Koordinationsausschüsse als parlamentarische Agendasetzer

协调委员会作为议会议程的制定者

• 批准号: 433598390
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Ulrich Sieberer
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Professur für Empirische Politikwissenschaft
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/433598390?language=en
• 关键词: Koordinationsaussch; sse; als; parlamentarische; Agendasetzer

The project analyzes coordination committees (CCs) in European parliaments as horizontal collective actors (HCAs). Examples of CCs include the Ältestenrat in the German Bundestag, the Präsidialkonferenz in the Austrian National Council, and the Backbench Business Committee in the UK House of Commons. These non-hierarchical committees typically comprise the president of parliament and additional members such as party group representatives and committee chairs. Their core task is setting the parliamentary agenda. Agenda setting is crucial for understanding legislatures because it shapes parliamentary processes and outputs, influences public debate and electoral competition, and affects the distribution of power between different actors in parliament. Nonetheless, we know very little about how and with what consequences CCs shape the legislative agenda and about why their role differs across parliaments. The project’s first module will map and explain variation in agenda setting regimes, especially in the design of CCs (composition, internal decision rules, and resources) across European parliaments. The second module will explore internal dynamics in selected CCs to assess whether the often highly consensual decisions of CCs can be explained based on their members’ individual preferences or reflect the emergence of an autonomous HCA in the terms of the Research Unit (RU) “Horizontal Collective Actors”. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and psychological group theory the project develops competing theoretical accounts of how CCs gain resources and whether and why they develop into autonomous actors. These accounts will be tested empirically based on original data collected from legal rules and official documents, a survey of committee staff, and qualitative interviews with committee members and staff. The project will contribute to ongoing debates on the institutional design of legislative agenda setting regimes. Within the RU, CCs constitute a hard case for finding autonomy because their members represent corporate actors (party groups) with often antagonistic preferences leaving, on first sight, little room for group-based behavior that deviates from an aggregation of members’ preferences. Finding autonomy under such conditions would provide strong evidence for the pervasiveness of the phenomenon whereas its absence helps define boundary conditions for the emergence of autonomous HCAs.

该项目将欧洲议会的协调委员会（cc）作为横向集体行动者（hca）进行分析。CCs的例子包括德国联邦议院（Bundestag）的Ältestenrat、奥地利国民议会（Austrian National Council）的Präsidialkonferenz以及英国下议院后座商业委员会（Backbench Business Committee）。这些非等级委员会通常由议会主席和其他成员组成，如党派代表和委员会主席。他们的核心任务是制定议会议程。议程设定对于了解立法机构至关重要，因为它影响议会进程和产出，影响公共辩论和选举竞争，并影响议会中不同行为者之间的权力分配。尽管如此，我们对CCs如何影响立法议程以及其后果知之甚少，也不知道它们在议会中的作用为何不同。该项目的第一个模块将绘制和解释议程设置制度的变化，特别是在欧洲议会的cc（组成，内部决策规则和资源）的设计中。第二个模块将探讨选定cc的内部动态，以评估cc通常高度一致的决定是否可以根据其成员的个人偏好来解释，或者反映研究单位（RU）“横向集体行动者”术语中自治HCA的出现。利用理性选择制度主义、社会学制度主义和心理群体理论，该项目发展了关于CCs如何获得资源以及它们是否以及为什么发展成为自主行为者的竞争性理论。这些说法将根据从法律规则和官方文件中收集的原始数据、对委员会工作人员的调查以及对委员会成员和工作人员的定性访谈进行实证检验。该项目将有助于正在进行的关于立法议程制定制度的体制设计的辩论。在俄罗斯内部，cc很难找到自主性，因为他们的成员代表着公司行为者（政党团体），他们的偏好往往是对立的，乍一看，他们几乎没有空间让基于群体的行为偏离成员偏好的集合。在这种情况下找到自主性将为这种现象的普遍性提供强有力的证据，而缺乏自主性则有助于确定自主hca出现的边界条件。