A COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON LOCKE'S AND BERKELEY'S LOGICAL SPACES OF IDEAS

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We ordinarily treat various experiential objects from the direct realist point of view But concerning the experiential objects and our perception of them some 'physical' suspicions begin to form in our minds. And in Locke's case, as a way of, solving these problems, the things themselves are hypothetically posited, which merely have primary qualities and powers based on them. The moment things themselves are posited, the reality of things is transferred from experiential objects to the things themselves, and it becomes inappropriate, strictly speaking, to continue calling experiential objects 'things'. Therefore, in order to make the argument precise,, one needs a different name for experiential objects and their properties. For this purpose Locke uses the term 'idea'. Thus, when things themselves are posited beyond them, the experiential objects and their properties, which are originally external beings, are, along with other internal beings, relocated in the mind, namely, in the world of ideas. Thus, the three-term-relational, naturalistic framework of Locke's theory of ideas, comprised of things themselves, ideas and the mind, is framed.While Berkeley's idealism is dependent on the naturalistic logic of Locke's theory of ideas, it can be established by 'distortion', in the double sense of the word. First, his idealism rejects its premise as a result; in this sense it is contradictory. Second, Berkeley improperly, emphasizes that Lockian materialism is a contradiction, by making inappropriate use of imagist thinking, which is in harmony with conceptual thinking in Locke's theory of ideas. Thus, in order to determine the logic of Berkeley's idealism adequately, it appears necessary to reconsider those basic problems.