Optimal Policy Design with Entry: A Model of Aggregative Oligopoly Games

进入最优政策设计：聚合寡头博弈模型

• 批准号: DP160102948
• 负责人: Prof Nisvan Erkal
• 金额: $ 9.46万
• 依托单位: The University of Melbourne
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Projects
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2016-01-01 至 2020-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DP160102948
• 关键词: Optimal; Policy; Design; Entry; Model

This project aims to develop a theory of endogenous market structures using aggregative oligopoly games to engage issues in competition, trade and innovation policy. Effective and innovative policy design is crucial for economic growth and productivity. Policy analysis with endogenous market structures is in need of better tools. The toolkit of aggregative games, in which each player’s profit can be written as a function of own action and an aggregate variable, would greatly simplify the analysis of oligopoly interaction. This would lead to a tractable but general welfare analysis yielding new results. The framework is designed to allow us to examine complex policy questions in a simplified way, accommodating models with heterogeneous players and entry, and generalising models with different types of competition and demand specification.

这个项目旨在发展一种内生市场结构理论，利用聚合寡头垄断博弈来处理竞争、贸易和创新政策中的问题。有效和创新的政策设计对经济增长和生产力至关重要。内生市场结构的政策分析需要更好的工具。聚合博弈的工具包可以将每个参与者的利润写成自己行动的函数和聚合变量，这将极大地简化寡头垄断相互作用的分析。这将导致一项易于处理但普遍的福利分析产生新的结果。该框架旨在允许我们以简化的方式审查复杂的政策问题，容纳不同参与者和进入者的模型，并概括不同类型的竞争和需求规范的模型。