The interdisciplinary and philosophical justification of a philosophy of values

价值哲学的跨学科和哲学论证

• 批准号: 457895741
• 负责人: Dr. Moritz von Kalckreuth
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Max-Weber-Kolleg für Kultur- und sozialwissenschaftliche Studien
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: WBP Position
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2020-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/457895741?language=en
• 关键词: interdisciplinary; philosophical; justification; philosophy; values

The aim of this project is to investigate the question whether or not a philosophy of values may be defended as opposed to certain philosophical and interdisciplinary critiques. In an initial step, various concepts of value, such as they are employed within the discourses of specific sciences, will be reconstructed systematically in order to assess not only their claims to a philosophy of values, but also points of criticism that might be raised against them. In a second step, a number of objections that have been brought forward by different philosophical traditions against theories of value are to be analysed. While some views are critical of the idea that our actions and decisions might ever be reasonably justified on the basis of non-conceptual experiences of values, because these are barely susceptible to a rational discourse, others worry at the ontological commitments of a philosophy of value, ascribing some sort of ‘Platonism’ or ‘Idealism’ to it. Thirdly, the project will elaborate its own philosophical view on values against the background of certain fundamental insights and distinctions introduced by Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, respectively. The final step will consist in an inquiry into the question whether this philosophy of value, such as it is exposed in this project, can be defended against the above-mentioned philosophical objections and if it would be able to account for relevant scientific concepts of value.

这个项目的目的是调查的问题是否可以捍卫价值观的哲学，而不是某些哲学和跨学科的批评。在第一步中，将系统地重新构建各种价值概念，例如在特定科学的论述中使用的价值概念，以便不仅评估它们对价值哲学的主张，而且评估可能对它们提出的批评意见。第二步，分析不同哲学传统对价值理论提出的一些反对意见。虽然有些观点批评我们的行动和决定可能会在价值的非概念经验的基础上得到合理的证明，因为这些经验几乎不受理性话语的影响，但其他人担心价值哲学的本体论承诺，将某种“柏拉图主义”或“唯心主义”归因于它。该项目将阐述自己的哲学观点的价值观的背景下，一些基本的见解和区别介绍了舍勒和哈特曼，分别。最后一步将是探讨这样一个问题：这种价值哲学，如在本项目中所揭示的价值哲学，是否能够抵御上述哲学上的反对意见，以及它是否能够解释有关的科学价值概念。