权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Stabilizing the International Monetary System after Hegemony

霸权后稳定国际货币体系

基本信息

批准号：
08630061
负责人：
ISHIGURO Kaoru
金额：
$ 1.34万
依托单位：
KOBE UNIVERSITY (1998)Ritsumeikan University (1996-1997)
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1996
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1996 至 1998
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-08630061/
关键词：
international currency monetary power hegemonic system

项目摘要

We have two purposes in this paper. One of them is to construct a model of international currency under hegemonic system and consider credibility of hegemon's monetary policy. Regarding this purpose we have three results. First, the credibility of hegemon's foreign monetary policy depends on policy targets' discrepancy of an exchange rate between outward and inward-looking hegemons, hegemon's policy preference and biased depreciation of international currency. Second, if policy targets' discrepancy of an exchange rate between outward and inward-looking hegemons is enough large like ages of hegemonic establishment, the announced foreign monetary policy by the hegemon will be credible. The hegemon commits a foreign monetary policy and non-hegemons believe it to anticipate an exchange rate. Third, if policy targets' discrepancy of an exchange rate between them is enough small like hegemonic building and unsettled ages, the announced foreign monetary policy by the hegemon will not be credible.The other purpose is to analyze how fluctuations of an international currency are affected by a hegemon's policy management. We have three results. First, any type of hegemon, including both inward and outward-looking ones, first guides an international currency higher than its true preference, and later let it fall based on its true preference. Second, by disclosing the hegemon's private information about its own preference, while the outward-looking hegemon has its expected payoff increased, the inward-looking hegemon has it decreased. Third, while the outward-looking hegemon has an incentive to promote international cooperation involving disclosure of private information about its own preference, the inward-looking hegemon does not.

本文的研究目的有二。其一是构建霸权体系下的国际货币模型，考察霸权货币政策的可信度。关于这个目的，我们有三个结果。首先，霸权国家对外货币政策的可信度取决于外向型和内向型霸权国家的汇率目标差异、霸权国家的政策偏好以及国际货币的有偏贬值。第二，如果外向型和内向型霸权之间的汇率政策目标差异足够大，如霸权建立时期那样，那么霸权宣布的对外货币政策将是可信的。霸权国家实施了一项外国货币政策，而非霸权国家则认为这是为了预测汇率。第三，如果政策目标之间的汇率差异足够小，如霸权建设和不稳定的时代，霸权宣布的对外货币政策将是不可信的。另一个目的是分析国际货币波动如何受到霸权的政策管理。我们有三个结果。首先，任何类型的霸权，包括内向型和外向型霸权，首先引导国际货币高于其真实偏好，然后根据其真实偏好让其下跌。第二，通过披露霸权者关于自身偏好的私人信息，外向型霸权者的预期收益增加，内向型霸权者的预期收益减少。第三，外向型霸权有动机促进国际合作，包括披露有关其自身偏好的私人信息，而内向型霸权则没有。