Global Warming and Intergenerational Equity : An Axiomatic Approach

有一种功利主义的传统，即平等对待平等的世代。戴蒙德指出，在满足强帕累托原则、西季威克公平原则和连续性公理的无限效用流上，不存在社会评价排序。我们引入了两个版本的平均主义的精神的庇古-Dalbon转移原则和洛伦兹统治原则，并检查其兼容性的弱帕累托原则的存在下，弱连续性公理。社会评价关系被假定既不完全也不完全传递，然而戴蒙德的不可能性又重新出现了。我们在萨缪尔森（1958）提出的代际重叠经济中引入了几个不同的公平概念，即无嫉妒。重叠消费中的无嫉妒要求，在每个时间段，没有人更喜欢生活在同一时期的任何其他人的捆绑。终身消费中的无嫉妒说，任何人都不应该喜欢任何其他人的终身消费计划。终身收益率的公平性要求终身收益率（卡斯和雅里，1966）对所有人都是平等的。对于这三个概念中的每一个，我们都描述了满足它的分配，并阐明了这些条件之间的逻辑关系。我们还研究了存在一个固定的分配，达到最大效用下，终身消费的无嫉妒。

There exists a utilitarian tradition a la Sidgwick of treating equal generations equally. Diamond showed that no social evaluation ordering over infinite utility streams satisfying the strong Pareto principle, Sidgwick's equity principle, and the axiom of continuity exists. We introduce two versions of egalitarianism in the spirit of the Pigou-Dalbon transfer principle and the Lorenz domination principle, and examine their compatibility with the weak Pareto principle in the presence of the weak continuity axiom. The social evaluation relation is assumed neither complete nor fully transitive, yet Diamond's impossibility strenuously resurfaces.We introduce several distinct notions of equity as no-envy into the overlapping generations economy formulated by Samuelson (1958). No-Envy in Overlapping Consumption requires that for each time period, no person prefer the bundle of any other person who lives in the same period. No-Envy in Lifetime Consumption states that no person should prefer the lifetime consumption plan of any other person. Equity in Lifetime Rate of Return requires that the lifetime rate of return (Cass and Yaari, 1966) be equal for all persons. For each of the three notions, we characterize allocations satisfying it, and clarify logical relation among these conditions. We also examine existence of a stationary allocation that attains maximal utility under No-Envy in Lifetime Consumption.