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Crisis of Free Trade Regime and New Trade Rule

自由贸易体制危机与新贸易规则

基本信息

批准号：
03044091
负责人：
ONO Yoshiyasu
金额：
$ 2.24万
依托单位：
The Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University.
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for international Scientific Research
财政年份：
1991
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1991 至 1992
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-03044091/
关键词：
Oligopoly Voluntary Export Restraint GATT Rule Foreign Asset Position Welfare Dynamic Trade Model International Spill-Over Effect GATTル-ル

项目摘要

This project consists of three parts : 1. International Trade in an Oligopolistic Open Economy (with S. Lahiri), 2. International Strategic Policy Interdependence in the Context of the GATT Regime (with J. Eaton), and 3. International Spill-Over Effects of Various Policies in a Dynamic Optimization Framework (with S. Ikeda, A. Shibata, etc.).1. A two-country model with one competitive and one Cournot-oligopolistic sector is examined. If free entry is allowed in the oligopoly sector, both factor price equalization and the standard result on comparative advantage hold. Furthermore, in addition to the standard gains from trade, opening trade benefits a country through a reduction in the degree of monopoly. Next, using an oligopoly model with endogenous R&D investment and a marginal-cost differential between oligopolists, the effect of eliminating a firm on the world welfare is examined. Surprisingly, monopoly results in a higher world welfare than Cournot duopoly.2. The threat of the exporting country's retaliation approved by GATT makes it advantageous for both the exporting and importing countries to establish an OMA. By designing an OMA under which its deadweight loss is appropriately distributed to them, they avoid the retaliation approved by GATT which causes an additional deadweight loss.3. By applying dynamic optimization behavior to a two-country economy, the effects of various policies (e.g. fiscal spending, an asset-holding tax, a corporate tax, etc.) and supply-side shocks on the paths of consumption, foreign asset position and each country's welfare are explored. The welfare effect consists of the intratemporal terms-of trade (the relative price) effect and the intertemporal terms-of-trade (the interest rate) effect. Thus, even if a country's policy promotes import and improves a foreign country's terms of trade, the foreign country may be worse off depending on its foreign asset position.

该项目由三个部分组成：1. 寡头开放经济中的国际贸易（与 S. Lahiri 合作），2. GATT 制度背景下的国际战略政策相互依存（与 J. Eaton 合作），3. 动态优化框架中各种政策的国际溢出效应（与 S. Ikeda、A. Shibata 等合作）。 1．研究了具有一个竞争性部门和一个古诺寡头垄断部门的两国模型。如果允许自由进入寡头垄断部门，要素价格均等化和比较优势的标准结果都成立。此外，除了贸易带来的标准收益外，开放贸易还可以通过减少垄断程度使国家受益。接下来，使用具有内生研发投资和寡头之间边际成本差异的寡头垄断模型，研究消除一家公司对世界福利的影响。令人惊讶的是，垄断比古诺双寡头垄断带来了更高的世界福利。2． GATT批准的出口国报复威胁使得建立OMA对出口国和进口国都有利。通过设计一个OMA，将其无谓损失适当地分配给他们，他们可以避免GATT批准的报复，从而导致额外的无谓损失。3。通过将动态优化行为应用于两国经济，探讨了各种政策（例如财政支出、资产持有税、公司税等）和供给侧冲击对消费、外国资产头寸和各国福利路径的影响。福利效应包括跨期贸易条件（相对价格）效应和跨期贸易条件（利率）效应。因此，即使一国的政策促进进口并改善外国的贸易条件，根据其外国资产状况，外国的情况也可能会变得更糟。