The interdisciplinary and philosophical justification of a philosophy of values

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The aim of this project is to investigate the question whether or not a philosophy of values may be defended as opposed to certain philosophical and interdisciplinary critiques. In an initial step, various concepts of value, such as they are employed within the discourses of specific sciences, will be reconstructed systematically in order to assess not only their claims to a philosophy of values, but also points of criticism that might be raised against them. In a second step, a number of objections that have been brought forward by different philosophical traditions against theories of value are to be analysed. While some views are critical of the idea that our actions and decisions might ever be reasonably justified on the basis of non-conceptual experiences of values, because these are barely susceptible to a rational discourse, others worry at the ontological commitments of a philosophy of value, ascribing some sort of ‘Platonism’ or ‘Idealism’ to it. Thirdly, the project will elaborate its own philosophical view on values against the background of certain fundamental insights and distinctions introduced by Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, respectively. The final step will consist in an inquiry into the question whether this philosophy of value, such as it is exposed in this project, can be defended against the above-mentioned philosophical objections and if it would be able to account for relevant scientific concepts of value.