Cartel Formation and Cartel Stability - Experiments on the Role of the Leniency Rule and with open Communication

卡特尔的形成和卡特尔的稳定性——宽大规则的作用和开放沟通的实验

• 批准号: 389447910
• 负责人: Professorin Dr. Lisa Bruttel
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2017-12-31 至 2021-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/389447910?language=en
• 关键词: Cartel; Formation; Stability; Experiments; Role

Cartel prosecution is an important part of the work of antitrust authorities all around the world, because cartels can severely harm social welfare. Recently, many antitrust authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures, because researchers cannot observe (the number of) functioning cartels. Therefore, experimental studies on the topic are needed. However, previous experimental studies have simplified the decision framework in many aspects so that it is hard to draw conclusions about the effects of the leniency rule on real cartels from their results.The main objective of the project is to analyze the effectiveness of leniency policies when the antitrust authority is included as an active player in the experiment. This is crucial with respect to the external validity of the results. Most importantly, the presence of an active antitrust authority allows communication to take place without necessarily resulting in cartel formation and allows for free text communication. Previous studies on the leniency rule did not distinguish explicit price agreements from communication about harmless topics and in case of a control, the decision to communicate was automatically interpreted as the formation of a cartel. However, real employees of real firms meet the employees of other firms anyway from time to time, for example in the context of trade fairs. Moreover, while according to the law firms cannot be prosecuted for talking about topics that are unrelated to market conduct or prices, even such communication may facilitate collusion by generating trust. Previous studies on the role of communication for cartel formation and stability did not consider the interaction with an antitrust authority or the introduction of a leniency rule. The project has three further objectives. First, we will analyze how cartel formation and stability is affected by an even more flexible approach to communication where subgroups of firms can also communicate if the group as a whole does not unanimously agree to communicate. Second, we will explicitly analyze cartel prosecution with active antitrust authorities when an identified ringleader is exempt from fine. Finally, we plan to test whether market conduct changes when, in contrast to current practice, the consumer surplus is actually paid to experimental participants in the role of consumers.

卡特尔的起诉是世界各国反垄断机构工作的重要组成部分，因为卡特尔会严重损害社会福利。最近，许多反托拉斯当局引入了宽大处理规则，以破坏现有卡特尔的稳定，并阻碍新卡特尔的形成。从经验上讲，很难判断这些措施的成功，因为研究人员无法观察到运作中的卡特尔（数量）。因此，需要对该主题进行实验研究。然而，以往的实验研究在很多方面简化了决策框架，因此很难从实验结果中得出宽恕规则对真实的卡特尔的效果。本课题的主要目的是分析在实验中加入反垄断机构的情况下，宽恕政策的有效性。这对结果的外部有效性至关重要。最重要的是，有一个活跃的反托拉斯机构，就可以进行沟通，而不一定导致卡特尔的形成，并可以进行自由的文本沟通。以前关于宽大处理规则的研究没有区分明确的价格协议和关于无害主题的沟通，在控制的情况下，沟通的决定被自动解释为卡特尔的形成。然而，真实的公司的真实的雇员总是不时地与其他公司的雇员见面，例如在交易会的情况下。此外，虽然律师事务所不能因谈论与市场行为或价格无关的话题而被起诉，但即使是这种沟通也可能通过产生信任而促进共谋。以前关于沟通对卡特尔形成和稳定的作用的研究没有考虑到与反托拉斯当局的互动或采用宽大处理规则。 该项目还有三个目标。首先，我们将分析卡特尔的形成和稳定性是如何受到更灵活的沟通方式的影响，如果集团作为一个整体不一致同意沟通，企业的子集团也可以沟通。其次，我们将明确分析卡特尔起诉与积极的反垄断当局时，确定的头目是免于罚款。最后，我们计划测试是否市场行为的变化时，与目前的做法相比，消费者剩余实际上是支付给实验参与者的消费者的角色。