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Sunthetic research about the varous problems in company law which takes place when the person who is not a director in law is engaged in the company management

非董事人员参与公司经营管理中出现的各种公司法问题的综合研究

基本信息

批准号：
11620048
负责人：
KITAMURA Masashi
金额：
$ 2.05万
依托单位：
Osaka City University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1999
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1999 至 2002
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Various problems were analyzed by this research which took place when the person who is not a director in law is involved in the company management. Specially, the problems of de facto manager's responsibility to company creditor and the competition done by de facto manager are discussed. As for the former, it is important that de facto manager does the order for command to the management, from the analysis of the precedent. As for the latter, it is important that de facto manager dealt in it by himself.The legislation to treat de facto director according to the director in law was held in England and South Korea. The shadow director system which developed in case law was taken in the statute in England. In South Korea a rapid company law revision was done when the currency crisis occurred at the end of 20th century. Such legislation in England and South Korea is important for the de facto director's responsibility to company creditor.De facto manager is usually a controlling shareholder. Fiduciary duty theory of the controlling shareholder developed in U.S. It is handled about the distribution of a corporate opportunity between the controlling shareholder and the company especially in detail by this research. It became clear that acquiring an corporate opportunity is prohibited in the controlling shareholder as well.A director's function changed by the amendment of the Commercial Code in 2002. Another analysis will be necessary about the de facto executive officer and de facto director in the future.

本研究分析了非法定董事参与公司管理时出现的各种问题。特别讨论了实际管理人对公司债权人的责任和实际管理人的竞争问题。对于前者，从判例分析来看，重要的是实际管理者对管理者下达命令。对于后者，重要的是实际管理人自行处理。英国和韩国都曾立法按照法定董事的规定对待实际管理人。案例法中发展起来的影子董事制度被纳入英国的法规中。韩国在20世纪末发生货币危机时迅速修改了公司法。英国和韩国的此类立法对于事实上的董事对公司债权人的责任很重要。事实上的经理通常是控股股东。美国发展起来的控股股东信托义务理论，本研究特别详细地论述了控股股东与公司之间的公司机会分配问题。明确了控股股东也禁止收购公司机会。2002年商法的修改改变了董事的职能。未来对于事实上的执行官和事实上的董事有必要进行另外的分析。