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Two Level Game Analysis of International Trade Negotiation and Domestic Politics

国际贸易谈判与国内政治的二级博弈分析

基本信息

批准号：
13630055
负责人：
ISHIGURO Kaoru
金额：
$ 1.41万
依托单位：
Kobe University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2001
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2001 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-13630055/
关键词：
international trade negotiation domestic politics two level game sanction political pressure policy preference 自由貿易協定通商交渉 2レベルゲーム

项目摘要

This research examined interdependence of international trade negotiations (an international level) and domestic politics (a domestic level) by two level game theory. It clarified in particular what kind of influence domestic politics gave to international trade negotiations.This research clarified the following points about political pressure and trade negotiations results. First, when policy preference of a government is similar to its own congress's one, political pressure for the government of objection group of trade liberalization raises a trade barrier of the own country and raises a foreign trade barrier. Second, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one moderately, negotiations results are determined by the government's preference and political pressure to the congress does not influence negotiations results. Third, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's enough, negotiations results are determined by the co … More ngress's preference and political pressure to the government does not influence negotiations results.This research clarified the following points about a threat of sanctions by the foreign government and results of trade negotiations. Effects of a threat of sanctions by the foreign government are dependent on estrangement degree of policy preference for trade liberalization between the government and domestic members (congress). First, when policy preference of the government is similar to its own domestic member's one, sanctions by the foreign government decrease the trade barrier of the own country and raise the foreign one. Second, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one moderately, sanctions by the foreign government do not influence negotiations results. Third, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one enough, sanctions by the foreign government decrease the trade barrier of the own country, but do not have an influence on the foreign one. Less

本研究运用两层博弈理论考察了国际贸易谈判(国际层面)与国内政治(国内层面)之间的相互依存关系。特别是明确了国内政治对国际贸易谈判的影响。本研究澄清了关于政治压力和贸易谈判结果的以下几点。首先，当一国政府的政策取向与其本国国会的政策取向相似时，反对贸易自由化的团体对政府施加的政治压力会增加本国的贸易壁垒，并增加外贸壁垒。第二，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好适度不同时，谈判结果由政府的偏好决定，对国会的政治压力不会影响谈判结果。第三，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好足够不同时，谈判结果由co…决定更多的对政府的偏好和政治压力并不影响谈判的结果。本研究澄清了以下几点：外国政府的制裁威胁和贸易谈判的结果。外国政府威胁制裁的效果取决于政府和国内议员(国会)之间对贸易自由化的政策偏好的疏远程度。首先，当一国政府的政策偏好与其国内成员的政策偏好相似时，外国政府的制裁降低了本国的贸易壁垒，提高了外国的贸易壁垒。第二，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好适度不同时，外国政府的制裁不会影响谈判结果。第三，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好相差较大时，外国政府的制裁会降低本国的贸易壁垒，但不会对外国的贸易壁垒产生影响。较少