movement” (ca. 1900-1927). Although there do already exist notable accounts of particular types of phenomenal activity, what is still missing are proposals that try to systematically classify these various types and their constitutive aspects and to explore their interconnections and relations towards one another. This is where the envisaged project will start. It will proceed in three steps: first, methodological and conceptual issues regarding the phenomenology of activity are addressed; second, I will defend the idea that experiential activity is real and irreducible to other phenomenal traits; third, a classification and characterization of basic types of activity is developed. At the end, it is asked whether there is a (phenomenal) unity across these various types of agency.