Ethics of Computer Games

电脑游戏的道德规范

• 批准号: 413050359
• 负责人: Dr. Sebastian Ostritsch
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Eugen-Biser-Stifungslehrstuhl für Religions- und Subjektphilosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2017-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/413050359?language=en
• 关键词: Ethics; Computer; Games

One of the main ethical questions about computer games that is being discussed within academic philosophy is the following: What – if anything – is ethically wrong about playing violent computer games? The usual approaches try to answer this question by applying one of the three classical theories of normative ethics. In the process, they are all faced with the basic problem of ludic amoralism. According to ludic amoralism, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation insofar as they are merely games that are defined by the act of stepping outside the boundaries of morally assessable reality.The usual approaches have been criticized because they have not been able to identify intrinsic moral problems with regard to computer games. Instead, these approaches are based on the assumption that the exposure to computer games has severe negative causal effects. However, it is questionable whether such effects really exist; and more generally, it is not a philosophical but an empirical task to establish whether such effects exist. What makes the question about the moral acceptability of computer games so compelling from a philosophical perspective is the widespread intuition that there is something intrinsically wrong about playing certain violent computer games, i.e. that there is something wrong about such an activity regardless of any putative negative effects.The goal of this project is to introduce and defend a new answer to the challenge of ludic amoralism. In the process, I will argue for two main changes to the current debate:1. A fundamental philosophical reflection on the meaning of "ethics" and "computer game(ing)" will show the need for some basic conceptual distinctions between multiple ethical as well as multiple ludic dimensions. Only with such conceptual distinctions can we have a precise understanding of the question what (if anything) is wrong about playing certain violent computer games.2. These conceptual distinctions make it possible to change the debate from the activity of playing computer games to computer games themselves, i.e. games as interactive symbol systems. This change of perspective allows to combat ludic amoralism with the “endorsement-view”. According to it, computer games (as complex symbol systems) can be rightly subject to moral evaluation insofar as they do not only contain representations of immorality but also endorse an immoral worldview.

关于电脑游戏的一个主要伦理问题是在学术哲学中讨论的：玩暴力电脑游戏在道德上是错误的吗？通常的方法试图通过应用规范伦理学的三个经典理论之一来回答这个问题。在此过程中，他们都面临着滑稽非道德主义的基本问题。根据滑稽的非道德主义，电脑游戏不受道德评价的影响，因为它们仅仅是一种游戏，通过超越道德可评估现实的界限来定义。通常的方法受到了批评，因为它们无法识别电脑游戏的内在道德问题。相反，这些方法是基于电脑游戏具有严重的负面因果效应的假设。然而，这种影响是否真的存在是值得怀疑的；更一般地说，确定这种效应是否存在不是一个哲学任务，而是一个经验任务。从哲学的角度来看，电脑游戏的道德可接受性问题之所以如此引人注目，是因为人们普遍认为，玩某些暴力电脑游戏在本质上是错误的，也就是说，不管这种活动是否会产生负面影响，它都是错误的。这个项目的目标是介绍和捍卫一个新的答案，以应对滑稽的非道德主义的挑战。在这个过程中，我将提出对当前辩论的两个主要变化：1。对“伦理”和“电脑游戏”的意义进行基本的哲学反思，将表明需要在多重伦理和多重趣味维度之间进行一些基本的概念区分。只有有了这种概念上的区别，我们才能准确地理解玩某些暴力电脑游戏有什么错（如果有的话）。这些概念上的区别使得讨论从玩电脑游戏的活动转向电脑游戏本身成为可能，也就是说，游戏是一种互动符号系统。这种观点的改变可以用“赞同观点”来对抗滑稽的非道德主义。据此，电脑游戏（作为复杂的符号系统）可以理所当然地受到道德评价的影响，因为它们不仅包含不道德的表现，而且还支持不道德的世界观。