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Evidence and Objective Bayesian Epistemology

证据和客观贝叶斯认识论

基本信息

批准号：
405961989
负责人：
Dr. Jürgen Landes
金额：
--
依托单位：
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2017-12-31 至 2021-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/405961989?language=en
关键词：
Evidence Objective Bayesian Epistemology

项目摘要

Subjective Bayesian epistemology is currently widely perceived to be the paradigm of evidential reasoning in the philosophy of science and of rational degrees of belief underpinning the dominant account of decision making, as well as many of our statistical methods. Objective(!) Bayesian epistemology is emerging as an alternative epistemology challenging the subjective account. Objective Bayesians hold that rational degrees of belief are determined by the agent's evidence while subjective Bayesians claim that there is a range of rational degrees of belief given an agent's evidence. We urgently need to determine which Bayesian epistemology we should employ. This project aims to strengthen the case for the objective approach.Evidential reasoning in subjective Bayesian epistemology is based on two long-standing interconnected parts: it is grounded in expected utility maximisation which is implemented by updating beliefs via conditionalisation. It will be argued that these parts face so-far under-appreciated difficulties. Currently, evidential reasoning in objective Bayesian epistemology is lacking solid foundations for evidential reasoning to stand upon and is also lacking a framework for an implementation of evidential reasoning. Without these foundations and such an implementation objective Bayesian epistemology cannot aspire to stand up to the subjective approach.This project will hence develop foundations for evidential reasoning in objective Bayesian epistemology. Furthermore, the objective approach will be supplied with a comprehensive framework for evidential reasoning. It will be argued that the provided foundations and the developed implementation are superior to those of the subjective approach in key aspects and thus strengthen the case for the objective approach.This research will inform a core debate within formal epistemology, namely the question of whether the subjective or the objective approach better characterises the norms governing belief. The outcome of this debate is highly relevant to rational decision making in policy-making, science and daily life since the two approaches single out different actions as rational, in general. The outcome is furthermore relevant to statistics and artificial intelligence, where Bayesian principles are widely used and where there is little agreement as to whether subjective or objective Bayesian principles are best.

目前，主观贝叶斯认识论被广泛认为是科学哲学中证据推理的范式，也是支撑决策主导账户的理性信念程度的范式，也是我们许多统计方法的范式。目标(!)贝叶斯认识论作为挑战主观解释的另一种认识论正在兴起。客观贝叶斯学派认为，理性的信念程度是由行为人的证据决定的，而主观贝叶斯学派认为，给定行为人的证据，存在一定范围的理性信念程度。我们迫切需要确定我们应该采用哪种贝叶斯认识论。本项目旨在加强客观方法的案例。主观贝叶斯认识论中的证据推理基于两个长期相互关联的部分：它以预期效用最大化为基础，通过条件化更新信念来实现预期效用最大化。有人会说，这些部分面临着迄今未被充分认识到的困难。目前，客观贝叶斯认识论中的证据推理既缺乏坚实的证据推理基础，也缺乏实施证据推理的框架。没有这些基础和这样的实现，客观的贝叶斯认识论就无法与主观的方法相抗衡。因此，这个项目将在客观贝叶斯认识论中发展证据推理的基础。此外，客观方法将为证据推理提供一个全面的框架。有人认为，所提供的基础和已开发的实施在关键方面优于主观方法，从而加强了采用客观方法的理由。这项研究将为形式认识论中的核心辩论提供信息，即主观方法还是客观方法更好地表征控制信念的规范的问题。这场辩论的结果与政策制定、科学和日常生活中的理性决策高度相关，因为这两种方法一般都将不同的行为列为理性。结果进一步与统计学和人工智能相关，其中贝叶斯原理被广泛使用，并且关于主观贝叶斯原理还是客观贝叶斯原理是最好的几乎没有一致意见。