Thought Experiments, Arguments, and the Role of Argumentation in Philosophy (TAR) – Renewal Project for a Sixth Year of the Emmy Noether Project "Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases – Theoretical Foundations, Responses, and Alternatives (EXTRA

这个项目是艾美奖诺特项目额外项目的续集。Extra的核心思想是针对实验哲学的挑战，研究假想案例或思维实验的方法。这种方法是哲学中最古老和最核心的方法之一，通常被理解为：对假设情况的直觉结论通常对哲学理论的构建具有决定性作用，这取决于这些理论与所讨论的直觉结论的适应程度。然而，近几十年来，案例方法受到了严厉的批评，以至于许多哲学家怀疑这种方法是否能够持续下去。这一潮流的一个关键运动是实验哲学，它是在21世纪初发起的，通过测试心理学实验中著名的哲学思维实验案例的直观结论而发起。这项工作表明，关于带有哲学上无关因素的假设案例，直觉的变化令人惊讶，比如陈述的顺序。由于这些发现很难与关于案件的直觉裁决的可信度相一致，一些哲学家认为，案件的方法应该受到限制，甚至应该放弃。因此，案例方法陷入了一场半哲学危机--尤其是因为它的理论基础被证明是有问题的不清楚的。因此，额外项目的一个主要动机是为案例方法提供理论基础，这也将有助于回答来自实验哲学的挑战。对关键的半哲学前提的实验研究，例如对哲学直觉专长的假设，是额外知识的另一个关键部分。Extra的一个重要见解是，关于假设案例的直觉假定的核心作用在很大程度上是一个神话。相反，哲学家们为他们对这类案例的判断辩解。这既促使人们从直觉判断转向思维实验的论证内容，也促使人们重新评估论证作为一种哲学方法的关键作用。因为，直觉在哲学中的重要性被夸大是一个相当新的趋势，但自柏拉图的对话以来，论证在哲学中的关键作用是司空见惯的。鉴于这段历史，令人惊讶的是，论证理论--与形式逻辑相反--在哲学上受到的关注要少得多。哲学的许多可察觉的问题--例如它缺乏进步或基础分歧持续存在--也与作为一种哲学方法的论证密切相关。因此，在更新项目TAR中，我们将把论证带到关于案例方法的辩论的中心舞台上，更广泛地讲，在元哲学中。正如在额外的项目中一样，我们计划通过将实验偏智学的工作与基础理论工作相结合来再次做到这一点。

This project is a sequel of the Emmy Noether project EXTRA. The core idea of EXTRA is to investigate the method of hypothetical cases – or thought experiments – in light of the challenge from experimental philosophy. This method, one of the oldest and most central of philosophy, is typically understood as follows: intuitive verdicts about hypothetical cases are often decisive for philosophical theory-construction, depending on how well those theories accommodate the intuitive verdicts in question. However, the method of cases has attracted severe criticism in recent decades, up to the point where many philosophers doubt that it can be sustained at all. A crucial movement for this turn of the tide is experimental philosophy, which was initiated in the early 2000s by testing intuitive verdicts about famous philosophical thought experiment cases in psychological experiments. This work suggests a surprising variation of intuitions about hypothetical cases with philosophically irrelevant factors, such as order of presentation. Since these findings are difficult to reconcile with the trustworthiness of intuitive verdicts about cases, some philosophers have argued that the method of cases should be restricted or even abandoned. As a result, the method of cases has slipped into a metaphilosophical crisis – not least because its theoretical foundations have turned out to be problematically unclear. One main motivation of the EXTRA project is thus to provide theoretical foundations for the method of cases, which would also help to answer the challenge from experimental philosophy. The experimental investigation of crucial metaphilosophical premises, such as the assumption of intuitive expertise in philosophy, is another key part of EXTRA. An important insight from EXTRA is that the presumed central role of intuitions about hypothetical cases is largely a myth. Rather, philosophers argue for their judgments about such cases. This motivates both a shift of metaphilosophical attention from intuitive judgments to the argumentative content of thought experiments, and a reassessment of the crucial role of argumentation as a philosophical method. For, the exaggerated importance of intuitions in philosophy is a fairly recent trend, but the key role of argumentation in philosophy is a commonplace since Plato’s dialogues. In light of this history, it is surprising that argumentation theory – in contrast to formal logic – has received much less philosophical attention. Many perceived problems with philosophy – such as its lack of progress or the persistence of foundational disagreements – are also intimately related to argumentation as a philosophical method. In the renewal project TAR, we will thus bring argumentation to the center of the stage in the debate about the method of cases and in metaphilosophy more generally. As in the EXTRA project, we plan to do this again by combining work in experimental metaphilosophy with foundational theoretical work.