A COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON LOCKE'S AND BERKELEY'S LOGICAL SPACES OF IDEAS

我们通常从直接的现实主义的角度来看待各种经验对象，但关于经验对象和我们对它们的感知，我们开始在头脑中形成一些‘物理’的怀疑。在洛克的案例中，作为解决这些问题的一种方式，事物本身是假设的，只是基于它们的基本性质和力量。当事物本身被设定时，事物的实在性就从经验对象转移到事物本身，严格地说，继续把经验对象称为“事物”是不合适的。因此，为了使论证准确，人们需要为经验对象及其性质取一个不同的名称。为此，骆家辉使用了“想法”一词。因此，当事物本身被放置在它们之外时，最初是外部存在的经验对象及其性质，与其他内部存在一起，重新定位在头脑中，即在思想的世界中。因此，洛克思想理论的三项关系的自然主义框架被框定，包括事物本身、思想和心灵。伯克利的理想主义依赖于洛克思想理论的自然主义逻辑，但它可以通过词的双重意义上的扭曲来建立。首先，他的唯心主义因此否定了它的前提；在这个意义上，它是矛盾的。第二，伯克利不恰当地强调洛基唯物主义是一种矛盾，不恰当地使用了形象主义思维，这与洛克思想理论中的概念思维是一致的。因此，为了充分确定伯克利理想主义的逻辑，似乎有必要重新考虑这些基本问题。

We ordinarily treat various experiential objects from the direct realist point of view But concerning the experiential objects and our perception of them some 'physical' suspicions begin to form in our minds. And in Locke's case, as a way of, solving these problems, the things themselves are hypothetically posited, which merely have primary qualities and powers based on them. The moment things themselves are posited, the reality of things is transferred from experiential objects to the things themselves, and it becomes inappropriate, strictly speaking, to continue calling experiential objects 'things'. Therefore, in order to make the argument precise,, one needs a different name for experiential objects and their properties. For this purpose Locke uses the term 'idea'. Thus, when things themselves are posited beyond them, the experiential objects and their properties, which are originally external beings, are, along with other internal beings, relocated in the mind, namely, in the world of ideas. Thus, the three-term-relational, naturalistic framework of Locke's theory of ideas, comprised of things themselves, ideas and the mind, is framed.While Berkeley's idealism is dependent on the naturalistic logic of Locke's theory of ideas, it can be established by 'distortion', in the double sense of the word. First, his idealism rejects its premise as a result; in this sense it is contradictory. Second, Berkeley improperly, emphasizes that Lockian materialism is a contradiction, by making inappropriate use of imagist thinking, which is in harmony with conceptual thinking in Locke's theory of ideas. Thus, in order to determine the logic of Berkeley's idealism adequately, it appears necessary to reconsider those basic problems.