The choice of accounting and management alternatives for corporate disclosure

我调查了现有的实证研究和理论模型，以解决自由裁量权的企业会计披露。此外，本文还建立了便于分析的数据库，并利用该数据库对企业养老金会计中的自由裁量权进行了检验。在实证研究的综述中，我总结了管理者管理报告盈余的动机，并指出了一些重要的权责发生制模型估计可自由支配应计利润的实证问题。我考察了它们的优点和缺点来衡量应计项目的可自由支配部分。总之，我坚持认为，为了解决低功率的模型来测试的存在的自由裁量会计决策，重要的是应用几个模型，以增加测试结果的精度。特别是，我们必须使用一些其他模型，而不是Jones[1991]的模型。接下来，我建立了一个数据库来分析公司信息披露中的自由裁量权。该数据库包括一些与盈余管理动机有关的项目。通过对数据库的分析，分析了日本一些商业期刊所批评的管理者操纵养老金义务的动机。本文在“养老金折现率与股价选择的自由裁量权”一文中对研究结果进行了总结，分析了养老金会计自由裁量权、管理者动机与股价之间的关系。主要研究结果如下：(1)基金经理对基金贴现率的选择受未备基金相对水平、企业盈利能力和企业规模的影响；(2)基金经理对养老金义务的可选部分贴现率的估计与股价的相关性；(3)基金经理对未备基金和杠杆率较高的基金经理对股价的相关性高于基金经理对未备基金和贴现率较低的基金经理。在未来，我们应该分析的结果是否是由于固定与否。最后，在代理理论的框架下，考察了几种解释管理层会计自由裁量权的分析模型。本着Arya、Glover和Sunder[1998]的精神，我对最近的分析模型进行了分类，并对它们进行了识别。少

I surveyed extant empirical researches and theoretical models that addressed discretion in corporate accounting disclosure. In addition, I made the database which was useful to analyze it and by using this I tested discretion in corporate pension accounting.In the survey of empirical researches, I summarized managers' motives of managing reported earnings and pointed out empirical issues relating to some important accrual models estimating discretionary accruals. And I examined their merits and demerits to measure the discretionary parts of accruals. In conclusion I insisted that to address the low power of the models to test the existence of discretionary accounting decision, it is important to apply several models to increase the precision of the result of the test. Especially, We have to use some other models than Jones[1991] based models.Next I made a database to analyze discretion in corporate disclosure. The database includes some items relate to earnings management motives. By u … More sing the database, I analyzed managers' motives of manipulating the pension obligation some business journals criticized in Japan. The results are summarized in the paper "Discretion in the choice of pension discount rate and stock price", which analyzed the relations among discretion in pension accounting, managers' motives and stock prices. The main findings were as follows : (1)relative level of unfunded pension obligation, firm profitability and firm scale influenced the choice of the discount rate by managers, (2)discretionary part of the pension obligation estimated through estimated discretionary part of the discount rate correlated to the stock price, (3)the sample that had high unfunded pension obligation and high leverage are related to low stock price compared to other samples with low unfunded pension obligation and low discount rate. In the future, we should analyze whether the results is due to the fixation or not.Finally, I surveyed several analytical models that explain accounting discretion by management in a framework of agency theory. In the spirits of Arya, Glover and Sunder[1998], I categorized recent analytical models and recognized them. Less