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Aristotelian Constitutivism: an alternative account of practical normativity

亚里士多德构成主义：实践规范性的另一种解释

基本信息

批准号：
391136454
负责人：
Dr. Christian Kietzmann
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Philosophie
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2016-12-31 至 2022-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/391136454?language=en
关键词：
Aristotelian Constitutivism alternative account practical

项目摘要

Practical normativity, i.e. the phenomenon that we should or ought to do certain things and are at fault if we don't, is difficult to understand. It displays at least three properties that are difficult to reconcile with each other: Firstly, ought-judgements aspire to objective validity; secondly, they have motivational power; and thirdly, they are intelligible as ingredients of the natural world. The two most prominent positions concerning practical normativity in recent decades are Realism, which holds that practical normativity is grounded in irreducible normative facts, and various Subjectivisms, which take practical normativity to be grounded in subjective motivational attitudes. Both positions fail to reconcile these three properties. In recent years, Constitutivism has emerged as an alternative account of practical normativity that promises to do justice to all three properties. Constitutivists explain practical normativity through norms that are thought to be constitutive of the activity of acting for reasons. However, Constitutivism has mostly been developed in a broadly Kantian spirit, and in this form, it faces several problems of its own. Arguably, all of them have their roots in the fact that the Kantian approach, in describing the activity of practical reason, abstracts from the demands that comes from the specifically human life form. My project proposes an Aristotelian alternative to Kantian Constitutivism. Its core idea is that acting for reasons is essentially a life activity. The norms constitutive for acting are therefore norms of (specifically) human life. My Aristotelian Constitutivism differs from the various Neo-Aristotelianisms that have been proposed since it treats the norms of human life as the formal principles of human practical thinking (rather than as contents of practical thought). In my project, I will develop and defend a viable version of Aristotelian Constitutivism and show why this position is a highly promising contender for explaining the nature of practical normativity.

实践规范性，即我们应该或应该做某些事情，如果我们不这样做就是错误的现象，很难理解。它至少表现出三个难以相互调和的性质：第一，应当判断渴望客观有效性;第二，它们具有激励力量;第三，它们作为自然世界的成分是可理解的。近几十年来关于实践规范性的两个最突出的立场是现实主义和各种主体主义，现实主义认为实践规范性是基于不可还原的规范性事实，而主体主义认为实践规范性是基于主观动机态度。这两种立场都未能调和这三种性质。近年来，宪政主义已成为实践规范性的替代解释，承诺公正对待所有三个属性。宪政主义者通过被认为是理性行为的构成性规范来解释实践规范性。然而，宪法主义主要是在广泛的康德精神中发展起来的，在这种形式下，它面临着自己的几个问题。可以说，所有这些都有其根源，因为康德的方法在描述实践理性的活动时，从来自特定人类生活形式的需求中抽象出来。我的项目提出了一个康德立宪主义的替代品。它的核心思想是，理性行动本质上是一种生命活动。因此，构成行动的规范是（具体而言）人类生活的规范。我的亚里士多德式的宪法主义不同于已经提出的各种新亚里士多德主义，因为它把人类生活的规范看作是人类实践思维的形式原则（而不是实践思维的内容）。在我的项目中，我将发展和捍卫一个可行的版本的阿斯特丽德宪政主义，并表明为什么这个位置是一个非常有前途的竞争者解释的性质，实践规范性。