Some reflections upon the regulation of broker's investment recommendation from the perspective of cognitive limitations of investors.

泡沫破裂后，我们遇到了许多客户投诉经纪人的案例，他们认为经纪人的不当投资推荐导致了灾难。解决这些纠纷的法院必须判定经纪人是否隐瞒了有关风险的信息，或者客户是否知道风险，只是做出了错误的决定。投资者将这种信任寄托在经纪人身上的合理程度是关键。在推荐一项投资时，经纪人必须在推销的同时，根据经纪人对客户需求和目标的了解，披露那些重要的风险因素。通过一项标准，要求经纪商披露与所推荐投资的适宜性和稳健性有关的所有重大风险因素，以吸引有能力的投资者的注意，从而最大限度地保护客户。我从投资者认知局限性的角度给出了这些问题的答案。我强烈反对新古典主义的说法，即证券监管长期以来主要是基于理性行为者的简化假设。

After the burst of bubble we have confronted a lot of cases in which customers complain of brokers arguing that their abusive recommendations of investments caused disasters. Courts resolving these disputes must then decide whether the broker withheld information about the risk, or whether the customer knew about the risk and simply made a bad decision. The extent to which it is reasonable for the investor to repose this trust in a broker is the crux. When recommending an investment, the broker must balance the sales pitch with disclosure of those risk factors that are material in light of what the broker understands about the customer's needs and objectives. Customer protection will be maximized by a standard requiring a broker to disclose all significant risk factors going to the suitability and soundness of the recommended investment in a way that captures the attention of the competent investors. J offer the answers to those problems from the perspective of cognitive limitations of investors. I strongly argue against the neo-classical statement that securities regulation have long worked largely from the simplifying assumption of the rational actor.