Two Level Game Analysis of International Trade Negotiation and Domestic Politics

本研究运用两级博弈理论考察了国际贸易谈判（国际层面）与国内政治（国内层面）的相互依存关系。它特别阐明了国内政治对国际贸易谈判的影响。本研究阐明了政治压力与贸易谈判结果之间的关系。首先，当一国政府的政策偏好与本国国会的政策偏好相似时，对贸易自由化反对集团的政府施加的政治压力会造成本国的贸易壁垒，也会造成对外贸易壁垒。第二，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好存在适度差异时，谈判结果由政府的政策偏好决定，国会的政治压力不影响谈判结果。第三，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好相差足够大时，谈判结果是由国会决定的，国会的偏好和对政府的政治压力对谈判结果没有影响。这项研究澄清了以下几点关于外国政府制裁的威胁和贸易谈判的结果。外国政府制裁威胁的效果取决于政府与国内议员（国会）对贸易自由化政策偏好的疏离程度。首先，当一国政府的政策偏好与其本国成员的政策偏好相似时，外国政府的制裁降低了本国的贸易壁垒，提高了外国的贸易壁垒。第二，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好存在适度差异时，外国政府的制裁不会影响谈判结果。第三，当政府的政策偏好与国会的政策偏好相差足够大时，外国政府的制裁降低了本国的贸易壁垒，但对外国的贸易壁垒没有影响。少

This research examined interdependence of international trade negotiations (an international level) and domestic politics (a domestic level) by two level game theory. It clarified in particular what kind of influence domestic politics gave to international trade negotiations.This research clarified the following points about political pressure and trade negotiations results. First, when policy preference of a government is similar to its own congress's one, political pressure for the government of objection group of trade liberalization raises a trade barrier of the own country and raises a foreign trade barrier. Second, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one moderately, negotiations results are determined by the government's preference and political pressure to the congress does not influence negotiations results. Third, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's enough, negotiations results are determined by the co … More ngress's preference and political pressure to the government does not influence negotiations results.This research clarified the following points about a threat of sanctions by the foreign government and results of trade negotiations. Effects of a threat of sanctions by the foreign government are dependent on estrangement degree of policy preference for trade liberalization between the government and domestic members (congress). First, when policy preference of the government is similar to its own domestic member's one, sanctions by the foreign government decrease the trade barrier of the own country and raise the foreign one. Second, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one moderately, sanctions by the foreign government do not influence negotiations results. Third, when policy preference of the government is different from the congress's one enough, sanctions by the foreign government decrease the trade barrier of the own country, but do not have an influence on the foreign one. Less